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ABSTRACT
The collapse of East European communism and the subsequent 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, challenged the 
status quo in Europe. Ideas of a "New World" order, and of a "New 
European Architecture" proliferated.
Immediate calls from the new States of Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
as well as the Soviet successor States were for the CSCE, (The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) to be the 
foundation structure on which to build a new pan-European 
security community.
The purpose of this thesis is chart the origins and evolution of 
the CSCE, and its contemporary role in the undivided Europe. 
Chapter One initially looks at the post war condition in Europe 
and then the steps leading to the agreement to hold multilateral 
preparatory talks, which would seek to reduce tensions and 
enhance security in Europe. Chapter Two addresses the subsequent 
talks which ran for almost two years, from August 1973 until the 
Helsinki Final Act was signed in August 1975. Chapter Three 
charts the Follow Up Mechanism of the Conference, this was the 
means by which the process was to survive to play its extended 
role in contemporary Europe. Chapters Four and Five address the 
Paris Meeting of Heads of State. and Governments in November 1990, 
and the Helsinki Follow Up Meeting of 1992. Dealing with post 
Berlin Wall issues, including the formal ending of the Cold War, 
and setting in place the means to revitalize and institutionalize 
the CSCE. Chapter Six deals with the Third Council of Ministers 
Meeting of the CSCE at Stockholm, outlining how this newly creat­
ed decision making body of the CSCE moves forward the decision 
making process. The final chapter, addresses the contemporary 
role of CSCE, its place vis-^-vis other European security 
organizations, and the position of CSCE in the immediate future.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CSCE
In order to know what Is going to happen,
one must know what has happened
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI.x
To understand the development of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe the CSCE process,2 it will be necessary at 
the outset to make a resume of the post-war condition in Europe 
that led to the original Soviet proposals for a European Security 
Conference and the subsequent development of CSCE. Although this 
will be a historical resume, it will not necessarily be rigorous­
ly chronological.
The unconditional surrender of Germany and the ending of the 
Second World War brought Europe once again to a crossroads. In 
May 1945 agreements which had previously been reached regarding 
the Allied occupation of Germany and the zoning of Berlin came
’cited in Garthoff R. Detente and Confrontation Washington, 
Brookings 1985.
^Soviet strategy defined security primarily as a process. In 
the Soviet view ’’security should not be regarded as an abstract 
and static thing, but as a dynamic and evolutionary process and a 
function of the existing and developing internal and external 
ties."cited in Dobrosielski M,"Peaceful Coexistence and European 
Security" International Affairs June 1972:Vol.6.p35
Legvold points out that there is obvious good sense in recogniz­
ing that security, being a state of mind cannot be fixed. It is 
not the end product that the Soviets seek, rather they are more 
interested in the process of building security - for the same 
reason that it builds on contextual security i.e. "their interest 
is in enhancing the condition of their existing security system" 
in the status quo. cited in, Mastney V, Human Rights and European 
Secur itv 1986 Duke University Press Durham p53.
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into force with the movement of Allied forces into their respec­
tive zones. There are differences of opinion as to how the 
division of Europe actually came about. John Freeman uses a good 
analogy in his book Security and the CSCE Process
The map of Europe might have been likened to a chess 
board. Military power had secured the place each 
player’s pieces occupied when hostilities ceased. The 
game had however not been concluded when the armies 
halted; rather the positions they occupieh were 
instrumental in determining how the game would con- 
hisue.°
Where, to alter Clausewitz’s metaphor a little, peace became a 
continuation of war by other means. In othc r wdrh s St«alcn hedd 
the trump card. He maintained,
[T^is war is not as jin tHe patt ; whoevro cupi^cs a 
territory imposes on it his own social system. Everyone 
imposes his own system as far as his army can reach."*
So whether there were secret pacts between Stalin, Churchill, and 
Roosevelt makes very little difference. The underlying realities 
of Yalta were already in place owing to Russian military 
ses. Yalta was merely an exercise in damage limitation as the 
ideological divide between the superpowers hindered the signing 
of a peace treaty with Germany.’
Cessation of hostilities can usually be expected to enhance 
security for the victors, however, in a short space of time
^Freeman J. Security and the CSCE Process The Stockholm 
Conference and Beyond. . Barinstokh, Macmillan 1991 p7.
■,*item
"F’our Powers* Responsibilities ended with the signing of 
the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany^n 12 
September 1990 in Monowi, paving the way for a fully sovereign 
Germany to be united on 3 October 1990. Facts on File p679.
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disagreements, over Berlin, began to emerge between the Allied 
Powers. At first the Four Power machinery worked adequately, 
despite the German Communists holding the majority in the new 
city govtramtnt which was established by the Soviet Military Ad­
ministration. Adverse election results for the Communists in the
October election of 1946 caused the already difficult relations
to worsen. Allied administration became a fiction as the Truman
Plan and the extension of Marshall Aid served to deepen the East- 
West conflict. The London Meeting of the Four Power Council of 
Foreign Ministers in November 1947 marked the fnaal attempt at 
administrative cooperation over Germany as a single entity.
Two events in 1940 influenced the Western Allies. The Communist 
coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in February, and the Berlin 
Blockade which commenced in June of the same year. The Berlin
blockade continued for eight months before Stalin backed down in
face of the success of the Allied Air Lift. Despite Stalin's 
climb down, these events marked a high point in the consolidation 
of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. As a result Britain, 
France and the Benelux States formed the Bruxelles Treaty 
Organization in the summer of 1940.ei In addition, by September 
1949, West Germany had become t federal republic. In the after­
math of the Czechoslovakian coup the United States were persuaded
^BTO formed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands cnd 
UK to act in the event of a renewal of aggression by Germcny.That 
the SU wcs the cctucl threat had not at this stage been articul­
ated. Archer C. Organizing Western Europe Arnold London 1990, p4.
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that a military alliance was necessary and the North Atlantic
Treaty was signed.'z
The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was 
established (April 1948) as the first formal intergovernmental
institution of European unity. Meanwhile the British and French 
economies had reached the point of breakdown prompting General 
Marshall's plan for a common programme of recovery.6 * * *The
success of the OEEC led to the first steps toward the strengthen­
ing of European defence. The British ana Canadian leaders 
pressed for an American led Atlantic Alliance, whereas the French 
were more in favour of the European character of defence and 
emphasised the need for closer political collaboration within the 
framework of a European assembly. Notwithstanding the fact that 
such "entangling alliances"* were anathema to American policy 
makers, the decision to establish NATO signalled a shift or 
revolution in American foreign policy. From the outset Europe's 
weakness and therefore its inability to defend itself without 
foreign assistance shaped the character of the Treaty..10
The Bonn Convention of 1952, between the three Western War
zDonelon & Grieve op.cit.p28:see also Freeman op.cit.pl6.
"Laqueur W. Europe Since Hitler Penguin London 1982 pl30.
See also, Ireland T.P. Creating the Entangling Alliance. European 
Studies No.6,London, Aldwych Press 1981.
■idem.
’.’for fuller detail seerLaqueur op.cit.
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Allies, Britain, France, the United States, initiated a period of
tit for tat, or alhtss and reaction with the Soviets. The Bonn
Convention established the sovereignty of the Federal Republic
Germany (FRG) and ended its occupied status. In theory Berlin
remained a special case subject to Allied control; however, in
practice control was passed to West Germany who undertook to
provide economic assistance for three quarters of Berlin. After
an abortive attempt at forming a European Defence Community,
upon which the establishment of the sovereignty Federal Republic
Germany was contingent, West Germany was drawn tsho NATO through
the Paris Agreements of October 1954, which expanded the
Bruxelles Treaty Organization.11
Simultaneously with these initiatives by the Western powers, 
similar developments took place in the East. The German Democra­
tic Republic (GDR) was declared a separate State, by the Soviets, 
by means of a Treaty signed on 20 September 1955. The establish­
ment of the two German States was in direct contravention to
Article 14 of the Potsdam Agreement which explicitly required 
that Germany be governed as a single unit.1®
The Warsaw Pact, which included the German Democratic Republic, 
was formed in May 1955 immediately after the Federal Republic of
11She:Protscol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, 
and Protocol on Forces of the Western European Untsn,Paris, 23 
October 1954:EursDh Transformed;Documents on the end of the Cold 
War. Freedman L.(ed) Trt-Servtlh Press London 1990.p34-6.
5
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Germany's entry into NATO. As hihs been pointed OU. above there 
are many differing opinions as t. ho. nd. why these things hap­
pened, however, it is not the purpose of this work to answer 
these questions, suffice to say, they served to complicate and 
indeed impede the search for the expected security that should 
have followed the cessation of conffict. Instead no sooner wcs
this war over than another ono had begun, c^lt^^i^t the "Cold War."
:i. :a
The "Cold War" was tae step off war, and it was fought by all 
means, political, ectatmic and mnlnhcry. It wcs a ata violent war 
in cs much that bloody conflict, both on a world-wide scale, and 
between the divided Europe, wwc avoided, aaltoi-iug blaotsheV did 
occur in many other peripheral States. With the formation of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pcct came a pptaTiisTton thhT wac to last for 
forty years. This compthnhnon and dispute between states over 
territorial bohnadcies, fronti.nes aan unuc^c wovaona sse^d the 
wider clash oo communist and aor8-communi st. ideologies. Moreover 
it ccn now be seen with retrospective analysis that the Cold War
also served tt hold t he central balance in world affairs for
almost fifty years cs Lcwrence Freedman has observed,
The old eash8oesh system achieved a balance of extraor­
dinary simplicity. The coatinenh wcs divided into two 
dnshnnchnoe calncaces and neither abat to over whelm 
the other w1'"-
"8'i'^unac^nce of literature available which deals with the 
"Cold War" and the division of Europe see: Joll J. Europe Snnot 
107 0. Lccquer W. Europe Since Hihler:Lool N. Mastering Modern 
World History: Watson J. Success in Twentieth Century World Affairs.
" '"Iadeptndenh 9 March 19 9 0 p2 7.
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Qt xgins and,,, conke-Kt.
There is no clear starting point for the concept of a European 
security system. Borawski in his book From the Atlantic to the 
Urals deems that the idea can be traced as far back as the 
Congress of Vienna of 1815.Arie Bloed points out in his 
book, The CSCE Process from Helsinki to Vienna, that some 
attribute the idea to Stalin in the 1930s. The initiative that 
culminated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe certainly can be traced back to the Soviets and was first 
offered in 1954.:LZ
At this time the Soviets were massively armed with conventional 
weapons and were, in this sphere, militarily secure. Although 
given the growing atomic arsenal of the United States, the 
Soviets may well have been concerned with their general security 
position.
According to the Czechoslovakian historian Karel Kaplan, the 
Soviet leadership had by 1950 decided that military confrontation 
with the capitalist world was inevitable if the desired spread of 
the Marxist/Leninist ideology was to be realized. In a speech in
x as B o r a ws k i J. From the Atlantic to the Urals London, 
Pergamon 1988 pi.
1 *B1 oed A. The CSCE Process From Helsinki to Vienna: An 
Introduction Netherlands,Nijhoff 1990 pi.
:,“zMiko F. "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE): Role in a Changing Europe" 1990 Congressional Research 
Service Issue Brief: Library of Congress p2.
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January 1951 to an audience of First Secretaries and Defence 
Ministers of the Soviet bloc, Stalin outlined this view.
No European army is capable of seriously opposing the 
Soviet Army, and one can even assume there will be no 
resistance. The current military strength of the United 
States is not very great. The Soviet camp thus enjoys a 
temporary superiority in this field. But it is only 
temporary, for three or four years. After that the 
will have at their disposal rapid means 
to bring troops to Europe and could
exploit fully their nuclear superiority. It will be 
necessary to make good use of this short period to 
complete the systematic preparation of our armies by 
devoting to them all the economic, political and human 
means at our disposal. During the three or four years 
to come the whole of our domestic and international 
policy will be subordinated to this goal. Only a total 
mobilization of our resources will allow us to seize 




In almost every other dimension the Soviets were insecure. 
Technologically they were insecure as the race for atomic 
supremacy gained momentum. The United States appeared to be the 
initiator of most innovations until the Soviet's introduced the
ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) in 1958.'*
Politically the Soviets were insecure; domestically they had no 
popular mandate to rule. Their totalitarian procedures had no 
foundations in the rule of law so they were also legally in­
secure. Without a peace treaty with Western Germany they were 
geographically insecure. Unlike the West, the Soviets chose not 
to accept Marshall Aid, Laqueur argues, that the linking of 
military assistance with economic assistance made it impossible
"‘Rupnik J. The Other Europe London, Weidenfeld 1989 pl27. 
:l-*Rapoport A. "Conflict Escalation and Conflict Dynamics"
Quest for Peace London,Sage,1987 pl77.
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for the Soviets to opt into the Marshall Aid plan, consequently
economic recovery of their command economy was impeded, rendering 
them economically insecure..2*
In the societal sphere the Soviet Union consisted of a multi­
plicity of ethnic groups, which complicated the progress of 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. Ideas, management and policy 
established and practiced in one ethnic situation do not operate 
necessarily when applied in an alternative ethnic milieu. These 
endogenous factors coloured and accentuated the exogenous factors 
of the international environment in which the search for Soviet 
security was being conducted. In contrast the progress of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction on a democratic basis in the 
Federal Republic Germany was clear for all to see. America, in 
the Soviet view, was in command in Europe. Although in truth, 
America had little interest in assuming the lead in Western
Europe.
The FRG’s accession into the Western security system seemed to
unnerve the Soviets and diminish even more Stalin’s pipe-dream of
a Soviet initiated demilitarization of Germany. Freeman says,
[T]he emerging strength of a uniting Europe firmly 
linked to the United States in NATO was precisely the 
kind of scenario Stalin had sought to avoid when, 
during the war, he had contemplated the post-war 
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Stalin, by his own actions had brought about what, as the "weaker
party," he sought most to avoid."—’ By the early 1950s the
Soviet’s seemed to have lost the initiative on Europe, in other
words Stalin had failed. The German question lay in abeyance
following the Soviets’ rejection of the initiative which emanated
from the Council of Ministers’ Meeting in Paris after the
abandonment of the Berlin Blockade in May /June 1949.
In March 1952, by means of a "Soviet Note" the Soviets called for 
negotiations among the "Four Powers leading to a peace treaty, 
the withdrawal of occupying troops, and a unified but neutral 
German. This first "Soviet Note" may have been a genuine
diplomatic offensive to honour the Potsdam agreement from which 
the parties widely digressed. On the other hand, the aim may 
have been simply to destabilize the embryonic State of the FRG, 
and thereby impede Western integration in general. As the 
"Soviet Note" contained no provisions for free elections the 
latter explanation was adopted by the Wesd.""® Stalin could see 
that the juxtaposition of the two States, the German Democratic 
Republic and the Federal Republic Germany developing under widely 
differing ideologies would become the principal destabilizing 
factor to security. Stalin was simply using pragmatically the 
Potsdam ideal of a unified Germany.
"""iliid p2 2
^Cmnd 1552 Document No. 54 (a): "Selected Documents Relating 
to Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1954-57"Cmnd 
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When, after Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Foreign Minister 
Molotov called for a European security conference tensions were 
running high both in Europe and on the international scene.2®
In Eastern Europe, East Berlin was in turmoil. Food shortages 
coupled with the "higher output decree" caused the workers' 
revolt leading to the imposition of martial law and an exodus of 
1.7% of East Germany's population to West Berlin. In Hungary the 
people were being promised far reaching changes that would trans­
form their country by the incoming Prime Minister Imre Nagy, 
which were instead to lead to the 1956 Revolution. In addition 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Albania all had the potential for
internal strife.
In contrast to the situation in Eastern Europe there was increas­
ing economic prosperity in democratic Western Europe, yet its 
military impotence reduced its freedom of action and therefore 
its political influence. It was almost reduced to the role of 
passive onlooker in the struggle between the Americans and the 
Soviets. That this dichotomy seemed to bother the Soviets more
than it did the Westerners was manifest at The Geneva Conference.
The Geneva Conference was held from 18-21 July 1955. It was the
first East-West meeting of the Heads of Government of the Allied 
Powers since 1945. It represented an attempt to find common 
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Marshal Bulganin, in his capacity as Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers, argued that a "European collective security
pact should be established before Germany could be reunified."
The Soviet draft was based on the concept of two German States
aiming at "regular European conferences and permanent political
consultative machinery." Other possibilities were included in
the draft viz
[Plossible agreements on mutual renunciation of force, 
a freeze on the existing levels of armed forces and, by 
implication, the withdrawal of the United States from 
Europe.
At the Foreign Ministers' Meeting later in the year, proposals 
and revised proposals were submitted. The Soviets, arguing on the 
basis of the continuation of a divided Germany, and the Western 
Powers adhering to their position "for the reunification of 
Germany through free elections."030 At the Soviets* suggestion,
the conference attached the subject of German reunification to
the wider issue of European security. Once again an impasse was 
reached over the timing of free elections, whether they were to 
be the basis of a peace treaty as proposed by the British, or the 
finalization of a peace treaty as the Soviets wished. Free 
elections might well have resulted in a unified Germany which 
would choose to join the Western military alliance. Hence, to 
prevent this, the Soviet goal then became the de jure recognition 
of the de facto division of Germany.
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Robert Legvold outlines the Soviet dilemma in this way'. Instead
of the "ever closer union" aspired to by those working toward
European integration,
The Soviet leaders would prefer to face a Western 
Europe divided into a loose configuration of "sub­
regions" composed of states dealing for themselves 
alone, and generously dotted with permanently neutral 
governments . ®a-
yet, paradoxically,
[A] fragmented Western Europe with only the rudimentary 
structures of co-operation must inevitably remain 
under the shadow of the United States ..., their 
greatest concern is still over the ease with which the 
United States can [sic] turn European cooperation to 
its own advantage.®^
By this stage both East and West were locked into a system of two 
opposing alliances, and fearful of invasion the Soviets displayed 
a "contextual" approach to security rather than a "basic" 
approach, mainly due to political insecurity as outlined above.®® 
A basic approach to security would allow the restructuring or 
revision of security including military security. The contextual 
view of security allowed tte Soviets Ito disregard the military 
imbalance of the status quo. Rather the emppasss ttncled to be on 
factors such as inviolability of frontiers, refraining from the 
use of force, creation of permanent constltoSOve soggns san 
economic cooperation, all oo whiih weer en'ennounly So aapenn in 
the Declaration of Principles in the Helsinki Final Act. However, 
they were contentious issues because they reflected the Soviet 
preoccupation with preserving the Eastern status quo, and their
3nMas0nny op.cit.pp51-3.
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need of economic cooperation in the face of their declining
economies. In addition, the creation of permanent consultative
organs would, the Soviets hoped, allow revision of the Western
status quo.®"”'
Another "contextual" factor existed in the fact that it was the 
age of international organizations, by 1956 there were 1,105 in 
total.®® The United Nations had existed for a decade, with the 
Soviet Union and the United States both firmly committed to 
participate in its structure. The Six were rapidly growing to 
become the biggest regional organization in the world. Thus the 
creation of a pan European security organization would be in 
context with the wider developments in international relations.
A Pan European Conference, if it were ever to become a reality, 
would constitute a non-bloc organization of sovereign States, 
hopefully, capable of looking beyond the stalemate of the two 
Alliances. The fear, in the West, was that it could also serve to 
enhance Soviet dominance in Europe as a whole. As with all 
aspects of the "German question" the Western Allies were not 
interested in giving recognition to the East European States 
which the Soviets so desired. The West was preoccupied with 
achieving military security through NATO. Meantime, at the 
subsequent Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Geneva in October 1955,
®-*ibid p52,
^^International Year Book 1992.
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Molotov, dismissing the British initiative for free elections as
counter to Soviet interest, called for the dissolution of NATO
and the Warsaw Pact in favour of a security system covering all
European States. In reply, Harold Macmillan the British Foreign
Secretary ■ avowed that, "the West cannot accept that giving
security to Russia must involve abandoning its own defenses."®®
Perhaps deflected by the need to reaffirm its hegemony in the 
aftermath of the Polish and Hungarian revolts in 1956, the status 
of Berlin was not readdressed by the Soviets until November 1958. 
By this stage the deployment^n 1958, of their Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) had helped redress the military balance 
between East and West. However, there were other factors which
smay have caused Khrushchev to reiterate Soviet demands vis-a-vis 
the status of Berlin. Soviet relations with China left much to 
be desired, as did the declining economic and migratory situation 
in East Germany. If, Khrushchev asserted, after six months no 
action had been taken to comply with the Soviet demand for the 
demilitarization of Berlin, the Soviet Union would conclude its 
own peace treaty with East Germany. NATO members at their 
meeting in Paris in December rejected the Soviet plan and Western 
rights in Berlin were reaffirmed; thus ending what Bowraski 
claims to be the first phase in the search for European security. 
This stalemate continued throughout the failed summit of 1960,
® ®Chronicle of C20 History p7 77 .
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the American attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in the "Bay of
Pigs" fiasco in 1961, and the building of the Berlin Wall.'7'
1960s Phase
The geiterntinn of the 1950s initiative, which reflected the
Soviet shift of emphasis, began Ohe next phase in the quetS for a 
Pan European Security Conference in tOh 1190s. TTh Cuban Crisis 
of October 1902 emphasized Ohe direct relationship between the
United States and Ohe Soviet Union. In this crisis the Allies on
both sides were kept on the margins and the peaceful settlement 
allnhne for Ohe hope of reduced conflict between Ohe superpowers 
perhaps leading to an expansion in detente. The Soviets en­
couraged Ohe move toward improved relations with Ohe West with 
refurbished proposals for a European Security Conference. Many 
of Ohe Eastern European StaOes welcomed this move, notably Poland 
because of its border problems; and Rumania who reasoned that a
reduction in tension enOhmnn the East and West woold result in a
lessening of pressure within the Eastern Alliance.
The first major proposal for a European Security Conference was 
the development of a speech originally delivered by the Polish 
Foreign Minister Rapacki, Oo Ohe UniOed Nations General Assembly 
in October 1957. Rapacki envisioned "an atnm-£rnn zone in 
central Europe"3® Thss was then Oaken up by Ohe Warsaw Pact
Consultative Committee in 1905, and then by the 23rd Party Congr-
;:':')'"'Doneias. op.cit.p^O .
“3"Cmnd 0 9 3 2 Section 0 p 3 .
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ess in March 1966. Rapacki's speech gave an outline for a
European Security Conference that would include the United States
and Canada covering "the problem of European security in its
entirety... including nuclear issues.’'s-* When the Warsaw Pact
Consultative Committee issued its communique, however, the
reference to North American inclusion was absent. This failure
to include North America was a clear indication that the desire
to exclude the North Americans from Europe, and to isolate the
FRG was still uppermost in Soviet aspirations.
In reply to this call for a European Security Conference 
General De Gaulle, who had a long standing distrust for the "bloc 
to bloc" (i.e.NATO-WTO) approach to security issues in Europe
averred,
[Tlhis matter will not be settled by the direct 
confrontation of ideologies and the forces of the two 
camps...What must be done will not be done, one day, 
except by the understanding and combined action of the 
peoples who have always been, who are, and who will 
remain principally concerned by the fate of the German 
neighbour - in short the European peoples.-*0
The debate which followed the building of the Berlin Wall 
resulted in the publication, by Willy Brandt, of a memorandum 
outlining a new policy of Ostpolitik.** Its remit was to seek
the "normalization" of the FRG's relations with the Soviet Union.
From 1966 onwards the FRG paid particular attention to Soviet
ss-Freeman op.cit.p34.-'Staaley T.& Whitt D. Detente Diplomacy:United States and 
European Security in the 1970s: Cambridge Mass.1970 pp29-30 cited 
in Freeman op,cit.p36.
•":t Ostpolit ik : the policy seeking rapprochement with the West 
which earned for Willy Brandt the Nobel Peace Prize.
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overtures calling tor a pan European security conference. The
basic reason for this was that Germany was a divided nation with 
Soviet troops on its borders, by dint of which, it was the West 
European State most exposed to Soviet power. This added a
certain poignancy to the old adage "better the devil you know 
than the devil you don’t," a point not lost on Bonn. OsOpoldtdk 
was an acknowledgement that cooperation was as necessary for the
West as the East.
The Bucharest Declaration adopted by a meeting of the Warsaw
Pact's Political Consultative Committee in July 1966, denounced
the American presence in Europe as follows.
The American imperialists and the West German revanch­
ists... are trying even further to deepen the division 
of Europe, to fan the arms race, to increase interna­
tional tension and to frustrate the establishment and 
development of normal ties between the West European 
and the East European states.
The Bucharest Declaration proposed a number of measures toward 
the implementation of peace and security in Europe, through 
peaceful cooperation among States despite their differing social 
systems. Initially the declaration called for the dissolution of 
the military blocs, NATO and the WTO, and then for the adoption 
of partial measures toward military detente. These included the 
liquidation of foreign military bases including the withdrawal of 
foreign troops to within their national frontiers, as well as an 
agreement to reduce the armed forces in the two German States.To 
limit the danger of nuclear conflict agreement was necessary
•-Cmnd 6932 Document 2, pp38-42.
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toward the cessation of transportation, either by air or sea of 
nuclear weapons over European States,*® Accordingly the implem­
entation of mearens such at these would pave tei way foi a
system of security on hec Eureaeic Ctntinent.
Perusal of the Bucharest Document highlights Soviet concern 
regarding the proposed plans for creating a multilateral nuclear 
force within NATO; which would have allowed West Germany access 
to nuclear weapons. Stating that Western persistence in pursuing 
this policy would leave the Warsaw Treaty member States no choice 
but to follow suit, the declaration warned that the FRG's access 
to nuclear arms "in any form whatever" must be preeluded. e-* in 
addition it was deemed that the normalization of the situation in 
Europe "demands that all frontiers established after the most 
devastating war in the history of mankind" must be recognized as 
inviolable, "including the Polish frontier along the Oder-Neisse 
and the two German States,”*® Furthermore the German question 
must take into account the interests of the security of Europe as 
a whole. The unification of the two German States could only be 
achieved through a "relaxation of tension and gradual rapproche­
ment of the two sovereign German States..." Accordingly, all 
interested States, both North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty members
*+3ovolny M. "The Soviet Union and the European Security 
Conference." Qrbis Spring 1974,p206.
•■“•Extracts from a Declaration on Strengthening Peace and 
Security in Europe" adopted by the Warsaw Pact's Political 
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and Ohe snuOgals, hnge isviOnd Oo join Is a honfegnnhe neegntt- 
ing European tnhtgnOty.•"t7
Repeated reference Oo all States, both those in Europe and those 
nlOtien Europe, highlights Ohe continual obsession OhaO Ohe 
Soviets had with Ohe American presence in Europe. Freeman 
asserts OhaO the Soviet proposal for a European Security Con­
ference ,
[H]ad as much Oo do with the Russian wish to damage Ohe 
chances of Ohe NATO Multilateral Nuclear Forces as iO 
had with any wider security goals,•"’"z
The policy of OtOpnliOik was agreed by Ohe West German ParliamenO 
in 1900, and although, since OsOpoliOik, the FRG was "listening" 
Oo Ohe East, this was construed by Ohe Soviets as an aOOempO on 
Ohe part of Ohe FRG Oo use,
[I Its (sic) new policy as a means by which to increase its 
influence in Eastern Europe and over the German Democratic 
Republic in particular.
However, Ohe bilateral relations established through OtOpnliOik 
made Ohe skeptic more skeptical. Rumania’s establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Bonn indicated that while Ohe Soviets 
were working for endorsement of Ohe status quo, Rumania looked 
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The proposals contained in the Bucharest declaration of July 1966
were revamped at Karlovy Vary in April 1967 when an attempt was
made by twenty four European Communist Parties to discuss the
proposal of a European Security Conference. The statement on
peace and security issued at the close of the meeting at Karlovy
Vary placed its emphasis on "respect for the realities of post
war Europe."®* In other words, although bilateral relations were
increasing with the West, consolidation of the Eastern Bloc and
the WTO were of paramount importance. Notwithstanding this, the
meeting reiterated muted Communist support for an all European
conference, as well as consolidating the alignment of the
Communist satellites into the Eastern Bloc with the Soviet Union.
Rumania did not attend this conference nor did Albania and 
Yugoslavia. Three of the smaller West European communist parties 
also absented themselves. Rumania's attitude highlighted the 
disunity among the communist parties over a common policy on the 
"German question," and Ceausescu's decision to re-establish 
bilateral relations, in January 1967, with West Germany did much 
to inflate the "German question."
Concurrently with these pronouncements from the East, problems 
were manifesting themselves within NATO. France was becoming
increasingly disenchanted with what it perceived as US-Anglo 
domination within the NATO institutions. The "Special Relation­
ship" between the United States and the Britain, which had
®*Freeman op.cit.p41-2:see also Povolny op.cit.pp201-31.
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flourished between Kennedy and Macmillan was in French perception 
Anglo-Saxon hegemony. This, coupled with De Gaulle's fierce 
nationalism, led to the withdrawal of the French from the 
integrated military command of NATO; and subsequently to the 
transfer, out of France in April 1967, of all Allied facilities 
including the NATO headquarters in Fontainebleau.
By December of the same year the Harmel Report had committed NATO
to linking military security to detente and in so doing destroyed
the myth that the two concepts were incompatible. Harmel
explained the twin track function of NATO as follows,
[Mlilitary security and the policy of detente are not 
contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is 
a stabilizing factor in the world of politics. It is 
the necessary condition for effective policies directed 
towards a greater relaxation of tensions... the 
ultimate purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just 
and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by 
appropriate security guarantees... acknowledging also 
that whilst bilateral talks were continuing, certain 
subjects... require by their very nature a multilateral 
solution.®ss
Not surprisingly any hint of discord within the Western alliance 
raised Soviet hopes that, as the first twenty year term of the 
NATO Treaty approached, disarray within NATO could be exploited 
to their advantage and thereby deter some of its members from 
renewing membership. Thus, in what Borawskia refers to as the 
second phase, from roughly the mid 1960s, both the Harmel Report 
and the Karlovy Vary meeting consolidated the military blocs,
Nato
?“iXOsgood R.& Wegener H. "Deterrence:The Western Approach"
Information Service p4 .
“’'^Freeman op.cit.p43: Cmnd 6932 Document 7,pp49-51.
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contrary to the Karlovy Vary ideal which envisaged a Europe 
outwith military blocs.®59 '
At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968, NATO 
Ministers confirmed that, in line with the Harmel recommendations 
which gave NATO a political dimension with the twin track policy, 
the first NATO studies of mutual force reductions in Europe were 
getting under way.®"* This first step survived the wobble caused 
by the Soviet suppression of the Prague experiment, when, on the 
night of the 20 August 1968 Czechoslovakia was overrun with units 
from Russia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland.®® The invasion 
of Czechoslovakia brought to the fore the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of 
limited sovereignty of socialist States. The "Brezhnev Doctrine"
maintained that if the continuation of socialism was threatened
then other socialist States have an obligation to intervene in 
the internal affairs of that particular State. Povolny argues
that in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakian invasion the Politi­
cal Consultative Committee turned their attention to the need to
strengthen the "...structure and administrative bodies of the
Warsaw Pact defense organization."®®
The meeting in Budapest of March 1969 adopted a more conciliatory
stance. The call for the abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
was dropped, as were the routine attacks on German and American
®-Cmnd 69I2 Document 5,p47.
«"*Gartto00 o^cit^HO.
R3®For full discussion see Donelon op.cit.pp276-7 I 
Flanaghan S.European Security; Prospects for the 1980s. 
Leebaert(ed) Mass., Lexington Books 1979 pl91.
®^Povony op. cit. ^210-1: Cmnd 69 I I Section 20, p8.
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policies. The demand that existing boundaries in Central Europe
be acknowledged, and that West Germany, East Germany and West
Berlin be recognised as separate political entities was also
muted. All previous calls for a European security conference, by
placing emphasis on all European States, effectively excluded the
North American States, this prerequisite was aIso dropped. The
meeting simply issued what has become known as the "Budapest
Appeal" calling for a security conference to be held at the
earliest date and proposing a preparatory meeting of officia 1s;
thus leaving the way open for dialogue with the West.®'z
In less than a month the NATO Ministers meeting in Washington on 
10-11 April 1969 to celebrate the Twentieth Anniversary of NATO, 
indicated on that the Western Allies were prepared to explorr 
"which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotta-
tion and an early resofution," and thus tnstructtd the tATT 
Council to "draw up a list es cheh sssups awd ts ututy hta a 
useful process of negotiation could te test tnitiaaiS, tn due
course."®'
This communique made clear that any discussions toward a security 
conference in Europe were conditional on the inclusion of the 
United States and Canada, they must entail clear advance prepara­
tion, and must progress toward eliminating existing sources of 
tension in central Europe, as well as including measures aimed at
“■“‘Povoony op.cit . pp210-ll.
®‘Cmnd 6932 Document 12, p59.
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improving the situation in Berlin, and communication between the
two Germanies.-5’
In May 1969 Finland's President Kekkonen offered to host, in 
Helsinki,any possible European security conference, and thereby 
sparking off a series of cat and mouse type of events. The 
Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in October of 
1969, ignored the issues put forward earlier in the year by the 
NATO Foreign Ministers, and after acknowledging the Finnish offer 
put forward two general items for a possible agenda, namely,
1. European security and the renunciation of the use of 
force or threats of force in relations between European 
states.
2. The expansion of trade, economic, scientific and 
technical ties, on the basis of equality, with the aim of 
fostering political cooperation between the European 
State s
This move by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers was interpreted, 
by the United States, as nothing more than a crude Soviet attempt 
to ratify the existence of a divided Europe thus legitimizing its 
application of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in Czechoslovakia. Serving 
in addition to strengthen Soviet control over the trade policies 
of the other members of the Warsaw Pact thereby retaining right 
for the Soviets to intervene "legitimately" in Eastern Europe. 
These were, according to the US Secretary of State Wm.P Rodgers, 
the factors in Soviet behaviour which raised questions which 
ought to be addressed before meaningful negotiations could be * 25
®^idem.
®oHExtracts from a Statement issued by a conference of 
Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Prague on the 30-31 October 
1969." Cmnd 6932 Documentl4,p61.
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entered into. Arguing that the non-use of force proposal had
been, for twenty years, a basic principle under Article 2 of the
Charter of the United Nations, and that diplomatic channels are
always available for increased trade and technical exchanges,
Rodgers asserted that the Soviet proposal did not address the
fundamental questions of a security conference.®'-
Yet another communique from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
Meeting in Brussels on 5-6 Dec 1969, reiterated its commitment to 
pursue a durable peace settlement in Europe attached to the 
principles of,
[Slovereign eqqality, political independence, and the 
territorial intterity of each European State; the ri^c^iot 
of peoples to shhpe their own destines; the peaceful
settlement of disputes; non intoqveqtion in the
internal affairs of any State by any other State, 
whatever their political or social system; and the 
renunciation of the use or the threat of force against 
any State.®'-2
The Declaration expressed regret that as yet no common interpre­
tation of the principles had been reached. Hope was expressed 
that the bilateral and multilateral discussions, "already begun 
or could begin shortly^s^), which relate to fundamental 
problems of European security would make a major contribution to 
improving the political atmosphere in Europe and thus help to 
ensure the success of any eventual conference.®^
®&Borawski op.cit p9.
®r,E: Declaration of the North Atlantic Council Adopted at the 
Brussels Council Meeting December 4-5.1969 Cmnd 6932 Document 
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19.7.Q.S Ehas.g..
The early 1970s saw the beginning of detente on the premise that
closer, more open relations between East and West could over time
lead to a more normal situation. Bilateral discussions had begun 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and as United 
States' relations with Moscow improved, so too did the West see 
the Imperative of not being left behind in the field of European 
security. Four-Power discussions on the Berlin situation, and 
movement on territorial issues created by, and outstanding since 
the war were under way.
However, the increasing military power of the Warsaw Pact, which 
was perceived by the Soviets to be necessary to present a 
credible deterrent to the NATO military bloc, carried the possi­
bility that these strengthened East European armies might just 
mount an insurgence against the Soviets, and so destroy Moscow's 
buffer zone security system." it is perhaps worth reiterating 
here that, as one writer has pointed out, state security and 
ideology were so inextricably bound that any hint of insurrection 
in the satellite States of Eastern Europe constituted a fundamen­
tal challenge to the Soviet system.®® For the Soviets the 
Eastern States acted as a barrier to the spread of Western ideals 
eastward, a successful challenge in just one state and the whole
®'See Dawishra K. Eastern Europe Gorbachev and Reform 
Cambridge,CUP 1989 p80: Maresca J.J.To Helsinki The Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1973-75:Durham and London, 
Duke University Press 1985 pl31.




The Evolution of the CSCE
bloc would collapse jeopardizing the very security that the 
soviets were striving so hard to maintain. As in fact did happen 
in 1989 when the Berlin Wall ruptured, heralding the end of the ;
Cold War and bringing about geopolitical and geostrategic changes 
the importance of which cannot be overestimated. Thus the Soviet 
Czechoslovak Friendship Treaty of 6 May 1970 gave retrospective £
endorsement to the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty, at 
the same time recognizing the dominance of Soviet hegemony.®® |
Xs-
I
In the light of the movement gained through bilateral discussions 
the North Atlantic Council announced its willingness to begin
■'Sexploratory negotiations on the possibility of a European 
security conference. The set agenda was to address, >
1. principles governing relations between states, including
the non-use of force |
2. economic, cultural, technical scientific, and j
environmental cooperation , with cultural encompassing 1
the freer movement of peoples, ideas and information.®^
Consequently, the agenda of the June 1970 meeting of the Warsaw
Pact Foreign Ministers in Budapest, paralleled the criteria
demanded by the NATO communique, with one exception, and one
-9;
addition. They did not consider that the "freer movement of z
peoples, ideas and information" was a cultural issue. The
conference was to do with interstate relations not with the
problems of individual citizens.®* This was to become a bone of 
contention throughout the forthcoming process. The addition was
®®Cmnd -.69. 32. pplO-11.
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to be the creation of a permanent organ a "body for questions of
security and cooperation in Europe." This was interpreted by the
West as a device with which the Warsaw Pact could monitor the
activities of the NATO military bloc.®®
Ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin by the 
Governments' of France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet 
Union on September 3rd 1971 marked the next significant break 
through. whilst, in the eyes of the Soviets, the wall was still 
necessary as a barrier to the spread of imperialism, the Quadri­
partite Agreement had improved the condition of the Berliners 
considerably. The only issue left was that of the proposed 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks which were
consistently played down by the Soviets. The Reykjavik call of 
June 1968 for talks on MBFR had largely been ignored by the 
Soviets. In December 1971 the NAC communique reaffirmed the 
decisions taken, on 5-6 October 1971, by the Deputy Foreign 
Minister and High Officials to appoint, former Secretary General 
of NATO Signore Manilo Brosio, to conduct exploratory talks with 
the Soviets and other interested East European States on MBFR in 
Europe. This political initiative of the fourteen member States 
of the allied alliance came to nought. Indeed the Soviets 
ignored the visa request of the NATO envoy. The proposed talks 
did not take place and resolution on the question of MBFR only 
came to pass after the linkage of the issue with the European
®'"Cmnd 6 9 3 2 Document 3 4,p9 8.
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security conference.^* The NATO allies wanted a positive response
to the Reykjavik proposals owing to United States Congressional
pressure, for unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe. A direct
link was made between these issues and any acceptance of an
opening date for preparatory talks on a European security
conference.
The Warsaw Pact refused to negotiate with NATO as a bloc,
suggesting that this issue could be handled by a sub committee of
the proposed security conference. However the Soviets reluctance
to meet bloc to bloc, was seen as an attempt to multilateralize
talks on MBFR, and to the NATO allies,
[Mlultilateralism meant fragmentation of the West,while 
with the possible exception of Rumania,the Soviet Union 
could trust the discipline of the members of her (sic) 
bloc."z:t
In May 1972 the first visit to Moscow by a United States Presi­
dent accelerated the process toward a European security con­
ference. At the Nixon-Brezhnev summit the Soviets agreed to 
begin MBFR talks in exchange for preparatory talks on a European 
security conference, the CSCE as it was to become knowo.7'2 
Accordingly the result was a set of carefully orchestrated 
invitations and responses. The allies planning to participate in
^"Fourteen member States only took the decision to appoint 
Sig.Brosio as France does not arrtake in the integrated defence 
system of the Alliance. France was crittcel of the nondere of 
MBFR in Europe and of bloc to bloc alliances.See Hans-Georg Wieck 
"Perspectives of MBFR in Europe" Aussen Politik 1973 Vol.23 No.l 
p36.
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MBFR sent invitations to the Warsaw Pact participants on 15
November 1972. By return, on 16 November 1972, the US accepted 
the Finnish invitation to the CSCE talks to open on 22 November 
1972. The preparatory MBFR discussions began in Vienna in 
January 19^®.
The Cold War crystalised three main goals for the Soviets, 
Firstly it confirmed Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe. Second­
ly, never having accepted their exclusion, and with it the 
limitation of their influence from Western Europe, the Soviets 
had a deep-seated antipathy toward Western integration. Thirdly 
the American presence in Europe was anathema to them, consequent­
ly their resistance to NATO, and the persistent call for a Europ­
ean collective security system was simply a way of saying
"Americans out."
The diplomatic jousting that had continued for nearly twenty 
years ended with agreement vis-a-vis preparatory talks for a 
European security conference. But what really paved the way for 
progress was the complex web of treaties which had been woven 
since the commencement of the 1970s. The first treaty, commonly 
known as the Moscow Treaty, was concluded on 12 August 1970, 
between the FRG and the Soviet Union. Article 3 states clearly 
that all States' frontiers are inviolable, including the Oder-
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Republic of Poland and the frontier between the Federal Republic
o£ Germany and the German Democratic Republic. ,rzc on 7 December 
of the same year the Treaty between the FRG and The Peoples 
Republic of Poland was signed in Warsaw, and accepted,in effect, 
the current frontiers of the FRG/GDR/Poland/ and the USSR. The 
Quadripartite Treaty of 1971, settled the Berlin issues outstand­
ing since 1945. In December 1972 the Treaty signed by the German 
Democratic Republic GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany FRG, 
established diplomatic relations between the two States. Both of 
which were admitted into the United Nations in 1973.’z®
All these treaties were interdependent, with the Germans coupling 
their treaties to an agreement on Berlin, whilst the Soviets 
counter coupled the Berlin agreement with simultaneous ratifica­
tion of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. Furthermore the Americ­
ans would countenance no preparations for a multilateral security 
conference without both.7"® In other words, bilateral diplomacy 
had secured the real progress. Notwithstanding this achievement
the Soviets still needed international endorsement of the status 
quo, which a high level gathering could afford.
Chapter II will trace the Diplomatic joust from the Multilateral 
Preparatory Talks of November 1972 through to the Helsinki Final 
Act (HFA) in August 1975.
z”*Freedman L.op.cit.pp65-82:also Degenhardt H. Treaties . and 
Alliances of the World Keesings Reference Publication. UK,(3rd 
ed.)1981, pp233-5:240-l.
T^idem
z®Bechtoldt H. "Berlin Agreement and the Security 
Conference" Aussen Politik 1972 Vol 23, No.l,p33.
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Peace depends on the ability of great powers to live 
together on the same planet despite their differences. 
We would not be true to our obligation to generations 
yet unborn if we failed to seize this moment to do 
everything in our power to ensure that we will be able 
to talk about these differences rather than fight about 
them in the future."
From the communique issued at the end of Ppesident Nixon's visit
to Moscow from 22-30 May 1972 came the statement,
The US and the USSR governments agree that the con­
ference should be carefully preaaeet it ordee that it 
may concretely consider specefic problems of security 
and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive 
reduction of the underlying causes of tension in 
Europe.
Despite the measure of agreement that this statement implied 
there was a fundamental dichotomy in the goals of both sides. 
NATO's aim was to use the Conference as means of change in 
Eastern Europe, chiefly in the fields of military security and
humanitarian issues. The latter the Soviets considered to be the
sole prerogative of internal management, not subject to external 
interference. The main goal of the Soviets was the legitimization 
of their supremacy in Eastern Europe. In other words, they wanted 
recognition of the post war territorial status quo in Europe. 
The need to further develop economic relations between Eastern 
Europe and Western States was also deemed necessary to halt the 
economic decline in the command system of the Communist Bloc
States.
"President Nixon’s State of the Nation Speech 20 January 
1972; Maresca op.cit.p9
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TheL_Muitj.iaterai_„p^5parator^jia^ij,£Li.Mt.Tj).
The MPT opened in Helsinki on the 22 November 1972, The emphasis 
on careful preparation by the West reflected a determination not 
to enter the Conference proper at a disadvantage. The Rumanian 
call in 1966, for the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 
was still in the background. The implication of equivalence in 
this call ignored the asymmetry between the two alliance systems,
because in the East a network of bilateral treaties had been
signed, "to coordinate the struggle against ‘undesirable’ 
influences," that were not up for dissolution.^ For example, the 
Czechoslovakian Treaty provided for close cooperation between 
Czechoslovakia and her partner the Soviet Union for the purpose 
of maintaining "the economic and social gains of the two
peoples," This in Povolny’s opinion would eclipse any European 
Security pact and allow for interference in the internal affairs 
of another State.® Any potential European security conference 
depended on the recognition that the security interdependence of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact required a reciprocal cooperative
framework.
-Bechtoldt H. "Berlin Agreement and the Security Conference" 
Aussen Politik 1972 Vol.23 No.l p26-35;see also Povolny 
M." The European Security Conference" Qrbis Spring 1979 p205: 
"Under Leonid’s eyes" Economist August 9 1975 pl3.
•“‘Treaty of Friendship.Cooperation and Mutual Aid , Between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Social­
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The Soviets wanted a high level ceremonial international endorse­
ment of the status quo. The Western participants wanted low 
level talks pending obvious movement towards their aims.®
The eventual compromise, devised by the French, was for a three 
stage Conference: Stage I, Helsinki: July 3-7 1973; Stage II,
Geneva: September 18 1973-July 21 1975; Stage III Helsinki: July 
30- August 1, 1975. Helsinki Stage I was to be at foreign 
minister level to assuage the Soviets with a high level symbolic 
start. Geneva Stage II was to be the forum for the substantive 
negotiations of interest to the West. The Final Stage III to 
return to Helsinki at a date oh e. fieed dunint the procedures at 
Geneva. Each Stage was to be conditional on the progress made at 
the preceding stage.'
The Multilateral Preparatory Talks were a diplomatic feat from 
the outset. They far exceeded the remit of date, place, agenda, 
and participation. Major and minor issues were addressed, 
ranging from the ten principles which were to be negotiated at 
the Conference proper, to the touchy issue of the seating 
arrangements. The two German States were seated, side by side,
®In this case the Neutral Non-aligned States had similar 
views as NATO which, according to Maresca, at this early stage 
served as the primary locus of Western policy coordination:Mares- 
ca
J.J. To Helsinki The Conference on Security and Co- operation in
Europe 1973-1979 Durham and London Duke, University Press,1985 p20
■'Freeman J. Security and the CSCE Process.The Stockholm 
Conference and Beyond London: Macmillan 1991.p61.
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on the right of the Finnish Chairman, a clear indication that the
"querelles Allemandes" had no place at the Conference."
Participation.
In line with the bargain struck during the "diplomatic joust" 
leading to the MPT, the Finnish invitation was extended to the 
United States and Canada and to all European States. Thirty two 
European States initially accepted the Finnish invitation. 
Monaco joined later at Stage I. Albania declared itself uninter­
ested in the efforts being made for a European security con­
ference stating that,
Security in Europe cannot be arranged by a conference 
that is organized by the two superpowers...which are 
trying to resolve major international problems "between 
themselves" and at the expense of other world states 
and world public opinion."*
This decision proved not to be easily reversible, and caused
®’As the recent Middle East peace talks in Madrid have 
indicated, seating is a contentious issue. At Helsinki French was 
the language used by the hosts, accordingly the two German States 
were seated side by side using the French - Allemagne for 
Germany. This arrangement whilst it satisfied the German States, 
aligned Austria (Autriche) next to the German States. This 
implied for the Austrians a Germanic bloc not much to their 
liking. This impasse was resolved by the United States assuming 
the title Amerique, Etats-Unis,de, thus separating the Austrians 
and the Germans: von Groll Gotz "The Helsinki Consultations" 
Aussen Politik 1973 Vol.24 No.2 ppl23-129.
"Cited in Bloed A.The CSCE ,,from Helsinki to Vienna: 
An Introduction p3 from Hronika 1972, p3154A quoted in: L 
Acimovic, Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe(Alphen 
aan den Rijn/ Rockville 1981 Netherlands: Nijhoff,1990 pll6.
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Part i
The Multilateral Preparatory Talks
procedural problems in 1990 when the Albanians wished to par­
ticipate . "*
Delegations,
National delegations varied widely in size. The Soviet delegation 
ranged from 60-100 people, whereas Monaco's delegation consisted 
of a single official who met the coordinating committee approx­
imately once per month.
The level of representation also varied. Most delegations were 
headed by an ambassador: in some cases permanent representatives 
to the United Nations organizations in Geneva doubled as heads of 
delegations at CSCE, or ambassadors resident in Helsinki travel­
led to Geneva to head their State's delegation. Most delegations 
of reasonable size had three diplomats in charge of the negotia-
loWhilst in theory all invited states were entitled to 
attend in line with HR 54. The Helsinki Recommendations Nos.54 
and 55 were to cause problems for Albania. In June 1990 at the 
Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD), Albania 
formally submitted, in writing, a request to obtain observer 
status within CSCE. The Chairperson of the day Danish Foreign 
Minister Elleman-Jensen proceeded on the understanding that by 
virtue of HR 54 Albania was entitled to observer status. At the 
time no objection was raised. However, following differences of 
opinion voiced retrospectively, it was then established that in 
future Albania would be required to submit a new request to 
observe at each meeting of the CSCE. Consensus was needed before 
observer status could be granted.
Schlager E."Procedural Framework of the CSCE: From the Helsinki 
Consultations To The Paris Charter 1972-90." in Human Rights Law 
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tions, few of whom were specialists. Mostly they were career
diplomats with broad general experience.
As will become clear later, the areas of interest were grouped 
into three baskets. The larger delegations had between one and 
three specialists working with each basket. The Soviets had an 
ambassadorial level official in charge of each basket, at least 
one specialist for each subcommittee and legal advisors for the 
principal. Size, however did not always reflect capability. As 
Maresca points out: diplomats from the smaller participating 
States such as The Holy See, Malta, Liechenstien were, by the 
very nature of the size of their delegations, obliged to keep up 
with the negotiations on all subjects, and contributed in key
areas . :l-"
The Multilateral Preparatory Taiks wrre held in hhe confreecce 
building of the TeTe^nlea 1 Accddrny in Dipcd nn^^ Helsinki, and 
thereafter became known as the Dip^i Talks. These talks ran for 
four rounds. The agenda and procedures that were hammered out
in the first round were to beeome the prpanhdral rules of the 
Conference, and in burr ccucial oe tte whole CSCE pracesl, 
remaining unchanged until the Paris Summit of 1990. However, the 
disagreements between East and Wc-sH were so fundamental that it 
was remarkable that seven months later, on 8th June 1973, the
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Final Recommendation of the Helsinki Consultations were laid out
in what has become known as the Blue Book.
Dipoli 1 consisted of daily plenary sessions in which all 
participating States announced their aspirations, and reserva­
tions on the aims of the Conference. The smaller and non-aligned
States made their mark at the outset with the insistence that
Item I of the standing orders should be the acceptance of 
sovereign equality independent of the alli^<accss. The point at 
issue was that there should be neither a "meeting of blocs" nor a 
"meeting of groupings" both of which were alien to France and 
Yugoslavia respectively. The Rumanian Ambassador also expressed 
the wish to be free from the obligations of bloc discipline. The
concept "Sovereign equality" for them needed the rider that all
States participate,
[I,n conditions of full equality, which [sic] might be 
their social system, their order of greatness, the 
level of development, their membership or non member­
ship of military alliances.3*'3
A long winded rider designed to elicit assurances that members of 
an alliance would be protected in the event of differences with 
its hegemonical power. Although the Soviets argued that they felt 
themselves no less sovereign because of their membership of the
1Si! von Groll "The Helsinki Consultations" Aussen Politik 
1973 Vol.24 No2.pl21.
"•Bechtoldt H."Von der ersten zur zweiten Runde in 
Helsinki:From the First to the Second Round in Helsinki. Aussen 
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Warsaw Pact, the phrase "outside the blocks," which was suggested
by the Polish delegation was adopted. Account was taken of the 
obligations of the members of the European Community vis-a-vis 
the legal transfer of powers to that body in the relevant areas.
The German draft of the final text reads:
[A] 11 States that take part in the consultations, take 
part therein on the basis of equality as independent 
States and with full entitlement. The consultations 
take place outside the military alliance.'*
The mechanism with which the work was to be tackled was a
committee structure with a rotating chairmanship.'® The first 
task, the election of the Finnish Chairman, was achieved rela­
tively simply. All interested parties became participating 
States, equally sovereign and independent. Decision making was 
to be by consensus. This was crucial to the process and subject 
to extensive wrangling as the talks progressed. It is therefore 
necessary to explore the concept in some detail.
Conafeaaag Pec la.1Q.n ..Making.
At the outset in Round I it became clear that if the Conference 
were to take place at all, never mind reach a conclusion, it 
would be necessary for each participating State to relinquish
I . ' ' -Idem
'-'Rotating chairmanship means the simple system of rotation 
among all participating states which enhanced the equality within 
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elements of Its own position. The debate centred round the 
possibility of majority voting on procedural matters with 
consensus being required on matters of substance. Although this 
arrangement would have streamlined the Conference, the Eastern 
Bloc States feared that In the event of "grouping," the NATO 
members aligned with a few sympathetic neutrals, could easily out 
vote them on procedural matters. To the Neutral and Non-aligned 
(NNA) States, the simple consensus ruling gave them participation 
on a truly equal basis with the larger powers, so this was the 
preferred method.
With the adoption of consensus there was a tacit understanding 
that there should be no veto. The Blue Book defines consensus
(HR69) as.
The absence of any objection expressed by a representa­
tive [of a participating State] and submitted by him 
(sic) as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the 
decision In question.1*5
That Is to say "those who are not against us are with us,""7 this 
tacit agreement which Is implied by the absence of objection must 
be achieved before any procedural or substantive issue can be 
passed within the CSCE process. Decision making by consensus 
means more than unanimity, it requires that each delegation 
withholds any potential rejection of the matter under considera­
tion. Schlager states that,
*-Bloed op.cit p37.
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[Wlhile a decision taken by consensus may indicate 
unanimous support from all quarters. It may also mean a 
combination of voiced support and quiet abstention. 
Purposeful silence on the part of a delegation may 
relieve it of the political pressures it would face for 
publicly supporting abroad policies which would undoub­
tedly be unpopular at home, but It does not relieve a 
country of its obligation to comply with a commitment 
which has gained consensus. The end result is that no 
document emerges from this process which has not 
achieved consensus among the participating States.10
That was the theory, In practice any participating State, large, 
medium or small can block consensus, as did Malta both at Geneva, 
and in the-closing days of the Belgrade Follow Up Meeting in 
1978; highlighting that there are both negative and positive 
elements in consensus decision making.
At Belgrade, Malta threatened to withhold consensus to the
concluding document unless agreement was reached on holding an
intersessional meeting on Mediterranean security.’■'® However,
although each State can specifically refuse consensus, there can
still be consensus if unanimity cannot be achieved, because,
[lit may be easier to get negotiators to refrain from 
saying "no" than to actually say "yes" on some Issues. 
Secondly, it protects the smaller,less powerful States, 
as each country - no matter how small - has the right 
to block or permit the achievement of consensus.Thirdly 
it increases the incentives for most countries to 
participate in this process. That is it protects the 
numerical minority from the tyranny of the numerical 
majority. Finally,it maintains the creditabiiity of the 
process, as no country can undermine the validity of a
■■"Schlager op.clt.p223 .
■'Mastne y Helsinki. Human Rights, and European Security
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document by suggesting the commitments contained 
therein were imposed upon it.a°
Conversely, the obvious problem with consensus decision making is 
the slowness of progress, when the collective will of the whole
cannot be subsumed to the simple majority rule. As the Maltese
incident indicates, the use of the veto means that the consensus
rule may be open to abuse. Schlager cautions that it is neces-
sary to distinguish between a threat to block consensus and
actually blocking it.
The mere threat to block consensus without actually
doing so can be a useful negotiating tool and not 
necessarily abuse.... Whether or not the consensus 
rule has been "abused" must be evaluated in the light 
of the national priority attached to the issue in 
question, the good faith of the country in negotiating 
its stated goals, and the timing of the blocking of 
consensus... This form of decision making creates a 
procedural bias toward the status quo. Arguably this 
inhibits the process. At a time when historical, 
events seem to be rushing forward this may be a greater 
liability than during a period of prolonged tension.381
In other words, the participating States in adopting the consen­
sus decision making rule used it as a defensive mechanism to 
protect essential national interests. This was a Conference on 
cooperation, cooperation is activated in the interest of recipro­
city, but the concept of reciprocity has little meaning if there 
is not some measure of equality and this is what consensus 
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States, some with rights of veto and some without rights of veto, 
as in the Security Council of the United Nations. There is also
no use of, as in the General Assembly of the UN, the one majority 
principle.
£££01^13,3
Groupings of like minded States played important roles through­
out the whole process. The Warsaw Pact's Important position was 
marred only by its single dissenter, Rumania. Hence the Soviet 
position was the number one question, because whatever the 
Conference issue, it could be expected that five or six other
States would toe the same line. Rumania was at all times 
primarily interested in levers with which to enhance its own 
independence from the Soviet Bloc, until it came to Basket 
III, involving the issues on human rights and the freer movement 
of peoples. On these issues the Rumanians were more determined
than the Soviets themselves.®
The European Community.Nine
The Nine member States of the European Community had 'two distnnct 
roles at the Conference. The first resulted from the legal 
commitment under the Treaty of Rome for the Commission of the
■"-eeBhtoldt op.nkt.p76: see Article 18 and 79 of UN Charter
cited in Goodrich L.M.& -ambro E. Charter of the United.Nations
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European Communities to conduct trade negotiations on behalf of 
all members."'* In this they were supported by ad hoc committees. 
On political questions the Nine established an internal special 
subcommittee of the CSCE delegation heads, responsible to the 
political directors of the Nine foreign ministries. Although on 
the same level as the ad hoc committees working on the trade 
negotiations, this internal subcommittee was not subject to the 
same.legal commitment as the ad hoc groups on Basket II. Never­
theless both received joint policy guidance on most major 
questions from the political directors of the Nine. This, at 
that time when the European Community had just enlarged from six 
to nine to incorporate Britain, Ireland and Denmark, was
considered a remarkable feat. Maresca avers,
The Nine regarded this coordination as a particularly 
successful example of foreign policy coordination, an 
area in which they are still attempting to build habits 
and traditions .•5S“W
Crispen Tickell, who was the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office representative at the MPT and the Conference proper, was 
of the opinion that, in this way, by thrashing out ideas among 
themselves the Nine had over the months thought of just about 
every idea, possibility or manoeuvre which might occur, thus 
giving them the edge in the Helsinki Consultations.
'■"Ehrhardt C. "Europe after the Paris Conference: The 
Community and CSCE."Aussen Politik: 1973 Vol.25.No.1 p79.
^Ma^sca op.cit.pl9.
'iTic^Jkell C. "Enlarged Community and the Security Confere­
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The NATO Group
This group overlapped with the Nine, since all, except Ireland, 
were members of NATO thus strengthening their position at the
Conference. The six monthly communiques of NATO, as noted in
Chapter 1, served as the vehicle for Western dialogue vis-a-vis
the feasibility of a European security conference as,
Most Western ideas on substance or procedure had been 
aired in NATO before the Conference and the United 
States' leadership in these preparations had been 
strong
Although the largest group at the talks, a clear role for NATO 
was blocked in the second round of the preparatory talks on 
account of French antipathy toward "negotiation between the 
military blocs," echoing again what appears to be French paranoia
of American dominance. Hence there was no institutional link
between NATO as such, and the NATO group at the negotiations. 
There were no NATO representatives fitting into the delegations, 
as was the case with the group of Nine. Although the Americans 
played a modest role at the talks their membership of the NATO 
group served as a counterbalance to the strong Soviet position. 
And this in turn allowed the Nine to maintain a high profile at
the Conference.
The Berlin Group
The Four war-time allies acted together to preserve the quad­
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Germany in the light of the Treaties signed between the FRG nnd 
the Soviet Union, between the FRG and The Peoples Republic of 
Poland, the Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin which had been 
outstanding since 1945, and the Treaty between West and East 
Germany, as outlined in the previous chapter (p32).
Neutral and Non-aligned Group (NNA).
The NNA States comprising Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugos­
lavia, Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Liechtenstein and The Holy See 
formed a grouping around the most important neutrals. Spain 
considered itself neither neutral nor non-aligned and therefore 
participated in no group. This NNA group was supremely cohesive 
despite the strongly held principle that each participating State 
was an independent entity. The exclusion of this group from the
Vienna talks on MBFR made it all the keener to broaden the
military content of the Conference. Yet at the same time it 
served to prevent the two military alliances from performing as
such.
The. Mediterranean Group
This group met to co-ordinate views of special interest to the 
littoral States of the Mediterranean. It served to highlight the 
North-South aspect of the talks, i.e. the dichotomy between the 
largely industrialized, richer states of the North and the less 
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The Nordic Group
Membership consisted of the three NATO members - Iceland, Norway 
and Denmark - one a member of the Nine, Denmark, and two neutrals 
Sweden and Finland. Maresca points out that on certain questions 
the Nordic five's solidarity was stronger than that of either the 
Nine or of NATO, especially with regard to the fixing of the 
date for Stage III of the Conference.-T~C3
Structure
As laid out in the Blue Book the basic structure outlined in the
Dipoli talks indicated a three level structure. Conference was to 
function through a number of working bodies. The central organ 
was to be the Coordinating Committee, with provision being made 
for committees to handle each group of related subjects, and sub­
committees which could set up their own working groups, open to 
all participating States (HR 67-68).
Secretariat
The HR 74-79 limit the secretariat to strictly technical matters 
and Maresca records that any attempt to breach this remit was 
"firmly squashed by one or more of the delegations.
Early in the Dipoli talks it became clear that the Soviet
conception of a security Conference and the actual Conference as







The Multilateral Preparatory Talks
envisaged. Security for the Soviets, at that time, was visual­
ized as some form of collective non-aggression pact involving the 
whole of Europe. This could be achieved to their satisfaction 
with a simply phrased solemn declaration on the same lines as
Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.530
In addition to a non-aggression pact there was the additional 
theme of universal cooperation between Western and Eastern 
European States in fields of economics, technology and science. 
Most of these aims were addressed by the four main treaties 
outlined in the previous chapter. In a system perceived to be 
Realist dominated, what Brezhnev wanted was a high profile short 
sharp meeting, announcing the emergence of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) as a State in its own right. Unfortunately for 
Brezhnev too many other participants had vested interests.The 
European Community Nine and The Atlantic Alliance on the front 
line wanted, for the two Germanies and all other European States, 
not only a declaration of goodwill, but also clarification and 
confirmation of Peoples Rights, with guarantees of their applica­
tion and implementation. Therefore the argument went from the 
general to the specific. The East's wish for a generalized
30 Article 52:"Nothing in the present Charter precludes the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security and as are appropriate for regional action, provided 
that such an arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
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approach to produce a short sharp text consisting of mainly 
intergovernmental principles was juxtaposed alongside the West's 
preference for specialized groups to handle each subject to be 
addressed by the Conference. Round I of the Dipoli talks conclu­
ded with disagreement over the necessity for a Christmas recess, 
however, the majority wish for a Christmas interval prevailed.
At the beginning of the second round of talks it became clear
that the Christmas recess had not been wasted. The detailed
tasks which were offered for the commissions were divided into 
three groups, Security; Economic Cooperation and Environment 
Protection; and Contacts, Cultural and Information Exchange. The 
NNA States' submissions complemented those of the West. The
Eastern States also submitted short texts for the "instructions" 
adding the "creation of a permanent consultative body" as a 
fourth necessary topic,®* The ensuing discussion on the sub­
stance of the Conference brought the rough classification of 
subjects. The concept of Baskets was introduced to the process 
by the Swiss in order to avoid prejudicing the importance of any 
single subject. In other words, given the gamut of material 
submitted, and also that to each delegation its interest was as 
important, to it at any rate, as the next delegation's; the con­
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There were four Baskets in all, into the first went all questions 
on security. The second Basket took care of economic, technolog­
ical and environmental issues, and Basket three got human 
contacts, cultural and information exchange. The fourth Basket 
was simply labelled conference consequences.
On conclusion of Dipoli 2 the Swiss were charged with the task of 
arranging all the text proposals and the "instructions" in the 
relevant baskets. Once this task was completed actual material 
discussion commenced at the beginning of Dipoli 3.
Eleven subcommittees were set up responsible to the three main 
committees. A "special working body" at the same level as sub­
committees was established to address both the Swiss proposal for 
a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes in Europe, and
also the Rumanian proposal vis-a-vis the principle of refraining 
from the threat or use of force. As the negotiations progressed 
several other bodies were created including working groups on the 
follow up conference, and on the contentious Mediterranean
question.
At the outset misunderstandings arose as to the meanings of the 
terms used. For example, much discussion ensued over the question
of the inviolability of borders. The East wanted all other 
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principle. In contrast, many other participating States®' 
represented at the MPT wished to avoid the statement on borders 
being so restricted "that peaceful border adjustments or
abolition of borders would be excluded.”®®
DiUOU—l *
At Dipoli 3 the Baskets were addressed in chronological order, to 
facilitate the smaller delegations. Basket I held two com­
ponents: the principles of relations between states, and securi­
ty, including, at the West’s insistence, the right to self 
determination, a concept that the Soviets argued belonged only to 
colonial situutitno.s Agreement was finally reached that 
confidence building measures such as: prior notification of major 
military manoeuvers and troop movements were to be included in 
Basket I for consideration at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. 
This was mainly carried by the NNA States who were not represen­
ted at the MBFR talks at Vienna, as was the section, introduced 
by the Swiss, on peaceful settlement of disputes. ®;“';
Basket II contained all the questions relating to economics, 
science and technology, and environmental cooperation. The
^'Especially Ireland, given that Articles 2 and 3 of the 
1937 constitution lay claim to Northern Ireland, which has been 
incorporated in the UK since the signing of the Treaty in 1921.
^^von Groll op.cit.pl25.
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contents of this basket were of particular Interest to the East 
European participants and consequently they, following tactics 
first used at the MPT by the Weetern and NNA delegations, 
submitted texts with aasigind rrles. Nn ttis nara Spain, Yugos­
lavia, and Finland also proposed that questions appertaining to 
the underdeveloped regions, such as itinerant workers, and 
further questions on issues which arise from economic inter­
linking should also be addressed by the economic committee.
Grouped into Basket III were the issues relating to ’'Contacts 
Culture and Information Exchan^/e7 whch were to become the 
most difficult and contentious of all the issues handled by the 
foreign ministers at HHdeinei.
The Western draft, as prepared by Nth Dannst, adhered to the 
position, which was laid out in Section 13 of the dNTO communique 
of December 1970, that the real impediments to the "free movement 
of people, ideas and information,"^*3 should be on the agenda for 
the foreign ministers' meeting. This was viewed by the Soviets 
as an instrument of ideological subversion and hence was the 
subject of protracted negotiations. The Soviets presented their
=aibid pl27.
n^iaam
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own texts for the "sadani ja,' meaning "instructions,"'* to the 
commission dealing with Basket III, stressing the concept of 
sovereignty, non-interference and existing laws. This was aimed 
at constraining any agreed formula or provision they did not want 
to implement. It became clear that this was a principle of 
selectivity, which would allow the East to "select and reject as 
they pleaeed.”*"’ Rumania was more communist or status quo 
oriented than the Soviets themselves, when it came to the area of 
"freer movement of people" From the Western perspective, if the 
issues of the people such as, family reunions, easing of travel,
media and transmissions were not to be addressed then a Con­
ference would be pointless. The East were aware that to secure 
Western endorsement of the inviolability o£ booders meent giving 
way on demands for the contents of Basket III. Basket III
contents were not so much a matter of principles, rather they 
were the discussion of practical measures designed to improve 
contacts and cooperation. So as early as these preliminary 
procedural negotiations in the Spring of 1973 the Soviets agreed 
somewhat reluctantly to the Basket III agenda of topipi thah 
would eventually dominate the Helsinki process. However, no
reference was made to the freer flow of ideas.
^"von Groll lp.cia.pa24.
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Basket IV, labelled Conference consequences, resulted from the
Soviet desire to create some sort of permanent organ to continue
the work of the Conference. Many States were reluctant to 
consent to the creation of new international bodies at this stage 
in the MPT. This would have bound the West to establishing an 
institution before agreement on its specific function had been 
reached. It also increased the risk that pertinent issues could 
be evaded by deferring them oo the follow pp meetings.-1 The NNA 
States were also keen on the cooceE^t^ eo esme esot of follow up 
mechanism, because it afforded them a continuing forum for multi­
consultations os European issues, which they did not ordinarily 
have. The compromise that was reached allowed for a coordinating 
committee charged tt oc^sMee,
[Sluch measures as may be require! et ggve further 
effect to the decisions of the conference nde oo 
further the pmces oo ivertlivn security and develop­
ing cooperation in Europe.
Dl_P.O.n. 4. .
Began os 25 April 1973, and addressed a comprehensive workload. 
This Round was by all accounts the most hectic period, and is the 
space of four or five weeks organized what Final Recommeceaeiocs 
were to be submitted to the governments of participating States
at Helsinki. The inevitabho increase in the work oO the main
-■'.•■von Groll ’’The Genevo CSCE NegotiaVisss” Ausseo PoVeVie 
1979,Vol 25 No.2 pl59; Times London 3 July 1973.
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conference necessitated adjustments to the Standing Orders, and a 
special working group at Dipoli addressed this question.
Finances
The host country of each stage was to advance all monies neces­
sary to host that stage subject to reimbursement by the par­
ticipating States (HR 92).
Observer Status
The contentious question of observation for non eligible States 
was left an open question and it was to cause problems at Stage I
in Helsinki.
Follow up Venues
The Finnish efforts and achievement in establishing the MPT and
ipso facto the CSCE, were recognized by the agreement to site 
both ceremonial meetings at Helsinki i.e. Stage I and Stage III.
Geneva was chosen for the working Stage II because its central 
location was thought to be more convenient for protracted
negotiations, In addition, the fact that telephone calls from 
Helsinki were often routed via Moscow and East Berlin, engendered
unease about privacy among the Western diplomats.*3
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Languages
Six languages: English, French, Gers^an, Italian, Russian and 
Spanish were used (HR 81). The task of translating text from
English or French working papers, which contained agreements and 
recommendations that were already compromises,into acceptable 
German text had to bt caceied at Diploi 4. As well as signif­
icantly incrcaeing the wordoab ait Dipoli 4, this was the 
beginning of o problem which wos to recur throughout the talks. 
The aim throughout was to end in June 197(3, but this hinged on 
the progress made at the MPT. On 8 June 1973 the participating 
States, by consensus agreed the Helsinki Final Recommendations. 
Fundamental to any understanding of the CSCE process is the 
concept that all component elements in the agenda for Helsinki 
were of equal weight and significance."'*
Crispen Tickell records,
The substaan ef ebe nilal RwconmladfWrsas which 
emerged from the consultations at Helsinki between 
November 1972 and June 1973 wholly reflects the Western 
idea of what the Conference should be about...rather 
than a high profile declaratory affair of peace,brot- 
heriwwl and high princi^e.
This emphasis on substance was reflected in the British Foreign 
Secretary's address delivered at Stage I of the Conference proper 
at Helsinki with the reminder that the issues were not military 
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trust which had been so conspicuously lacking during recent 
European history.
The people of our countries will not thank or congratu­
late us for adding more solemn declarations to the 
world's archives different from other such documents 
only in the signatures underneath them.'
The balance that was struck at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks 
gave the politico/military, economic, and the human dimension 
equal ranking, and linked them together thus making it clear that 
cooperation between governments in the interests of the people 
was the goal of the Helsinki Recommendations. Despite all the 
obstacles encountered on the way, not least the disagreements 
between East and West, the MPT produced a carefully drafted 
Conference agenda in the form of the Blue Book. The Blue Book 
set out a total of ninety six recommendations on the organiza­
tional and procedural aspects of the CSCE, which became the 
blueprint for the Conference proper.*'7
In the words of the French Foreign Minister Jobert,
[lit describes what has to be done for the peaceful 
development of Europe in the coming years. The how- 
that is to say the filling out of the programme, is the 
most important task of the commissions phase in Geneva.
'Sir Alec Douglas-Home 5 July 1973: Cmnd 6932 pl58.
■'zBloed A.op.cit.p3.
■‘von Groll "The Foreign Ministers at Helsinki" Aussen 
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However, a NATO REVIEW of that period carried a timely caution.
It is important to underline this distinction between 
the process of deciding whether to hold a Conference, 
which is now completed, and the process of detailed 
substantive negotiation which lies ahead. For if this 
is not understood, there may be a tendency to imagine 
that we are a good deal further on in our journey than 
is the case,and there may be undue disappointment at 
the pace of future progress.**®




The Foreign Minister’s Meeting at Helsinki opened at high level 
on 3 July 1973 to commence the introductory work of the Con­
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The purpose of 
this meeting was for the Foreign Ministers to adopt the rules of 
procedure and the agenda, as laid out by the Multilateral Prepar­
atory Talks in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consul­
tations. The Final Recommendations set out the draft resolutions
or directives in a language not renowned for its aesethicism. 
The translation of working papers from English and French into 
German text of the official documents had to bridge the divide 
between capitalist, socialist, neutral and non-aligned States.
In other words, the final text was a compromise, and described by 
the French Foreign Minister Jobert as "a giant torrent of
words."s°
•■•"NATO REVIEW 19 7 3 No 5 p4 .
v°vonGroll "The Foreign Ministers in Helsinki" Aussen 






The United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim addressed the 
Conference as the guest of honour, giving the international 
dimension that the Soviets desired so much. Thereafter the
foreign minister of each participating State spoke setting out 
the views of their respective Governments on questions relating 
to security and cooperation in Europe.
Finnish President Kekkonen in his opening speech observed at the 
outset that, "This is no meeting of the victors of war..., nor is 
it a meeting of the great powers.""'
Secretary-General Waldheim told the assembly at Helsinki,
[Wl’e now stand at a decisive turning point in world 
history. After a long period of acute international tensions throughout the world we are now conscious of a 
new situation and a new mood.""
This emphasises that detente goes much deeper than simply better 
political relations between the great powers, rather, true dete­
nte Involves the true understanding of the values and interests
of others.
It does require that all nations should try to under­
stand and certainly to tolerate,the systems and 
attitudes of others.-®
Immediately at Helsinki the issue of the littoral States of the 
Mediterranean, Algeria and Tunisia, was raised by Malta's Prime
Minister Dom Mintoff; echoed by Spain's Foreign Minister Lopez








Rodo. This procedural issue, which was strongly opposed by the 
Soviets, was resolved after two private talks between Herr Winzer
• East German Foreign Minister, who was chairman for the day, and 
Dom Mintoff. In an attempt to keep Middle Eastern issues off the 
agenda a working committee was set up to deal with this matter. 
Much merriment was caused when Mintoff was chosen, by lot, to be 
the second chairman of the special committee set up to consider 
his request.""
The preamble on questions relating to security states,
...the wider objective of promoting better relations 
among participating states and ensuring conditions in 
which their people can live in true and lasting peace 
free from any threat or attempt against their security.
Just how variable the "values and interests" of other States were
came to light with the questions appertaining to security at 
Helsinki. By and large the Western and NNA States emphasized the 
renunciation of force, while the inviolability of borders and 
territorial Integrity was stressed as a priority by the Eastern 
Bloc States. Military deterrence and credible defence were 
underlined as essential prerequisites for security. Absolute 
priority was given to sovereign equality, non interference and 
the right to self determination by the smaller and non-aligned
"""pavy R Times London 6 July 1973 p4:Cmnd 69 3 2 pl70:see also 
Maresca op.cit.p89.
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States. Switzerland stressed the effectiveness' of imposing 
binding obligations upon states to settle disputes peacefully. 
Human rights and basic liberties, consistent fulfillment of 
treaties, were all given voice as guarantors of security, and all 
featured in the Decalogue of principles that issued from Helsinki
as follows
- sovereign Equality respect for the rights inherent 
in sovereignty
- refraining from threat or use of force
- inviolability of frontiers,
- territorial integrity of States
- peaceful settlement of disputes
- non intervention in internal affairs
- respect for Human rights and fundamental freedoms including 
freedom of thought conscience religion and belief,
- equal rights and self determination of peoples
- cooperation among states
- fulfillment in good faith of obligations under International 
law.
As the MPT were concerned more with procedural issues and with
identifying differences that would have to be fully discussed at
the Conference proper should one transpire, the Soviets were
required to give a good deal of ground toward accepting that real
issues would have to be addressed if they were to gain the
Conference they so badly wanted. From here on they aimed at
recovering lost ground. Povolny points out that,
[Wlhat the Soviets had given away to bring the prepara­
tory consultations to a close, she [sicltried immed­








Following the speeches of the Finnish President, and the guest of 
honour at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko had pride of place among the assembled. Places 
were allocated on a first come first served basis. He spoke
first by dint of an all night vigil, outside the Marski Hotel, by 
a junior Soviet diplomat to ensure primacy on "the speaker’s 
list."='z "Europe of the future" he said, "must be a continent 
where aggression is excluded for ever from the life of its 
pec^ples.'"""* Mr Gromyko’s Soviet draft declaration stated that in 
order to achieve this it was necessary that,
[Tlhe participating States regard the existing fron­
tiers in Europe now and in the future as inviolable, 
shall not raise any territorial claims against each 
other and recognize that peace in this region can only 
be maintained if nobody disputes the present fron­
tiers. .'""
For the Soviets the renunciation of force was defined as an
obligation to exclude war as a means of solving international
disputes. This was seen by the West as an attempt to dissolve the
United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration simply to read:
[Elvery State has the duty to refrain from the threat 
or use of force to violate the existing international 
boundaries of another si:<at^.*°
This ignored the fact that the United Nations document actually 
embodies the forgoing in the principle of refraining from the
"■rzMaresca op.cit.p39:see also Times London 6 July 1973 p4. 
ttCmnd 6932 Document 59,pl61
o»von Groll "The Foreign Ministers at Helsinki" Aussen 
Politik 1973 Vol.24 No.3 p261.






threat or use o£ force. The inviolability of frontiers contrary 
to what the Soviets wished to convey is not a separate principle. 
The Foreign Ministers’ of the Western States spoke out clearly on 
this issue pointing out that one can only "violate" frontiers 
with force. The Inviolability of frontiers, therefore was a 
"field of application" of renunciation of force thus making it 
clear that "peaceful change" of frontiers was indeed their 
goal.®’'
Wearing two hats, as Danish Foreign Minister, and as the represe­
ntative of the Presidency of the European Communities, Foreign 
Minister Andersen pointed out that the basic principles were an 
"indivisible whole." And that force was the classical means by
which a frontier is violated,
(Alt the same time the principle of inviolability of 
frontiers did not mean that 7rontiers could 7oo, under 
any circumstance, be dianned. 7uch 2chanes hhd to be 
based on agreement freely entered upon by the states 
concrnned.
Foreign Minister Scheel of West Germany reminded the meeting that
there were many instances in which West Germany had given
contractual undertakings not to use force to change borders, at
the same time emphasising that,
(Tlhe political aim of the Federal Republic was to help 








German nation can regain its unity in - free self­
determination.
This Soviet interpretation of "inviolability as meaning im­
mutability," deeming that borders should be inviolable and 
permanently unchangeable was anathema to Ireland and the West 




The question of the MBFR talks at which the NNA States had no 
representation generated much discord. Failure to have MBFR 
included as an agenda item, gave way to demands that the Vienna 
talks should be obliged to report to the Conference. The Super 
Powers at that time were pursuing bilateral interests and wished
to keep military matters at the CSCE at a minimum. What evolved 
was Confidence Building Measures (CBM); principally CBM were 
evolved to identify the spheres of military activities that were 
deemed to be more political in character. Therefore, the final 
document of the Helsinki Consultations, under HR 23, allowed
only that,
Major military manoeuvers of the participating States
are to be notified in advance to the conference and
manoeuvre observers are to be exchanged. ®'"”
eJ3idem
®"-""nto the labyrinth rode the six hundred" Economist 
September 29 1973.p41.
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A military manoeuvre is simply an exercise designed to test the
readiness to mount or thwart an offensive. It can be used as a
signal which is either clear or misunderstood; ambiguity creates 
tension which can lead to a crisis situation with the inbuilt
propensity to escalation. In the UK delegation’s view the 
inclusion of HR 23 viz the prior notification and the exchange of 
observers would greatly reduce this risk.
The question of prior notification of major military movements 
was to be included in the remit of the First Committee at the 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting at Geneva. Much of the above argument 
used for the notification of manoeuvres, can be applied to the 
prior notification of major military movements. The UK delega­
tion argued that, if anything, major military movements could be 
potentially more threatening than manoeuvres
On this Issue the Rumanian Foreign Minister reiterated his demand 
for the closure of all military bases, the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops and dissolution of military blocs, but this along 
with the Finnish Foreign Minister's request for discussion at the 
Conference of a non nuclear zone in Scandinavia, found no space 
for discussion. This being a clear indication of how rigorously 
the Conference adhered to the prepared text of the Blue Book...







Economic, Science and Technology and Environment issues had 
caused problems at Dipoli 4, over the two principles, viz most 
favoured nation treatment, and non discrimination, which appeared 
in section 3 of the preamble," ... reciprocity of advantages and 
obligations... with regard for the diversity of economic and 
social systems"(HR 27). These problems arose because the concept 
of reciprocity was not applicable between planned and market
economies. Geneva’s remit was to work out recommendations for
concrete measures to develop cooperation in the following 
sectors,
- Trade
- Industrial cooperation and projects of common 
interest.
- Science and Technology
- Environment





Chapter III of the Blue Book entitled,"Cooperation in Humanitar­
ian and Other Fields"(HR 42) aspired to,
[T]he spiritual enrichment of the human personality, 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or 







The aims of the Blue Book were thus to seek improvement in human
contacts, information, cooperation in the field of culture, as 
well as cooperation and exchanges in the field of education.
The concept of a Follow Up Mechanism to the Conference was











The Coordinating committee shall consider, on the basis 
of the progress made at the Conference, such measures 
as may be required to give effect to the decisions of 
the Conference and to further the process of improving 
security and developing cooperation in Europe.Having 
considered proposals to this effect, including propos­
als of an organizational nature, it shall make any 
recommendations which it deems necessary.In examining 
the follow up of the Conference, the Committee shall 
also consider the contribution which it believes could 
be asked from existing international organizations.^0
In this way the West avoided pre commitment to the creation of a 
permanent fixed structure. Whatever form the further Conferences 
would take, would thereby be determined exclusively by the 
results of the Conference. This despite Gromyko's hint that too 
much should not be expected from this first Conference, affirming 
that possible subsequent Conferences would have to be prepared in 
some organizational form or other.®”®
Two important tasks were achieved at Helsinki Stage I: the recom­
mendations of the MPT were unanimously approved, endorsing the 
work of Stage II in which questions of substance were to be 
addressed. It was also agreed that Stage II should open in 
Geneva on 18 September preceded by a preparatory meeting of the 
Coordinating Committee beginning on 29 August.zo The question of
°Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations: Cmnd 
6932 Document 52,pl43-58.
®evon Groll op.cit.p267.
"zoCmnd 69 3 2 Document 58,pl71.
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the duration of the Geneva meeting was left open thereby frustra­
ting the Soviets wish for an early time limit.
Part iii
stage. n... Geneva
In line with HR 77, no official verbatim records were to be kept 
except at the first and third ceremonial stages. Delegations were 
free to keep records if they so wished, accordingly the work of 
J.J.Maresca, the US delegation deputy head: crispen Tickell the 
UK delegate representing the Nine: and Gotz von Groll the deputy 
head of the FRG delegation have been drawn on extensively in what
follows.
The Geneva talks took place in an atmosphere in which, according 
to a Times Editorial, "the split with China made the Soviets even
more anxious to secure her [sic] western frontiers, jn other 
words hostility to China was pushing the Soviets toward a more 
stable relationship with the West. Also the 1971 Five Year Plan 
had shifted the emphasis from "producer goods to consumer goods" 
and called for expenditure on such a scale that fulfillment was 
impossible without Western cooperation, which in turn was 
impossible while the rigid Cold War posture was maintained.'7'-* 
With this in mind the April 1973 Plenum of the CPSU produced
‘Z1 Times ,London , 3 July 1973 pl7.
'■In theory Five Year Plans are subject,to the force of 
law, failure to implement and fulfill the requirements can lead 
to the prosecution of those responsible. Shaw W.& Price D. 






, Stage II Geneva
complete support for their First secretary Brezhnev, and the
policy of detente. Mr Brezhnev believed that with detente they 
could have both "guns and butter. "ZS3
In pursuit of the title as arbiter of European security the
Soviets were keen that CSCE should succeed. Yet despite the
chief Swiss delegate, Mr Rudolf Bindschedler’s caution in his
welcoming speech at Geneva that,
Solemn declarations were inadequate, precision in 
agreements was necessary if national and individual 
freedom crucial for real security were to be
obtained,'7"*
the Soviets preferred broad agreements to allow flexibility of 
interpretation rather than specific commitments that lesser 
States could invoke for their own protection. Consequently the 
Conference moved from the specific to the general rather than 
vice versa and the outcome depended on the balance of its three 
baskets. Considering also that diverse views take time to 
resolve, especially when consensus is necessary, these were 
lengthy discussions. Hence this Geneva Stage which Brezhnev had 
hoped would be the swift jewel in his crown turned into a two 
year diplomatic marathon. The Economist, as early as September 
1973, averred that what Brezhnev really wanted was an enhanced 
profile that would earn him a place in Soviet history books as
T^idem. -
'z"*"Into the labyrinth rode the six hundred" Economist 






the man who managed, in the teeth of Western imperialist opposi­
tion, to legitimize the system that Russia had imposed on Eastern 
Europe .
There was, however, a long struggle at Geneva and the talks were 
wound up at the eleventh hour, just in time to enable the high 
level summit to take place in Helsinki in early August. If that
date had been missed there would have been little chance of
staging the 35 State summit before both the 25th CPSU Congress in 
February 1976 and the unveiling of a new Five Year Plan. Given 
that the promises made in the last Five Year Plan had not been 
fulfilled and that the 1975 grain harvest was the worst harvest 
for 10 years, Brezhnev needed something positive to report, to 
enable him to crown his years as leader.ZKS
The division of Europe was in no way unnatural to the Soviets. It 
established Soviet hegemony and, hopefully, enhanced the poten­
tial for Soviet expansionism. This encouraged the Soviets to 
support a Conference conducted in an apparently cordial atmo­
sphere, which created an impression of broad agreement and gen­
eral amity without the need for any real change. However, as 
outlined above, the Soviets were anxious for increased oppor­
tunities for Soviet trade in the West and the benefits that would
accrue from greater access to Western technical know how.Z£" On
'zraShaw & Pryce.op.cit.p88. 






the other hand, in the West where the postwar division of Europe 
was regarded as artificial and therefore distasteful, there was a 
commitment from the outset to real change. Given the conflicting 
aims and aspirations of the major participants, the West sought 
and required a precision and clarity of language not hitherto 
present in the documents; whereas the East wished to keep the 
language vague and imprecise. This is one reason why prolonged 
bargaining ensued at Geneva.
In the House of Commons on 9 July 1973 the Foreign Secretary Sir 
Alec Douglas Home said,
The onus will be largely on them and tin Eastern 
Europeans to say what they will bb able to do about 
increased talks and the increased exchange of ideas and 
people. 'zz
Despite any implication of simplicity in this statement, immed­
iately prior to the Geneva Stage II, indeed, concurrent with the 
preparatory meeting, which began on 29 August 1973, the internal 
trial of political dissenters Pyotr Yakir and Victor Krasin was 
in full-swing in Moscow. The accused were found "guilty" of 
having connections with the anti communist emigre organization 
the NTS (Popular Labour Front n,”™’ add of working as paid in­
formers of foreign correspondents in Moscow. The fact that no
z"zcmnd 69 e2 Document 58, pl72.
7BAcrynom - NTS derived from Russian words Popular Labour 
Front, usually described as right wing,worldwide strength of the 






foreign correspondents were allowed in the courtroom was read in
the West as failure on the part of the Soviets still to
understand that"internal and external affairs cannot be kept in
separate compartments."'-* The Times pointed out that the Soviet
regime's attack on Sakharov, subsequent to his criticism of the
suppression of elementary human rights,
[SJuggest the system is too insecure to face even 
modest level of dissent and modest lessening of its 
isolation. Blind to the fact that its critics are 
trying to save it from its own stagnation and are 
demanding no more than is promised by the Soviet 
constitution J-30
Internally Pravada and Izvestia ran articles of denunciation 
against Professor Sakharov and Mr Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 
supposedly by "ordinary workers" regarding statements that were 
in fact unpublished.*31 Sakharov argued that,
[TJrue international understanding and relaxation could 
not be achieved unless a democratized Russia gave its 
citizens free access to information and freedom to 
travel. Nor could there be a clearer illustration of 
what the pan European conference, that was formally 
opened in Helsinki in July, and is oo be properly 
started in Geneva on September 18th, is really about. «as® 
Speaking to a French correspondent on 21 August 1973 immediately
prior to the impending Conference Sakharov cautioned,
In this dialogue the Soviet Union is the interested 
party, it is bluffing hard. It is very important that
Times London 1 September 1973 p4:see also "Behind the 
facades" Economist 8 September 1973 pl4:also Maresca op.cit.pl36.
* eoTimes London 1 September 1973 p4.
t‘r "Behind the facades" 8 September : "Hugging the bear"
Economist 22 September 1973 pl5:pl4.






the Western countries should make full use of their trump cards. But they must understand they are dealing
with a very crafty partner who has the advantages of a 
totalitarian regime.
However, it was not a straightforward issue for the Western
participating States, consequently there was intense debate on
the ethics of pushing the Soviets too far on internal affairs.
Considered opinion held that there was a limit to the influence
that could be exerted on other States’ conduct, especially on the
conduct of regimes in the entrenched and authoritarian structures
of the Communist world. Kissinger averred,
We cannot be indifferent to the denial of human liberty 
but we cannot at the same time so insist on transforma­
tion in the domestic structure of the Soviet system as 
to give up the general evolution that we are hopefully 
starting
An opposing view was argued by Prof.Hans Morgenthau,
[A! government that cuts itself and its people off from 
objective contact with the outside world, that becomes 
a prisoner of its own propaganda, cannot pursue a 
foreign policy one can rely on to recognize let alone 
respect, those self imposed moral limitations that are 
the basis of a viable balance of power policy. C3f“i
The debate was not simply a moralistic or a realistic one, since 
the two concepts overlap. Political detente without human detente 
carries no substance. The Soviet Union was sending confusing 
signals. On the one hand Mr Gromyko was saying that the Cold War
was over.
m^ibid pl5.







IWle want trust and mutual understanding to allow the 
gradual overcoming of the division of the continent 
into military/political groupings. Relations between 
states should be based on peaceful and mutually 
beneficial cooperation.*"
On the other hand, as intimated by Povolny, internally the 
ideological struggle continued.
Some participating States were afraid that exerting too much 
pressure on the Soviets would be counter productive. Other
States were determined that no cosmetic version of detente would
suffice. The West would not be tempted into relaxation of its 
vigilance in case the Soviets were bent on expansionism. As many 
of the speeches at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Stage I 
indicated, detente for the West was to be based on the pivotal 
questions of democracy and individual freedom. The trial of the 
political dissidents contributed little to the enhancement of
democratization.
The Soviets had two advtatag es in Gene^. Give n tHeir political 
system they could with apparent impunity disregard public
opinion. They were pastmastirs at misinformation; foreign 
broadcasts were jammed, and the controlled press could and did 
stage "spontaneous" outbursts at whim. Consequently they had no 
need to inform their ppblic what was going on at -fche Conference, 
they could even misinform them. By contrast, in the West,
especially in the FRG, Conference proceedings were subjected to
*'Povolny op. 011^22..
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critical scrutiny. This worked to the advantage of the Soviets in 
two ways, because as well as being able to disregard their own 
public opinion they could also exploit Western public opinion to 
the maximum extent, owing to the desire of ordinary people to see 
continuing improvement in East-West relations.
That there was nothing to be gained by the uneasy confrontational 
situation of the 1950*s was the only certainty for both sides. 
Yet unless the Soviet Union was prepared to open up, as Sir Alec 
Douglas Home clearly intimated they must, the vital element of 
predictability would be missing from any possible security arran­
gements.®'3 Consequently, in the declaration guiding relations 
between States included in the remit of Basket I, proposals must 
have a practical effect upon the conduct of States. They must
include measures to reduce tensions, progress toward the freer
/
movement of people, and freer exchange of information and ideas. 
It had become clear during the MPT, that too much precision would 
most probably cause the Soviets to seek escape clauses in order 
to circumvent any agreements which were likely to endanger the 
precedence of the national laws or customs of any participating 
State. This was viewed, by the West, as akin to an opt out
clause designed to minimize the impact of agreements such as 
freer movement of peoples, and freer exchange of information
and ideas. For the West this was not a question of interfer-






ference in internal affairs, rather it was matter of making the 
obvious point that domestic and foreign policies cannot be wholly 
separated. The sort of cooperation that the Soviets claimed to 
want entailed abandoning their isolated autocracy and this, in 
the Finnish President's words, meant "opening gates" between the 
two systems. Furthermore, if elementary human rights are, "more 
honoured in the breach than the o^^sev^r^ce,"c', then Western 
public opinion would be less likely to support political con­
tracts .
The Working Stage II at Geneva ran from September 1973 until 21 
July 1975. In compliance with HR 80 all sessions were closed to 
the public. At the outset of the work in Geneva, although the 
very size of the delegations created a measure of incoherence and 
uncertainty, the habits and groupings that had been established 
at the MPT prevailed. However, the Russians and the Rumanians 
were very anti the Commission speaking for the Nine, consequ­
ently every time the European Community Commission's spokesman 
Lowis Kawan attempted to speak about trade matters there was a 
barrage of objections. But, as has been pointed out above, the 
EEC at CSCE was legally bound to respect its own competences and 
where the Treaties already signed required it, represent itself 
in line with this.'”"’ At the Bundestag debate on CSCE on 17
K,'”Hamlet I.iv.






October 1974, held at the request of the CDU/CSU group, this
point was also raised and defined.
Where the European Community is concerned, the East must 
realize that an increase in cooperation is only possible on 
the basis of 'realities.' That means on any sector such as 
trading policy which is part of the European Community's 
jurisdiction can only be signed with the Community it­
self. . .
The Rumanians feared that the Soviets would use the acceptance of 
the Commission representative as a precedent to introduce Comecon 
as a spokesman for the Eastern States.This fear was allevi­
ated through private assurances "in the wings" that the Soviets 
would not attempt to bring Comecon into Geneva and hereafter the 
Rumanians refrained from attacking Mr Kawan’s contributions to 
Basket II issues. By standing firm against Soviet grumbling the 
Nine won the day, and so became the "fully fledged" partner the 
Soviets needed to negotiate with given the United States reserve. 
The Commission itself was represented by the inclusion of 
Commission Officials as members of the delegation holding the 
Presidency of the Nine. During the course of the lengthy Geneva 
talks Commission officials acted within the Danish, FRG, French, 
Irish and Italian delegations in line with the rotation of the 
Presidency of the Nine.®03
9ivon Groll"The Bundestag Debate" Aussen Politik 1974 
Vol.25 No.4 p378.
®ffiComecon: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Es­
tablished Moscow 1949,viewed as Soviet response to growing 
European integration.
®03Tickell op.cit.:"The mood relaxes as Russia and Europe 






One factor that may have helped to win the day for Mr Kawan was
that from the beginning of 1973 the EC had taken over all 
national bilateral trade agreements made by the Nine with East
European States. At the end of 1974 they were to be renegotiated 
by the EC acting in unison in an attempt to harmonize all export 
credit policies with the East. Western diplomacy came to the 
fore when the Danes invited the General Secretary of Comecon to 
call on the Commission in Brussels at any time of his choosing.
In Brussels this was seen as a useful face saver for the Soviets
at a time when the East European States would have to start 
negotiating quotas and trade matters on an Individual bilateral 
basis with the CommnniSy.''*
The first task to be sorted out at Geneva was the question of 
"observers." This had been left open at the Dipoli 4 talks, and 
also caused confusion at Stage I in Helsinki, when the Maltese 
Prime Minister demanded a hearing for the littoral States of the 
Mediterranean, Tunisia and Algeria. Despite the Yugoslavian 
delegation's vehement opposition to a hearing for Israel which 
was sponsored by the Dutch, Danes and Norwegians, it was agreed 
that.
[Tlhose Mediterranean states that had sought a hearing 
should be heard at weekly intervals over a long month 
of Tuesdays, starting on October 9th, in order of their
*®-”TTie mood relaxes as Russia and Europe join the dance" 






application which was Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Syria,
Egypt, Morocco.
The working bodies of the Conference were quickly set up,as
stipulated by HR67. They consisted of a first commission with 
two subcommittees, a second with five subcommittees, and a third 
with four subcommittees. All sessions were to be held in private 
and Conference documents were to be distributed only to the 
participants. Amongst the Western caucus the workload was shared 
by means of assigning areas of interest. It was agreed that 
Britain should take the lead on freedom of information; France on 
cultural exchanges and Italy on educational issues; while the 
Danes and the Germans were to present proposals on freedom of 
movement incorporating the reuniting of divided families. 
Agreements were initially informally agreed, then provisionally 
registered and then in the final draft all brackets were removed.
First Commission.
The first commission consissed of two subcommittees. The task
of the first subcommittee was to draft a code of good interna­
tional conduct, which would eventually emerge as the Ten Prin­
ciples of the Final Act. The Soviet version of what constituted 
good International conSdct pleesse only the Soviet block,
therefore much discussion ensued.
■‘’’®”ini:o the labyrinth rode the six hundred" Economist 






The second subcommittee was concerned with Confidence Building
Measures. CBM were proposals designed to reduce the sense of
menace caused by the maintenance of large military forces by the
two superpowers until such times as the force levels themselves
could be lowered by the MBFR talks which were taking place
concurrently in Vienna. This may have been the reason the United
States seemed determined to keep a low profile at CSCE. Some
have argued that the Nixon Administration saw the CSCE,
[Plrimarily as a bargaining chip to be used to extract 
Soviet concessions in areas of more direct interest to 
the United States such as arms control.®*
The second subcommittee managed to start work immediately. The UK 
delegation, acting as NATO's floor leader, tabled its draft on 
CBM dealing with prior notification of all large scale military 
manoeuvres and movements. The measures being proposed were 
modest: advance exchange of information about troop manoeuvres 
and perhaps movements; freedom of movement and the freer 
exchange of ideas and information between East and West.
That this draft text was compiled by the UK delegation text 
reflected longstanding British interest in these aspects of 
security. In 1954 Sir Anthony Eden had first mooted similar 
proposals for European security after the collapse of the plans 
for the European Defence Community.®®
®*CRS Issue Brief wp.cit.p3.
"“zCmndo__69032 Document 5 p2:see also Thomas H.Ever Closer 
Union: Britain's Destiny in Europe. London,Hutchinson 1991 p67: 
Laqueur W.Europe Since Hitler. London Penguin Rev.ed.1982 ppl49- 






The Soviets stalled immediately on the issue of 
movements,agreeing at least to discuss advance notific­
ation of manoeuvres and the invitation of observers to 
watch them.®*’
According to Maresca the united States also "opposed the idea of 
giving advanced notification of major military movements" despite 
this being backed by most other NATO States. Other differences 
surfaced over the inclusion of naval and amphibious manoeuvres of 
particular interest to the NATO flank States.
Second Commission
The five subcommittees of the second commission dealt with trade, 
industrial cooperation, science and technology and environmental 
issues as well as other problems which Spain, Yugoslavia and 
Finland percieved to be linked with economic issues. The accep­
tance by the Soviets that the EC were not going to be deterred 
from acting in unison in all matters that fell under the scope of 
the Treaty of Rome, prevented major hitches in this area.
Third. Co,.mmls.si.Q.n.
The third commission with its four subcommittees was the one 
least welcomed by the Soviets. Its remit was to find new ways to 
facilitate "freer movement and contacts individually or collec­
tively": "freer and wider dissemination of information of all
For more on EDC see Understanding the Euroneco Communitjes 
Nicholl W.& Salmon TC.London Allan 199. pll:Archec e. Qonnnnming 
Western Europe London Arnold 1130 pl69.
■^’lInto the labyrinth rode the six hundred" Economist 






kinds, including wider cultural exchanges, and greater education­
al cooperation.’’®' This agenda was accepted by Mr Gromyko on 
behalf of the Soviet government, despite the fact that inside the
USSR the position remained categorically that,
(Tlhe ideological struggle will grow relentlessly and 
steadily sharper, and cooperation with the West will be 
allowed to erode neither its inspiration nor its 
goals? '
The endorsement of this agenda negated any claim that discussion 
of such issues were an intrusion into a State’s internal affairs, 
and amounted to tacit recognition that the power of the State
must be constrained.
No matter how much ill this concept boded for the Soviets, in 
agreeing to the agenda thrashed out at the MPT, and subsequently 
approved, earlier in the summer, at Helsinki the Soviets had 
accepted these terms. Furthermore they clearly understood that 
for the other participating States, without the inclusion of 
these issues on the agenda there would be no Conference. So in 
their eagerness to produce a Conference the Soviets were prepared 
to have these matters discussed and to see acceptable agreements 
as part of the overall outcome of the Conference. In short, if 
the European Communist states were not ready for human contacts 
then they had "no business talking about cooperation and coexist








ence,”XO1 If the Conference had evaded this issue it would
simply have buried,
Eastern Europe under a twentieth-century version of the 
Peace of Westphalia's cuius regio euis religio... and 
leave the world charged with incessant ideological 
confrontation generating its own explosive consequen­
ces, ooa
Many Basket III rights were embodied in the Soviet constitution, 
so they could not object in principle, nor so sharply as to 
contradict their support for detente, Because fragile though the 
policy of detente was, tte aiLm was, to replace confrontation by 
diplomacy.
According to Deutsch, diplomacy is the process of communication 
and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their 
relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war, 
Usually in diplomatic bargaining the perceptions and interests 
of both sides are treated as given and the rules of the game are 
applied across the board until an acceptable outcome is reached 
or the talks are abandoned or adjourned. Through means of 
communication each party to the negotiating process stands to 
learn something about the other which will eventually lead to a 
convergence of negotiating positioos .iOia Throughout the CSCE 
process the Soviets displayed a very Hobtesiain view of their
Times London 3 July 19 7 3 pl7.
i-o-^Povoony Tp,ctt,p229 : - Cuius regio eius religio = The
ruler of a territory chooses its religion.
^Deutsch K,The Analisis of International' Relations, New 






State's relations with other powers. For them the "Divine Right 
of Kings" had simply given woy to the "Divine Right of Com- 
momnsc.,, By dint of sovereignty by acquisition (which is by 
nature force), they used the Hobbeslan type of instrumental 
rationality, whereby the only premises are ends given by desires, 
as though they were marooned on a desert Is sand. iO-+ The problem
at Geneva was that the negotiating positions never did converge, 
there were no agreements just compromises, except, perhaps, in 
the very final stages over the Maltese issue! Soviet diplomatic 
tactics were: first to seek the minimum commitment in line with 
the HR, secondly to remain absolutely rigid until the eleventh 
hour of a discussion, and then, when forced by the "negotiating 
dynamic of the Conference," offer a sudden shift in position, 
which usually consisted of a minimum concession designed to make 
the other party settle for something rather than nothing.105=5
m^“*instrumemtal rationality involves one agent considering 
which tool to use in order to achieve a given goal.Where more 
than one agent is involved in the game,as in multilateral 
diplomacy, instrumental rationality gives way to strategic 
rationality. With strategic rationality we recognize that there 
are other players in the game but use our own rationality to 
think of what others are trying to do in order to achieve the 
maximum of what we want. Both instrumental and strategic rationa­
lity are inferior means of communication given that communica­
tive rationality is defined by a willingness to listen to the 
other party and perhaps change preconceived goals or maybe 
abandon them altogether. For more on this see Habermas J.Com­
munication and the Evolution of Society.London Heinemann 19 79 .







Early in December 1973, the Head of the Soviet Delegation, Mr 
Kovalev, outlined two prerequisites that would allow success
in the Basket III agenda issues that were crucial for improvement 
of the lives of all Europeans. Viz "The Third Committee would 
have only one final document", ’drawn up so as to be understood 
by public opinion’" this apparently meant that "general direc­
tives" rather than "specific proposals" should be the aim. The 
second prerequisite was that "the USSR did not intend to relent 
on the question of the preamble to the final document of the 
Third Committee" Notwithstanding these conditions the USSR was 
"willing to search for acceptable solutions to the various 
questions that came under the Third Committee’s jurisdiction."**®
Mastney points out that the Western dilemma over the question of 
the preamble was painstaking. Should the safety clause be of a 
general nature, or, should they insist on single clauses for the 
different subjects. The Western and NNA States were prepared to 
accept a general reference to all principles. However, they were 
not prepared to allow that specific principles would have special 
application to Basket III issues, to be used,in effect, by the 
Soviet Union as an opt out clause.**® That it took six months 
before the West agreed to the Soviet demand that whatever the
**eKovalev, held very powerful position as Soviet Delegation 
Head, he had direct access to the highest level,i.e. Brezhnev’s 
ear. No other delegation head, even the Head of the American 
Delegation, enjoyed this privilege: Maresca op.cit.p95.
'**'zMastney op.cit.p63.






agreements in Basket III would be, they were to be preceded by a
preamble, is an example of the sheer complexity of the issues 
facing the Conference.*'®
Solzhenitsyn’s arrest in February 1974, and his subsequent 
expulsion to the West caught the attention of the world’s press, 
highlighting the continuing ineerna1 problems of the Soviet 
State,and compounding its dilemma of how far detente with the 
West could be expanded without risking destablizing repercus­
sions. At the same time Solzhenitsyn's expulsion served to 
rekindle the West’s latent fears regarding Soviet expansionism 
and their dilemma of how far the fragile relationship of detente 
could be extended. Solzhenitsyn's treatment symbolized the 
entire problem of the Soviet position at CSCE vis-a-vis human 
rights sst^^c^isdEj. 11 raised the query as to whether expulsion 
rather ttan jail., was a prudmd bid to preserve the Conference, 
or, a genninn oo a more moderate approach to human
rights problems.
In late February, after the arrest of Solzhenitsyn, a period of 
intense movement signalled an attempt to finalize the CSCE. 
Although the argument centering around Basket III was still 
unresolved, by the end of February 1974 texts of Principle I, 
sovereign equality had been registered, along with several






provisions in the relatively uncontroversial Basket II area. In 
early March the Principle II, refraining from the threat or use 
of force was provisionally agreed after the original paper was 
revised and represented by Rumania.11*
The discussion on the next principle to go forward for registra­
tion, Principle III on the inviolability of frontiers was opened 
by the FRG. From the outset the FRG's position and purpose was 
unambiguous. The CSCE principle of inviolability would specifi­
cally accept peaceful changes of font^iers/11 hhe Soviets 
argued that the Soviet/FRG Treaty of 1970 did not include any 
reference to the peaceful change concept, hence they could see no 
reason why this was a necessary inclusion in the text of the
CSCE. The use of the German verb nicht antasten allows the
interpretation in translation that the frontiers are untouchable" 
but the Soviets preferred ’'immutability" to be the language of 
the inviolability principle. They wanted a crystal clear 
agreement on the immutability of borders, and conducted a major 
effort to have this principle registered in accordance with the 
wording in the Soviet/FRG Treaty. The impending Easter recess 
probably helped toward premature agreement on this issue, after 
an all-night sitting on 5 April the principle of inviolability 
was provisionally agreed. To achieve this end the Soviets allowed
"°Maresca op.cit.p89.
"•’•Maresca op.cit.p92.






movement on the Basket III issues of "family ties," and the 
"dissemination of printed information." as a gesture of good­
will. tia After this achievement so optimistic was the mood that 
the Finnish delegation circulated all the participants to the 
effect that Finland was prepared to organize, for July 1974, 
Stage III of the Conference in just over twelve weeks.11,4-
However the FRG had made it equally crystal clear from the 
earliest possible moment that the issue of inviolability was 
crucial to their agreement on any conclusion of CSCE. Hence the 
necessity to find a compromise. The Spanish compromise, which 
entailed drafting the "peaceful change" language on a separate 
sheet of paper, which could be attached later in the negotiations 
wherever appropriate. Soviet agreement to this measure signalled 
tacit recognition that the "peaceful change" concept was valid, 
and therefore, merited inclusion in the principles that were to 
emerge. However the Spanish compromise did not please Bonn.110
In the process of reaching agreement on this Bonn invoked HR 79, 
accepting it subject to,
[Flormal reservations which would permit them to hold 
open the question of the phraseology and placement of
::*Maresca op.cit p91.







the peaceful change language until much later in the
negotiations.""*
The final say, by telephonic communication with the higher
authority in Bonn, stated that,
Before the FRG delegation can give its consent to the final 
formulation of the principle of the inviolability of front­
iers, in particular to the words ’demand for’ in the second 
sentence, agreement must have been reached on the following 
questions: 1 on the principle to which the formulation conc­
erning ’peaceful change’ will be attached; 2 on a precise 
formulation of ‘peaceful change’ in this new context;3 . 
on a precise formulation of the principle of ’self­
determination’; 4 on a formula concerning the connect­
ion between principles; 5 Further more the German text of 
these principles must be satisfactory to the delegation 
of the FRG.1XZ
This final condition reflected the problem, first encountered at
the MPT, of ensuring that the terminology and language drafted by
the Swiss translators suited both German sides.1"* Owing to the
Bonn directives the Soviets abandoned the wording that would have
implied "immutability" of frontiers and eventually accepted the
following wording which precluded only violent change.
The participating States regard as inviolable all one 
another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States 
in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the 
future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they 
will also refrain from any demand for, or act of seizure and
1 idem.
In line with HR 79 "reservations or interpretative statements" 
participating States may request, in writing for their reserva­
tions to be registered by the Executive Secretary wd circulated 
to all participating States. These are entered into the Journal 








usurpation of part or all of the territory of any par­
ticipating State
Maresca attributes this shift in the Soviet position to high-
level pressure from General Secretary Brezhnev, on the Soviet 
Delegation Head, Kovalev. Brezhnev sought swift movement on the 
issue of inviolability. This is an indication of the importance 
of the inviolability principle to the Kremlin, and a sign that 
Brezhnev indeed had a personal stake in the successful outcome of
the CSCE.
This movement lulled the Conference into a false sense of achiev­
ement and optimism. The talk of a midsummer finale prompted the 
Dutch, in collusion with the Nine and the NATO allies, to present 
a draft of the Western concept of how the Final Act would be 
organized. This consisted of a Preamble, four sections (one for 
each Basket), a closing formulation and signatures. The conten­
tious issue of substance was omitted. However, the Soviets had 
their own perception of how the Final Documents ought to be 
framed, and they regarded the Dutch initiative as a preemptive 
strike against their position. The Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich 
observed "the most interesting word in this entire document is 
the last one," namely, "signatares."Despite this initial 
reaction the draft survived for several reasons. Firstly because 
it indicated that the West was actively thinking towards a concl-
11 "'Cmnd 6198 The Helsinki Final Act as Presented to Parl­







usion. Secondly, because the ten principles were placed in a 
prime position. Thirdly, each section was to be preceded by a 
preamble which allowed for any caveats that may have been impera­
tive to protect Soviet internal sovereignty. Finally, of course, 
signatures were the one thing most needed by the Soviets, if this 
were to be a surrogate peace treaty .:,::K:L
Following the Easter recess the Finnish Government had prepared
all the paraphernalia for a grand finale in July 1924 .
However, the inflexibility of the Soviet stance negated any
movement that may have been expected after the progress made on 
the inviolability/peaceful change issue. According to Maresca, 
the Soviet Delegation Head Kovalev, conveniently forgot promised 
concessions made before the Easter recess, in return for swift 
agreement on the inviolability principle, an agreement which he 
badly needed, to please his political masters in Moscow. !':a2a 
Consequently, because of this Soviet stonewalling, negotiations 
ground to a halt.
As midsummer approached "disenchantment [was] as widespread among
the non allied delegation as among those of the smaller NATO
members." :l Conflicting assessments of the progress of the
idem
x^:s:"The mouse's tail" Economist 23 February 1974 pp41-2. 
^i'-^Maiaesca op.cit.p95.






Geneva talks were issued the same day. Mr-Kosygin, perhaps 
mindful of the Finnish preparations for a Helsinki high level 
climax, made a Soviet call "in the face of definite results", for 
a thirty five Government meeting at "the highest level." The 
Western viewpoint, given by the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr Max 
van der Stoel, was simply that "what was started in Helsinki so 
hopefully will end in disappointment in Geneva," because of the 
continuing intransigence of the Eastern negotiators.1-"
Meanwhile the Soviets well aware of the political changes in the 
West, France, the FRG and Britain all having new leaders, and of 
President Nixon's impending domestic problems, overplayed their 
hand in the diplomatic game. In line with their negotiating 
style they offered eleventh hour concessions which,although they 
came too late to set the wheels in motion for a July summit, did 
breathe new life into the Conference.
The western Delegation Heads of the NATO and the Nine, had 
already met on 7 June to brief their respective foreign ministers 
on the progress of the Conference in preparation for the forthco­
ming NAC meeting in Ottawa scheduled for 18-19 June 1974, ••-^ 
Given the level of disenchantment at the Conference the briefings 








meeting in Ottawa reflected this mood of disenchantment. Noting
that the work of the Conference had advanced unevenly leaving,
still unresolved key questions, such as,
[T3he improvement of human contacts and the freer flow 
of information, as well as confidence building measures 
and essential aspects of the principles guiding 
relations between states . X36T
After this communique even the hoteliers in Helsinki realized 
that there would be no midsummer grand finale as the talks were
in "total deadlock . "122:63
Americans at Geneva
It is fair to say that up to this point the United States had
not been the strongest link in the Western chain, assuming the 
xrole of eminence grise. President Nixon's projected journey to 
Moscow harboured both the hopes and fears of the delegates at 
Geneva depending on which camp they were in. Eastern hopes
rested on the power of bilateral diplomacy, on Mr.Brezhnev being 
able to persuade Mr Nixon to agree that an early conclusion of 
the CSCE was still possible. In spite of the fact that there 
were no tangible gains on the measures that would genuinely 
reduce tensions in Europe, and that, "the fine words that are all 
they offer are the kind that butter no parsnips. ’’ 129 Weetern
fears stemmed from the fact that officially the American position * 20
1::s'zCmndL_6922. Document 6 5, pl8 3.







was akin to that of Brezhnev's, namely, that a July grand finale 
was still a possibility.
At the NATO meeting at Ottawa in June 1974, Kissinger compounded 
Western worries when he, "urged the allies to say what their 
terms were for agreeing to Mr.Brezhnev’s grand f inale This
could have been a simple misunderstanding on the part of Kis­
singer or on the other hand simply an attempt to approach the 
Conference stalemate from a different perspective. However, 
were Mr Nixon to join with Brezhnev in calling for a premature 
pan European summit before anything of real value was achieved, 
it would have rendered this whole attempt to improve security in 
Europe and, as a consequence the lives of all Europeans, to be 
"merely a delusion for the masses, a manoeuvre by the cleverest
and a mistake for the others.**1®1
Both leaders were in tenuous positions, both had to survive until 
1976. For Mr Nixon there were political storm clouds forming on 
his domestic horizon, which a foreign policy scoop might deflect 
and thereby prevent the American people from the toppling their 
President, especially a President who worked so hard and succ­
essfully for peace. Equally, Brezhnev needed a summit, for al-
xcjo"Dig in at Geneva" Economist 13 July 1974 pl7.
t3inNo summit thank you" Economist 1 June 19 74 pl6;"Dig in






though he had until 1976 before the impending 25th CPSU Congress, 
to achieve what he needed from the Conference, his dilemma was 
just as acute. If the European talks were to breakdown then open 
hostility between East and West could bee added t7 Soviet hos­
tility with China. Hostility with the West would necessitate
the expansion of Soviet armed forces, which .7 tun7 woul7 eaace-7 
bate the ailing Soviet command economy. The blunt fact that
American grain was averting a grave food shortage was carefully 
concealed from the Soviet people. In short the command economy 
could not be made to work as efficiently as was needed to enable 
them to disregard the substance of their State's relations with 
other powers and agencies if they were to achieve their gools.'-1-1®
New ideas take a long time to percolate in a closed society and 
the Soviets were beginning to realize that they did not exist in 
s vacuum nor were they i^roon! 7 n a 7 eeser 7sIsuS.
However, the joint communique issued after the Moscow talks
between Mr Brezhnev and President Nixoe made only mild references 
to coecluding the Conference at high level at an "unspecified 
early date."1Ki"*  As the Economist records, "Mr Brezhnev has
hardly begun to earn his grand finale. Oee swallow does eot make 
a summit." 13as The CSCE process was ie some way more than the
ta^Bowker M.& Wiiliims P. "Helsink: i an. West European 
Security" International .Affairs 1985 Vol.61 No.4 p611.
isaiThe cottmany 7e choosse" Ecor^c^p^j^i^^ 7 June 19 7 7 pi3. 
A.-n'Dig in at Geneva” Economist 13 Ju^jLly 1997 pl7.






sum of Its parts and not moveable merely by a political decision 
no matter how badly it may be needed by the political leaders of
the principal States involved.
Kovalev's move to break the deadlock was significant despite the
fact that it was ill-timed to save the midsummer summit. The
Soviets intimated on 12 June, after two months of stagnation, 
that they were prepared to sanction movement on two Basket III 
issues viz the acceptance of the inclusion of a "reference to the 
possibility of subscriptions to foreign publications" in the text 
dealing with dissemination of printed information. On the issue 
of "family ties," a clause stipulating that "official fees... 
should be moderate," was a recognition that emigration fees for 
eastern citizens tended to be prohibitive. The last movement on 
these two issues was in April before the Easter recess. The third 
area of movement concerned CBM. The "acceptance of the 100 km 
border zone for prior notification...," in effect doubled the 
width of the border zone previously demanded. They also shifted 
their position on the time scale on advanced notification from 
five days, to seven, and then within a week, to ten days. ’•C3S 
These three concessions gave the Western delegations the incen­
tive to continue. By the end of June the NNA delegations were 







yet again, by Soviet ineiseence thhe Phe prlamble be deafted 
before beginning work sn substantive provisions.
The Soviets, having there bid for a <gr<nn<t finale, were
relustant to go inte recese foe the sumerr, stating that the work 
of Stage II should continue without a break until it was finaliz­
ed. The vacation habits of the West were deeply ingrained and 
they prevailed, but this consistently annoyed the Soviets. The 
Conference went into recess from 26 July-3 September.
At the United Na^ses Generae Assembly in late September the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, affirmed the Soviets' continued 
commitment to a successful completion of the CSCE project. The 
inference that this commitment afforded was that pursuance of a 
conclusion required concessions. 1®*s> Yet no concessions were
forthcoming, after the recess the problems were still the same, 
which is a clear indication that no progress was being made. The 
impending visit to Moscow of Kissinger, who had remained at the 
itane Department after the departure of President Nixon, and the 
forthcoming Bundestag debate on the CSCE brought an expected 
flurry of activity on behalf of the Soviets. The aim, as usual, 
was to create as positive an impression as possible at the 








, Stage II Geneva
as possible afterwards.In keeping with this strategy, the text on 
"printed information" was provisionally registered, informal 
assurance given on the geographical limit question under CBM viz 
should notification of manoeuvers apply to some States only, or 
to "all of Europe." In addition "a text on the publication of 
the Final Act was informally agreed" only to be withdrawn after 
the two events that caused the movement in the first place.i4°
The Ford/Brezhnev meeting at Vladivostok on 23-24 November to 
conclude the agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive 
arms, heralded a series of high-level bilateral meetings between 
East and West. The Nine Foreign Ministers met early in December 
to prepare for the biannual meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) scheduled for 12-13 December. Within days the new French 
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and First Secretary Brezhnev 
met in Paris and Rambouillet, while West German Chanchellor 
Schmidt met with President Ford in Washington. Then just after 
the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting of 9-10 December Giscard/Ford 
met on December 12-13. Not surprisingly, in anticipation of 
these meetings another flurry of activity began to enhance CSCE's 
profile.
By 20 November the Principle VII,(HFA 48-56) "Respect for Human







just over a week later the "Family Reunification" (HFA 434-443) 
Issui was informally agreed. This first gesture in the Oumsci- 
tnriny field, "Os" of letting divided families be reunited, took 
nice months. It was firs" tabled by Austria ie March.1'*1
Initially movement came after "Oe Vladivostok meeting bu" a" 
RsmbwullSet "he French Preside." M. G^car! d'Eatsing's cautious 
acceptance "Oa" some progress had been made, allowed for a more 
positive approach by the French delegation at Geneva, a. ween 
developments were reviewed again s" the NAC meeting in Brussels 
oc 12-13 December 1974, ministers reiterated "heir readiness to 
follow through the policy of detenie with "he Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact members. Evey though progress at the CSCE was 
slow, enough movement was achieved io "show ths" substantial 
results were possible." Patient and constructive work was to
continue "towards balanced and substantial resulis under all "he
agenda headings • "'“^
As the process progressed, it became clear "Os" bilateral diplom­
acy and avoidance of war wss uppermost ie "he superpowers' goals. 
The change ie US leadership did co" Osve s significant impact oe
■“♦‘ibid ppl07~9.
'“•'-It wss widely held ai CSCE ihsi the French were luke warm 
because the late President Pompidou disliked "he ides of playing 
sicocI fiddle to the United Stsies and "Oi Soviet Union ai scy 
grand finale "Oai might ensue^'Qui of sigh"" Ecoeomis"
28 December 1974 p26-7:sii also Marescs wp.clt.pS09.






United States foreign policy, and the position of eminence grise 
held throughout the Conference process remained unchanged. In an
interview the new President Gerald Ford outlined his vision of
foreign policy as one of "a problem-solving Administration in the 
pages of history."In the nuclear age the problem was how to 
avoid another war. In Secretary of State Kissinger's view, "we 
must never lose sight of the fact that in the thermonuclear age 
war would be disastrous to mankind."1,4® The only viable option
was to expand detente, but the whole question of detente was mud­
dled, mainly because the concept of detente, given the vast 
ideological differences, meant different things to the opposing 
sides. On the one hand, for Western States, human rights did not 
depend on the state of relations between national governments, a 
concept that was blatantly foremost in the Soviet attitude. On 
the other hand for the Soviets progress in the field of human 
rights was inextricably bound up with progress in the field of
zdetente.
Perhaps because of the American stance of eminence grise in the 
negotiations the impetus was always likely to come from bilateral 
diplomacy. However, the recent intensive bilateral diplomacy 
gave the Soviets the spur they needed. Just before Christmas, 
Principle VII, that of "Equal Rights and Self-determination of 
Peoples" HFA 57-60, as well as Basket III issues of "Marriage







between citizens of different states" (HFA 444-447) and the study 
of "Foreign Languages and Civilizations" were informally agreed. 
The text on "cooperation in the Field of Information" was provis­
ionally registered. A revised draft of Principle X, which was 
designed to protect the Four Power rights and responsibilities in 
Berlin and Germany was tabled by France.
The Rumanian and Yugoslavian attempt to have the stationing of 
troops on another State’s soil prohibited, under the "Non-use of 
Force" principle, caused much rancour since it was read by the 
Soviets as a covert attack against them. But their threat to 
withhold the consensus needed for the provisional registration of 
Principle VIII, "Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples" 
meant that a compromise had to be found.
The issue of human contacts, which was being handled by the 
Danish and French delegations for the West, and the Bulgarians 
and Polish delegations for the East, ran into trouble. A 
private deal was concocted to pass two different versions of the 
text under the guise that it was only the language that con­
stituted the difference. Not surprisingly, considering how the 
Soviets had niggled throughout the process about the meaning of 
words, this caused much chagrin on the Western side, both with 
their own floor leaders, and the Eastern negotiators. Neither 
the NNA States or the Western groupings relished the idea of 





, Stage II Geneva
their Governments for signature. In this uneasy situation the 
Conference went into recess for Christmas leaving the big issues
to be resolved in the New Year.1,46
1975
"You can always tell when you are making progress: the problems 
change." Hewever, in the New Year the negotiating pattern did
not change, nor did the problems, therefore progress was slow. 
Few expected that this would be the year in which the Conference 
would culminate, few, that is, apart from the Soviets, who 
throughout. the process expected a grand finale just to happen.
Although the following two statements were made at the signing of
the Helsinki Final Act later in the year of 1975, they epitomize
the problems faced by the negotiators at this stage in their bid
to bring the Conference to the successful conclusion that had
been tacitly agreed to by all. Making his position clear General
Secretary Brezhnev declared,
Nobody should try to dictate to other peoples, on the 
basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or 
another, the manner in which they ought to manage their 
internal affairs.
To which Harold Wilson the British Prime Minister replied,
In 1975 there is no reason why "Europeans should not be 
allowed’ to marry whom they want, hear and read what 
they want, travel abroad where and when they want."1”4,6’
’“'’Maresca op.cit.pl09 :P129 .
I'lGates D.Non Offensive Defence London Macmillan 1991 pi. 






Meanwhile at the negotiations bitter disputes continued over the 
preamble in the Human Contacts section. Although the Soviet 
Basket III chief, Dubinin, enjoyed the good life from habits 
learned from a long sojourn in France, he was singularly unwill­
ing to move on Human Rights issues that might improve the lot of 
his fellow ci tizens . ’ "‘"Disputes over the language differences in 
the Eastern and Western texts in the human contacts section. In
response to the cavalier attitude of the Soviet affirmations that 
regardless of the language in the Western version, the Soviet 
version would not be changed, United States linguistic experts 
were enlisted to ensure that all final texts read the same.1"50
The concept of non-intervention in internal affairs, which was to 
constitute Principle VII, was also a complex issue dependent on 
perception, yet it was crucial to the concept of detente. For 
example, the British Government spends 1/lOth of the Foreign 
Office’s budget through the British Council to influence (or 
interfere in) the internal affairs of other States. Couple this 
with the fact that, based on historical dialecticism as the 
Eastern Bloc States were, the logic of Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
was expansionism. The identity of interest among the ruling 
groups is power, and the continuance of that power depends on the 
spread of either doctrine, Marxist or Capitalist.







Principle VIII, that of Equal rights and self-determination, was 
modelled on its counterpart in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
of the United Nations. This was also an ambiguous text as self­
determination means different things depending on the social 
system under which it is applied.
The problems with the document on Follow Up Mechanism (FUM) was 
exacerbated by the Rumanians who, off the record, averred that 
the Soviets were against the idea of a Follow Up Mechanism 
because of the way the Conference was shaping. Any Follow Up
Mechanism, it appeared to the Soviets, would allow the West too 
much scope to meddle in their affairs viz^-vis human rights. The 
Rumanians, of course, along with the Finns had vested interests 
in the Follow Up Mechanism. The Finns wanted an established 
CSCE forum to help protect their neutrality, and the Head of the 
Finnish delegation worked endlessly on compromises that might be 
the means to that end. On the other hand, the Rumanians hoped 
that a sound Follow Up Mechanism would afford them a more 
independent foreign policy stance from the Soviets. Consensus 
did not exist among the Western States either, the French, harb­
ouring their longstanding distrust of ' US meddling in pan-European 
affairs, were adamant that they would withhold consensus from 
anything more than the "Danish proposal for a single meeting 






Conference results.”1®” It is prudent to remember here that
this was, and still is, a double edged sword, since given the 
sovereign equality principle, a FUM that afforded an opportunity 
to one state or side under the CSCE, afforded exactly the same 
opportunity to the other participating States.
By the end of February and the beginning of March both sides were 
feeling edgy. For many of the smaller States the cost of the 
CSCE to date was overwhelming. The Soviets continued to demand an 
early climax. The need for national governments to plan ahead to 
attend any proposed grand finale contributed to the mounting 
pressure. However, talk of a climax was a politically sensitive 
issue. To fix a date would lull all delegations, especially the 
Soviets, into a false sense of security. Given the negotiating 
pattern, the fear was that, as time ticked by, issues crucial to 
fulfilling Western aspirations would be squeezed out. The West 
were well aware that time was needed for the printing of . final
documents and that the Helsinki Government also needed time to
organize any proposed grand finale, but they also understood that 
time was their greatest asset. If they consented prematurely to
a date the tables could be turned and the time leverage used
against them.






Despite the pressure to finish. Conference progress was slow as
the wrangling continued. In February, the Soviets and the
. Rumanians settled their differences over the "Non-use of Force"
principle, by inserting the wording "prohibit the use of armed
force against another state." Thus allowing the consensus needed 
for the registration of Principle VIII, leaving only two prin­
ciples to be drafted. The Mediterranean issue was agreed (HFA 
406), the preamble to FUM was registered (HFA 659-660),and behind
the scenes work was continuing on the FRG’s sine qua non on 
peaceful change.
By March the Soviets stepped up the pressure once again,this time 
from a higher level. Mr Brezhnev intimated by letter to the 
principal Western Heads of Government his personal interest in 
the establishment of a working group on Stage III. This personal
interest of Brezhnev’s manifested itself in the Conference as a
Soviet tangle over the ever contentious question of an Easter 
recess. The West recognized that if this were to be the final 
sprint then time was of the essence, so half time working was 
agreed to facilitate those who needed a break.’®"
Those who took an Easter break did so in the middle of a debate
over the form of the Final Document. Kovalev, on behalf on the 







four signatures. The Western and NNA States feared that this was
a Soviet ploy to select which documents to sign at the highest
level and which to leave for lower order officials to sign. Thus 
reducing the significance of the human rights document. The 
Western caucus therefore insisted that the Conference Final Acts, 
while not legally binding, were however of equal value, so they 
proposed one document with one signature.'®® The final agreement
for them had to be indivisible.
The Western leaders responded positively to Brezhnev’s personal 
investment in an early conclusion. They reasoned that if
Brezhnev were as seriously ill as his letter implied, then an 
early grand finale would strengthen the hand of the moderates, 
within the Kremlin, in the struggle for succeseion Yet these
developments did not have significant impact on the Soviet 
pattern of negotiating at the Conference,it did not change. The 
Conference trundled on with only minimal movement. The US 
delegation produced a further draft on the "peaceful change" 
issue. The French, to the delight of the Rumanians who had their 
own axe to grind over border issues, promptly blocked this United 
States effort to gain agreement between the FRG and the USSR, by 
demanding linkage of the "peaceful change" issue to the clauses
'®®ibid pl44:see also " Conference on Security and Coopera­
tion in Europerthe Second Phase." Report 7, European Cooperation 







on quadripartite rights, and that of assuring the equal value of 
all principles.”®®
Slight movement on the military aspects of the talks was taken
as a token of good intent on behalf of the Soviets. Basket II 
issues were more general agreements couched in terms of princip­
les or intentions, consequently these were achieved with little 
difficulty and by end of March several were drafted, with all 
brackets removed into final form.”®®
After the Easter recess, considering the volume of work still 
outstanding, it is only with the benefit of hindsight that it 
could be believed that a grand finale was only three months away. 
Principle X was completed (HFA 66-69), and (HFA 341-353) on 
transport, and (HFA 455-458) on tourism were all agreed by the 
end of Apr il.”®'z In line with the Conference pattern, just as 
one blockage could stalemate a host of other issues, just so, one 
agreement or concession, had a knock on effect, opening up 
movement in many other fields. However, these were just the 
minnows, nothing seemed to have an impact on the big fish of the 
Conference. What did have an impact was the American withdrawal 
from the Vietnam War, and the tremendous damage that withdrawal









President Ford's State of the World address on 10 April 1975
heralded the inexorable disaster for United States policy in
• Vietnam. 1’s’9 As the North Vietnamese communist forces pushed
south a hurried and desperate evacuation of United States 
personnel was carried out. On 30 April 1975 the fall of Saigon 
ended any vestige of hope for the Paris Accords of January 1973. 
These Paris peace efforts which were negotiated personally by 
Kissinger were dead, ending US power and their fifteen year 
involvement in Vietnam. In a briefing read to the press the new 
president called on the American people to close the Vietnam 
chapter,
... I ask all Americans to close ranks, to avoid 
recrimination about the past, to look ahead to the many 
goals we share, and to work together on the great tasks 
that remain to be accomplished."'*
From this point on the Vietnam experience caused a revision in
US foreign policy particularly in relation to the Soviet Union.
On 17 April 1975, Kissinger said.
We must continue our policy of seeking to ease tensions 
but we shall insist that easing of tensions cannot 
occur selectively...we must give up the illusion that 
foreign policy can choose between morality and prag­
matism. America cannot be true to itself unless it 
upholds humane values and the dignity of the
individual....
A revised attitude considering his view as cited in the Times









United States stance of eminence grise, Kissinger's revised view 
of detente reflected the long-held Congressional view that the 
human rights principle should be given more prominence when 
dealing with the Soviet Union, given that the United States 
constitution averred that man was born with God-given inalienable 
rights.
President Ford also reflected the revised attitude in a speech 
made in August 1975.
Detente means moderate and restrained behaviour between 
the two superpowers, not a license to fish in troubled 
waters. It means mutual respect and reciprocity - not 
unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements.Peace is 
crucial, but freedom must come first....'®'
The flaw in these fine words about freedom became obvious when,
the new President and Secretary of State Kissinger declined to
meet Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the arch protagonist of human
rights, when he visited the US during June and July 1975, seeing 
zit as "disadvantageous" for detente. In advance of the Apollo- 
Soyuz rendezvous on July 17,1975 Solzhenitsyn reminded a Washing­
ton dinner audience that in 1937 as Stalin sent "three Russian 
aeronauts on a transartic flight to the American pacific..." he 
"was executing 40,000 persons per month." Solzhenitsyn denounced 
the detente policy in general, and the European security con­
ference in particular as "the funeral of eastern Europe."'®'
'®'ibid pl22.






Notwithstanding this, the seeming change in American stance, and 
the forthcoming NAC meeting forced the pace at CSCE, giving 
primacy once again to bilateral diplomacy over the contents of
Basket III.
Many hopes hinged on the forthcoming NAC meeting in Brussels 
scheduled for 29-30 May.It was expected that conclusions would be 
reached regarding the feasibility of reaching a satisfactory 
conclusion in time for a summer summit. About mid May, just two 
weeks before the NAC meeting, the British delegation devised a 
plan aimed at unblocking the Basket III issues,in which there 
were few provisionally registered agreements. It was a huge 
gamble on the part of the Western delegations. However,if the 
Soviets were to be persuaded to accept it then the "key half of 
Basket III would be concluded before the NATO summit and the way 
to Helsinki open. "1 e::-’
The gamble, tagged as the "global" initiative, involved collating 
all proposals to date, agreed as well as unagreed. Then filtering 
out numerous inessentials,in the hope that agreement could be 
achieved in those areas considered essential for early resolu­
tion. The danger was the filtering process opened up a vul­
nerability in the Western position. By voluntarily reducing the 







concessions and start to haggle over the reduced texts. To reduce 
the odds the "global initiative" was presented to the’ Soviet
, delegation not on a "take it or leave it basis," but rather on"an 
all or nothing basis." It was clearly stated that minor changes 
were permissible, but any attempt at wholesale renegotiation 
would render the whole deal void, involving a return to the 
piecemeal and time-consuming negotiating style of former times.
While the Soviet delegation at the CSCE pondered this,on 19-20 
May Kissinger met with Gromyko in Vienna. Although he did not 
attempt to reach a bilateral accommodation with Gromyko, the 
"changed" Kissinger did take the offensive.He made it clear that 
the "global initiative" was a serious proposal, backed at the 
highest level in the US. Thus signa 11ing that their role of
zeminence grise had been abandoned. With this clear shift in 
policy Kissinger courted no proposals on specifics from Gromyko, 
referring them back to Geneva.®"'
The Soviets pondered the"global initiative" for one week. When
the response did come it marked a distinct shift away from the
set pattern o f negotiating, hereafter responses and counter
'"'ibid ppl48-9.pl58.
At this meeting with Gromyko, whom Kissinger regarded as the CSCE 
expert, Kissinger was much better briefed than hitherto for a 
meeting involving Europe. He was well warned, by the Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs, Arthur- Hartman, not to 







responses emerged on a daily basis. On 21 May Dubinin, the 
Soviet Basket III chief was abusive in tone when Hen proposed a
* total of fifty changes to the revised texts. Believing that 
Dubinin was overreaching his remit, the next day the Western 
caucus decided not to force his hand. Although they considered 
the proposed changes were too great they simply expressed 
surprise at the volume of the changes, drew attention to the 
time element, especially at this eleventh hour, and pressed for a
more realistic response.
Brezhnev was, by now, conspicuous by his absence on the public 
atage,aod the pressure from Moscow, to which the Soviet Delega­
tion Head, Kovalev was subject manifested itself next day when in 
a meeting with the US Delegation Head he'^ost his cool" over what 
he construed to be a unined Weesten ultematem nvee tte most 
politically sensitive i^ues of the CSCE. Howevrn on 21 May, 
just one day before the NAC summit, Kovalev intimated Soviet 
readiness to give ground on the issues needed to open the way to 
Helsinki. However once again Kovalev's move came too late-The 
NAC summit on 29-30 May 1975, did not give Brezhnev the overt go 
ahead he sought. As the briefings for NATO and EEC Nine summit 
meetings take place weeks io advance, the communique released at 
the end of the meeting simply reaffirmed the Atlantic Alliance's
view that,
[U]nderseaodnog and cooperation should prevail over 
confrontation^n advance along this road would be made 






were concluded on satisfactory terms and its words 
translated into deeds.'®®
Recording also the hope that the "negotiations will permit such a
conclusion in the near future." President Ford argued that,
[Hlowever much euphoric or inflated emphasis Russia 
might try to give to the CSCE, the allies aim must be 
to ensure that promises made at the conference are 
translated into action to advance freedom and human 
dignity for all Europeans.
In other words the President was telling Mr Brezhnev,
[Tlhere is no such thing as a free lunch, if [he] wants to 
exit with a European summit in a blaze of glory then he 
must, tell his delegates to stop stalling and agree on steps 
that would actually make Europeans feel more secure and more 
cooperative.'®®
NATO's Secretary General Joseph Luns placed the onus squarely on 
the inflexibility of the Soviets, which he said, "prevented the 
NATO Governments from offering Mr. Brezhnev an early date for a 
CSCE final session at summit level."'®'" However, it was not all 
negative, covertly it was agreed that the Soviets could achieve 
the grand finale they so badly wanted provided clear statements 
were forthcoming on all outstanding issues. "Clear statements" 
meant the removal of all brackets and provisional agreements on 
the following issues:- that of less restrictive conditions of 
work for foreign journalists, Including re-entry visas: the issue 
of travel provisions which must extend beyond organized groups of 
ballet dancers, to include reunification of families. East and
'®®Cmnd,69 32 Document 74, pp203-4.







West marriages, and easier human contacts In general: the Issue 
of wider dissemination of printed matter including, writers' 
access to foreign publishers: the Issue of jamming of foreign
broadcasts needed a clear assurance that such action will cease:
the Issue of the lay out, signatures and printing of the Final 
Documents: the Issue of Inviolability of frontiers ought to be 
accompanied by a clear unequivocal statement on peaceful change: 
and the Follow Up Mechanism Issue .le<3
Seemingly the oft repeated call on the Soviets to abandon the 
rigid positions held for so long at CSCE, had at last been heard. 
Kovalev's concessions. Intimated on 28 May, Involved most of 
these Issues. Some were complex Issues, even for the West, for 
example, is there a difference between X copies of Pravda being 
sold daily or is it sufficient to make them available? How can
it be ensured that bookshops stock titles that do not sell. Will 
books translated from the French have to be balanced exactly with 
those translated say from Rumanian? Great powers of imagination 
are not needed to envisage the problems that issues such as these 
presented for the Soviet bloc.
The negotiation on the revised thirty odd changes on the "global 
initiative" texts opened on 30 May, and within a week all "major
le^There are discussions on these issues in all three 
publications:Maresca op.clt.plSl^’Brevhnev watches the clock": 







remaining issues in the human contacts and information section
had been resolved."1^
Work on the CBM proposals, mrst tabled by UK at the outset of 
the Geneva talks, was way behind other subjects at the Con­
ference. The February 1974 joint Initiative of the six NNA 
seaees,(Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Yugoslavia), to find a middle path between Eastern and Western 
positions, had not progressed much since the end of March 
1975 , .’.'o While perusing the "global ioneiaenee" the Soviets 
softened their terms on advance notification of army manoeuvres. 
Initially by accepting that troop thresholds should be defined 
purely in numerical terms/similar to that of prior notification 
zones. The straight numerical approach simplified the Issues but 
tended to be too specific for Soviet liking.1X1
At the May meeting Io Vienna between Gromyko and Kissinger, 
Gromyko had tendered a new set of parameters on CBM. These 
"Vienna parameters," proposed a 30,000 troop level, 12 days prior 
notification, and 150km border zone In the USSR.X'Z“: Kissinger
’'’Maresca op^it^lS 3. 
x’z<^Ibid p91. 
n'znibid pl34:pl72.
"’The geographical lnmne of the border zone was a bone of 
contention at the Conference. For example, with the zone limit 
set at 150km smaller states would have to notify all their 
military maneuvers, whereas given the vast territory of the 
USSR^his zone limit would hardly Inconvenience them at all. The 
North American States were exempt from these proposals It was 






accepted this attempt at a bilateral accommodation despite the 
fact that in Geneva the UK floor leaders were negotiating hard 
for a threshold of between 20,000-22,000 troop level, a border 
zone of no less than 300km, and prior notification of 21 days.
On 20 June, the NNA made another attempt to break the deadlock 
and this proposal served to be the basis of an agreement opened 
in Washington rather than at the CSCE.
Through their Ambassador In Washington the Soviets reneged on the 
150km zone agreement In the "Vienna parameters" which Kissinger 
had accepted. This Information angered the UK floor leaders In 
Geneva. Kissinger's interference, as his Intervention was seen, 
sparked off a unholy row among the allies. The UK Ambassador Sir 
David Hlldyard did not relish his delegation's negotiating 
position being undermined by the US Secretary of StSte. After 
much telephonic "tolng and frolng" Kissinger bowed out, withdrew 
his agreement to the "Washington parameters," leaving resolution 
to the negotiators at the Conference.1 The NNA proposal was 
brought ftwwerd and with the UK as negotiator for the Western 
caucus, and the USSR as negotiator for the Eastern States ,the 
following compromise was reeched: 25,000 troop level, 250 km 
zone, and 21 days prior notification.
Soviets would have to deny their claim to Europeanlsm, this, for 







It was agreed that notification would contain Informa­
tion on the "designation" and the general purpose of 
and the States Involved In the manoeuvre, types and 
numerical strength of forces Involved. a 'z,,!|-
Such detailed specifications for the Information to be supplied,
reflect In Freeman's view, the determination of the Western 
delegation to establish that "troops" Included amphibious and 
airborne troops. X"ZK5 On the question of movements, It was agreed 
that major military movements were to be subject to the discre­
tion of each participating State.* 1", the Western caucus'
preference for mandatory obligations, these were left as discre­
tionary obligations. At the end of March, when the last sig­
nificant movement was made on the CBM issue, the Soviets had 
demanded a caveat that all CBM should be voluntary. Initially
this caused much concern within the Western caucus until It was
realized that the Helsinki Final Act itself would contain a
disclaimer clause (HFA 672) on its non-legal nature. It was to 
be neither a treaty nor an agreement. It was therefore pointless 
to negotiate methods of verifying compliance, simply requiring 
that for East and West alike "military activities should be pre­
notified and observed but not restricted or limited." Hence the
previously tabled draft of July 1974 was formally finalized. On 3 
July, the deal on HFA 107-113 was duly registered. Thus the NNA
1 z ** Cmnd 6198 The Helsinki Final Act as Presented to Parlia­








States while maximizing their own Interest, became bridge 
builders between Warsaw Pact States and the NATO Wlia^e.^7
Smaller manoeuvres, and movements were also addressed at Geneva.
No specific requirements were laid down for smaller military 
manoeuvres. The question of movements addressed Io (HFA 121-24) 
were left dinarrtienHry .’’‘s’ askl^et I was now full.
Meeting in Luxembourg 24 June 1975, the Foreign Ministers of the 
Nine announced,
[Tlhe Foreign Ministers of the Nine are willing to 
complete the work of the conference as soon as pos­
sible. Taking Into account the substantial progress 
accomplished oo numerous subjects, they think that It 
Is now both desirable and feasible to complete the 
negotiations Io Geneva so that the third phase can 
take place io Helsinki by the end of July. The realiza- 
tlon of this hope depends oo all delegations as 
hitherto accelerating their work and their efforts so 
that general agreement may be reached oo all outstand- 
Iog questions. The Nine for their part are ready to 
make every effort to contribute to this end."’”
Clearing the CBM hurdle did not simplify the mammoth task of 
reaching a Conference conclusion. Io the days Immediately follow­
ing the completion of Basket I many minor text were cleared aod 
duly registered. The Basket II preamble (HFA 139-149) was final­
ized, notwithstanding problems with Most Favoured Status which,
’’’Maresca Hp.cit.pp91:163-4:172-3:123n see also Freeman 
op.clt.p71.
'’^Cfflnd 61.9.S-The. Helsink 1 Fina 1' Act as Presented__ to. Parlia­
ment August 1975 plO.






despite Eastern pressure was not granted at CSCE. It was deemed 
more a problem for International cooperation groups than for a 
multilateral conference (see p67). Basket III was completed In
its entirety.
So far there was no consensus on the timing of the Grand Finale. 
The Finns were still In limbo. The argument centred round a few 
remaining substantive issues vital to the Western caucus, without
which there would be no date set for the finale. Two issues
appertaining to Berlin still awaited resolution. First there 
was the matter of quadripartite rights, and secondly the "all of 
Europe" issue required the assurance that all the contents of the 
Helsinki Final Act would apply to Berlin. In addition the FRG's 
sine qua non on "peaceful change" was still unresolved.
July 5 was a day of feverish activity. An enclave of the sub­
committee on principles worked all day to produce an agreeable 
clause on "peaceful change." A political compromise was reached 
on the FUM, leaving only problems with syntax. The disclaimer 
clause on the Final Documents, along with draft letters for the 
Finnish Government and the UN Secretary General were prepared. 
Despite this activity Rumania and Malta still held the centre 
stage.
July 8 could be dubbed Rumania day. The non use of force Issue 






reservation on peaceful change removed, allowing registration in 
the First Principle HFA 25. However, they linked agreement on 
the quadripartite clause, to a satisfactory outcome on agreement 
to the Follow Up Mechanism document. Consensus on the FUM was 
being withheld by Malta over the Mediterranean Declaration, 
which, because of Rumania's linkage continued the blockage on the 
quadripartite Issue and confirmation of the grand finale date 
patiently being awaited by the Finns.
The Finns deadline for a possible summit on 29 July had been 
missed Washiggton wanted Stage III set for the end of July 
to facilitate the President's scheduled meeting, In Washington on 
5 August, with the Japanese Prime Minister. The French proposed 
a two tier agreement namely, to fix a date pending the resolution 
of all Issues before a specified date. The European vacation 
habits were looming large spurring the Soviets to press for a 
summit date. Despite this there was disparity In the West. The 
UK and FRG delegations were adhering firmly to their political 
directors Instructions that no agreement whatsoever be reached 
until all Important East-West Issues had been resolved. As the 
Finns crossed off the possible date of 29 July the Canadian Dele­
gation Head, on instruction from his Prime Minister, Pierre 
Trudeau, took the lead In pressing for an end of July summit. By
nBOThe Finns had previously outlined that 21 days notice was 
the minimum needed to stage a high level summit. As all police 
leave would have to be cancelled,and hotel rooms would have to be 






adding specific dates to allow a 30 July summit, on condition 
that all work was completed within six days. This ammendment to 
to the earlier French proposal did the trick, by 15 July,
notwithstanding Malta's behaviour, the Finns went "ahead on
faith"’-*’-
The proposal on timing depended on the Maltese P.M. Dom Mlntoff, 
who, unhappy with the wording of Maltese Declaration scattered 
the pigeons by requesting that the Declaration should call for 
the "gradual withdrawal of the American and Soviet navies from 
the Mediterranean." Neither the Americans nor the Soviets were 
very pleased and at Geneva an abortive attempt was made by 
Kissinger and Gromyko to ditch the Maltese In favour of a 
"consensus minus one delegation." At Stage I, when Mr Mlntoff 
first flexed his muscle, the consensus rule was deemed a fun­
damental principle of the process. It was an absolute, to dis­
regard Mlntoff at this stage would be folly, undermining the 
whole process, so he had to be brought on board. To create the 
maximum impact Mr Mlntoff was somewhat incommunicado for a week, 
delaying a compromise agreement. In the end "reducing of forces" 
replaced the wording "gradual withdrawal" (HFA 412 J.1®® Mr 
Mlntoff's appeasement was not a specific agreement ,only an aim, 
but It serves to show how throughout this process, words could
:ieiMaresea op. clt. ppl84-5.






mean - Humpty Dumpty style - just exactly what the speaker wanted 
them to mean.
The Mediterranean Declaration (HFA 398-413) was duly registered, 
thus releasing the FUM document HFA 655-699, which in turn 
released the clause on quadripartite rights HFA 70-74, for 
registration. On the evening of 14 July the Coordinating Co­
mmittee approved the date for Stage III at Helsinki. Much to the 
relief of the Finns who could not afford another phantom Con­
ference . X’"K5’
Although approval had been gained bits and pieces had yet to be 
finalized. The final declaration of principles (HFA 16-74), came 
on 19 July.. Turkey, like Russia, had frontiers outwith Europe, 
to assuage Turkish fears the military committee Inserted a clause 
requiring that only the European frontiers shared with the other 
European participating States were to be subject to the 250km 
notification zone (HFA109). At the eleventh hour on 18 July 
when trying to tie up the ends of the Geneva process, the 
wording problem came to the fore again. The Soviet's wanted a 
"reference to the "irreversibility" of detente included in the 
opening phrases of Final Act." When the Western caucus demurred 
because they did not view detente as a fixed concept (see above 







Europe" wording needed for the Berlin issue. Confirmation of the
Conference date depended on a satisfactory compromise being found
• quickly, as the 19 July deadline was already four days overdue. 
Once again the telephone came to the rescue, this time probably 
saving the summit date. Mr Kovalev telephoned Moscow for 
permission to "fall back," and agreement was reached with the 
wording "continuing and lasting" and "throughout Europe" (HFA 5). 
The marathon was over subject to the blessing of the Vatican 
envoy, sent specially by Pope Paul VI to give thanks for the 
"peace and joy" about to befall Europe as a result of the CSCE. 
Thus the Geneva negotiations ended.10’*
Achievements in Geneva.
The negotiation Stage at Geneva was completed on 21 July 1975 
just days before the opening of Stage III at Helsinki, when the 
Heads of State or Governments of the participating States were
due to meet to endorse the Final Act.
The document that emerged from Geneva is a detailed and specific 
politically binding document, 10,85 giiing the Soviets politico/ 
military status quo and the West a tool with which to sculpt a 
reduction In tension, or maybe even a tension free Europe. Just 
as the Soviet concept of security was an "evolutionary process"
lo‘”!'it)i(3 ppl9 3-5.
•‘"“The binding nature of the document will be discussed 






not fixed, likewise for the West the concept of detente could not
be fixed by a singular definition, and was therefore Immeasura­
ble .toe That It was not much more "Iffy" can be regarded as a
plus for the Western negotiators.
Not all proposals won through. The Soviets had to drop the notion 
that human freedom was subject to the "laws and customs" of the
State concerned, that the laws and customs of individual States
could determine all other considerations: the Idea of non­
intervention in the Internal affairs of other States, conceding 
that the domestic order was "an Indlspenslble Ingredient of any 
stable international order.”1*3". Nrr did all Western proposals
win through. In January 1974 a Swiss proposal for peaceful 
settlement of disputes was axed by a Soviet launched attack. This 
proposal drafted by Professor Blndschedler, the Swiss authority 
on International law, outlined a system of new methods of appr­
oach for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Although this 
proposal was considered a legal masterpiece It was an early 
casualty at Geneva. The obligatory nature of the procedures 
found disapproval across the political divide, compelling the 
Swiss to negotiate for a mandate for a future meeting of experts 
to strive for a peaceful settlement of disputes mechanism. The 
Swedes wanted disclosure on defence expenditure. Yugoslavia 
wanted restrictions on particular kinds of military activity







which posed special threats to security. This was subsequently 
Incorporated In the NNA sponsored draft and was entitled "measu­
res to restrict military activities liable to cause misunderstan­
dings and appreheneions.’ns Also the attempt to devise some 
means of linking CSCE and MBFR by Information exchange which has 
been noted earlier in the text also failed. The problem of 
stalemate on military movements In CBM was not all that sig­
nificant since NATO was already Io possession of its own advanced 
reconnaissance techniques .
Throughout the Geneva process the haggling served as a continual
reminder to the world that half of the continent's inhabitants
were caught up Io a social system that breeds misunderstanding 
and fear, and although the Soviet press failed to cover the CSCE 
the Economist reports that "many Russians and East Europeans have
followed the struggle with keen Interest and hope.-” From his 
position as depute US Delegation Head at the Conference Maresca 
observed at an early stage that the Western negotiators would 
have to be consistent Io their negotiating position, no appealing 
to a higher level command and no resort to bilateral accommoda­
tions. Throughout the talks, the Soviets having agreed to vague 
general principles then used blocking tactics to avoid any 
requirement to translate them into practical terms.In the last
iBBlterreca op. clt.pBB :^38 :ri73 .
price from Russia" Economist 3 May 19 7 5 plO.






resort communicative rationality seems to have won the day, both
sides had to come to an understanding.
Coming to an understanding Is the process of bringing 
about an agreement on the presupposed basis of validity 
claims that can be mutually recognized... the task of 
mutual interpretation Is to achieve a new definition of 
the situation which all participants can share.1’3’1
The central political compromise of Geneva was non Intervention 
and human rights. The central territorial compromise, with 
respect to World War II was the Inviolability principle and 
peaceful change. Respect for Individual and human rights have 
through the CSCE dynamic become accepted as a legitimate aspect 
of relations between States and not, hereafter, classed as 
outside intervention In the domestic affairs of sovereign States. 
By this satge the CSCE seemed more than the sum of Its parts, It 




The Heads of State or Government of Austria Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Cyprus Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, 
Greece,The Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Leich-





Stage III The Final Act
tenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Rumania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United States of America and Yugoslavia assembled in Helsinki for 
the signing of the final document of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe on 1 August 1975. The Final Act was the 
product of the two year Stage II negotiations in Geneva. This 
gathering in Helsinki spanned the East-West divide,included four 
out of the five current nuclear powers, and the NNA States.
The term Final Act denotes the non juridical character of the
document. This format was adopted for two reasons, firstly to 
avoid a conflict of obligations In accordance with Article 103 of 
the United Natic^nns Chhrrtr thht the dirrctivee aad prrpooe^I^l^ of
the dontmecd tl-wold ti nn way tnirdilne on tcitticn prdcdtfrie aa^d 
Idhernthifnai trrctitt.:l•s’. todc^ndy^, from the Western perspec­
tive In general and the FRG In particular the CSCE was not a Con­
ference on Germany and Berlin, and most emphatically not to be 
regarded as a subshchuhc peace treaty. Therefore the document 
which emerged from Stage II of the CSCE process at Geneva was 
neither a hrethy nor an agreement and therefore Ineligible for 
registration under Article 102 of the United Nations hetdter.
^"•Art tcle 103 states "In the event of a conflict between 
the obligations oi; the members odE the bunted Nc^Is;lcoi^^ under the 
present cearhed and their obligations under any other Interna­
tional agreement, their obligthcons under the present Chtrhed 
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However, the signing at the highest possible political level, by 
the High Representatives of the participating Statcs,whctner weak 
or strong, gave the Final Act the highest possible political 
significance thus balancing the non-binding nature of the
document.
The Final Act comprised of five major documents, covering the 
four Basket areas with a separate document on the Mediterranean 
Issue viz Document I "Questions Relating to Security in Europe." 
Document II headed "Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of 
Science and Technology and of the Environment." Document III 
dealt with "Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation In 
the Mediterranean." Document IV on "Cooperation in the Humanit­
arian and Other Fields." Document V on the "Follow up to the
Conference."
The general preamble to the Final Act sets out the declaration of 
intent, stressing the Importance of the "common purpose" of the 
participants In overcoming confrontation, without any specific 
reference to the cliches such as "peaceful coexistence" ’^col­
lective security." Viz
Motivated by the political will and In the interests of 
peoples to improve and intensify their relations and to 
contribute in Europe to peace^ecurityjustice and co­
operation as well as rapprochement among themselves and 
with the other States of the world...to broaden,’deepen 
and make continuing and lasting the process of detente 
... reaffirming their objective of promoting better 
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which their people can live in true and lasting peace
free of any threat to or attempt against their
security. . . .
Basket I/Document I.
Document I consists of two major components: "The Declaration of 
Principles: and a "Document on Confidence Building Measures And 
Certain aspects of Security And Disarmament." Although the Ten 
Principles are set out immediately following the preamble, it is 
important to note that just as all components of the Final Act 
are of equal value, (that is Documents II and XV on oooerration 
carry equal with Documtnt I n n securin y retatn d issues),
so too are all principles of equal value. 1 * *
The preamble specific to Document I rreees to tiie "well being of 
all peoples" in "all nf Eooape" rocotnioing ttnt for most 
Orrhtctpaohs detente goes much deeper than simply better politi­
cal relations between the great powers. Rather detente involved 
the proper understanding of the values and Interests of others, 
and as such was as important as the Principles.
1' * Cmnd 6198 The Helsinki Final Act as presented to Parliam­
ent August 1975 p2. All references In this chapter are taken from
this source unless otherwise stated. See also von Groll "The 
Final Act of CSCE" Aussen Polihik 1975 Vol.26 Nos.1-4 pp247-269.
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The ixtlea,
I aoyexe i gn EnuaHty dcsoc£h_____fndt_.hec d^,gehs inecdcde.ttdSIvercigiiy
This principle evolved from Item I of the standing orders at the 
outset of the MPT at DCpflC (see o39)^ and is prescriptive in 
that It sets out the right of a State to "juridical equality to 
territorial integrity and to freedom and ooictitai cndeoend- 
cdtc...,” with respect for,
USlach other's dcghh to define and conduct as it wishes 
Its relations with other States in accordance with 
idhednahconal law and In the soirch of the present 
declaration...
Less strongly worded than the Soviets wished: they would have 
preferred that the State's right to "Intcrdyl sovereignty" be 
underscored.
The FRG's sine qua non on "oeacefui change" - hhah frontiers can 
be changed by "peaceful means and by agreement," allows each 
State the icgchcmahe right to change Its frontiers under certain 
conditions. The inclusion of the "peaceful change" clause at 
this juncture constitutes a compromise by the Western Caucus; as 
the Soviets insisted that the Inviolability principle III must be 
uncluttered and unambiguous, leaving no possible margin of error 
In cntcdpdehahcon. Included in principle one Is the endorsement 
of the State's rcghh to membership of cdheddahcodal organizations 
and alliances, or even to pursue neutrality. Most of the remain­
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States must refrain from behaving. The practical expression of 
this principle of sovereign equality is laid out in principle II.
II Refraining from threat or use of force
Drawn from the UN definition on non-use of force, Charter Article 
2.4, and the right of self defence, this principle clearly 
prohibits the employment of force as a means of settling dis­
putes. A special resolution to give effect to this principle is 
included at the end of the declaration of principles requiring, 
in the event of any dispute, recourse to the peaceful means set 
forth In Article 33 of the UN Charter. A commitment to further 
the "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" issue, submitted and later 
abandoned by the Swiss, was recorded by the convocation of a 
meeting of experts to address this subject.
III Inviolability of frontiers
The participating States regard as inviolable all of 
one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all 
States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now 
and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. 
Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand 
for, or act of seizure and usurpation of part or all 
of the territory of any participating State.
The words "assaulting" and "demand" in this principle caused much 
rancour at Geneva. It was thought the wording precluded even 
verbal aspirations to German unity, but von Groll argues that In 
the context of the third principle the use of "assaulting" refers 
exclusively to "frontiers," allowing no other interpretation 
other than reference to infringements on frontiers by the use of 
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Germany by illegal means, von Groll claims that the use of the 
word "assaulting" renders the statement on inviolability une­
quivocal allowing It to clarify the "peaceful change" clause in 
the first principle. 1,985 The phrase "any demand for" constituted 
refraining from actions tantamount to an "ultimatum" and was 
included much to German chagrin because of Soviet insistence.1'^6-'
IV Territorial integrity of States
Derived from principle two on the non-use of force, this 
principle complements the principle on inviolability of frontiers 
and precludes any action that jeopardises the unity or political 
independence of any participating State.
V Peaceful settlement of disputes
The partipipating States will settle disputes among 
them by peaceful means in such a mmnner aa not to 
endanger international peace and security, and justice.
On the basis of international law and, while adhering to any 
settlement procedures agreed to in advance of any disputes, 
States may pursue,"peaceful means of their own choice" in order
to reach an equitable solution. All participating States, 
whether involved in any dispute or not are charged to refrain 
from "any action that might aggravate the situation." This 
directive thus distanced the participating States from the Swiss
’"von Groll op.tit.p252.
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aspirations for obligatory procedures. Principles IV and V
complement principle II.
VI Non-intervention in internal affairs
Directed against military intervention or the threat of such
intervention this principle reads,
The participating States will refrain from any 
intervention, direct or indieett, indiviUaa1 or 
collective in the internal or external affairs ... of 
another participating State, regardless of their mutual 
relations.
In addition they must refrain from, "... activities directed 
toward the violent overthrow of another participating State."
The CSCE provisions, and especially those envisaged under 
Principle VII (see below), require behavourial change to a 
greater or lesser extent from all participating States. As von
Groll points out, all measures of the CSCE are based on consensus 
or provide for alternative bilateral or multilateral regulation, 
therefore this principle ought not to be Invoked by States to
deflect attention from such unacceptable elements that exist in
their internal affairs. 1’5*'z
A good example of the misuse of this principle took place in June
1991. Just before the Moscow coup there was an apparent swing to
a more conservative stance in Soviet foreign policy. One task of 
the CSCE Council Meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Berlin in





Stage ill The F i nal Ac t
June 1991, was to establish a new mechanism of procedure for
holding emergency meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials
(CSO), which would not require consensus as hitherto. At the CSO
meetings, held orcfr to the meeting of Foreign Mcdcshcds, in
Prague in May and June this issue had generated much discussion.
It was agreed (or so it seemed) hhyh in future in an emergency
situation a meeting could be justifiably called provided it had
the support of twelve fhhcr padhctcpahcdg States. But just
before the Berlin Meeting the Soviet delegation Invoked the issue
of dod-cdhervenhcfd demanding a,
[S]octcyl exclusion stating that the new mechanism 
should not lead to Interference in the Internal affairs 
of the oyrtctcpytcng states.
This may have been a justifiable ahhcmot to achieve "Idherdyl
sovereignty," given the turmoil in their domestic situation, but
dfdcheeless it made the ncgfhcahifds at Berlin more difficult 
than they need have been.
VII Respect for Human rights and fundamental freedoms including
freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief
Despite the fact (as outlined above) hhah Principle VI can be 
used to make negotiations more difficult,it also has the pohcn- 
hcal to effectively to block progress on Pdcnccole VII. Because 
of their importance in the humanitarian field these two pdCn- 
ccolcs are to be considered in rciahcod to each fheed.
*•»®»DerdctI>cd Y. "The Helsinki process from Vienna to Moscow" 
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States are directed to act in conformity with the U.N.Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
VIII Equal rights and self determination of. peoples
By virtue of this principle ... all peoples have the 
right in full freedom to determine when and as they 
wish, their Internal and external staaus,waahoua 
external interference, and to pursue as they wish their 
political, etntnmat,sncial and cultural development.
Some participating States such as Canada, Spain and Yugoslavia 
were concerned as to the possible consequences this principle 
might bode for separatist asparatinns.Develnpments in Cyprus gave 
added poignance to these fears, consequently this principle takes 
recourse in the UN Charter vis-a-vis the "territorial integrity
of States"'1-
IX Cooperation among States
This Principle, although vaguely worded, allows for the develop­
ment of a positive role for persons to contribute,
[Tlhey (the participating states) confirm that governments 
and institutions, organizations and persons have a relative 
and positive role to play in contributing toward the 
achievement of these alms of their cooperation.
This principle with its reference to "persons" enhances the 
importance of the individual to domestic order, and thereby to 
itaertatinnal stability.
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X,Euai^^BSitllJVilSOOdL.faIth.-SIL....JObligai..ij2h^^j2nas.x._l^L^.^rnatAonal.
law
The formulation of this principle was aimed at precluding any 
temptation to regard the laws and customs of a sovereign State as
sacrosanct.
PTJhey will conform with their legal obligations under 
International law ... pay due regard to and implement 
the provisions in the Final Act of the CSCE.
It was hoped this clause would cover any potential ambiguities 
involving treaties already signed, or any chance that the Soviets 
might evoke "laws and customs" as opt out clauses.
"Matters related to giving effect to certain of the above 
principles." Under this heading the Romanian and the Swiss 
aspirations on the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement 
of disputes (discussed above) were rolled together to be ad­
dressed at a later date. This like everything else was a com­
promise decided by consensus. All ten principles are related, 
though itii,iVtVt have special reference to security, signifying 
that security issues were an integral part of the CSCE.Prineipaes 
II-V and IX are generally recognised obligations of the United
Nations Charter.
DQe^QentlOnlConfVdei£ellBu^^^gL..Measu^LS,
The preamble sets out the desire of the participating States to 
eliminate the causes of tension. Paragraph III details the 
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security." At the same time acknowledging the interrelationship 
between security in Europe,the world, and between Europe and the
Mediterranean area.
Under the auspices of CBM, military manoeuvres were regarded as
examples of politically significant activity. Although they had 
no immediate relationship to military capacity or force levels, 
under discussion in the MBFR talks at Vienna, they could reflect 
political intentions and achieve political objectives and 
therefore, were a vital element of security.
Major military manoeuvres only were addressed at the Conference, 
however, under "general considerations" the Final Act deems that 
"further consideration will be given... to the prior notification 
of major military movements," presumably through the Follow Up 
Mechanism at Belgrade. The differentiation between military 
manoeuvres and military movement is a delicate matter of percep­
tion, but this can be viewed as a starting point toward attaining 
the physical security of Europe.
It was no secret that the resolutions agreed on military aspects 
of security fell well short of NNA States aspirations. In the 
face of stalemate between the big powers in Geneva, the per­
severance of the NNA contingent carried the whole initiative on 
CBM through. Maresca points out how valuable the eventual com­







Stage III The Final Act 
The final instruction, that as security Interests are Inherent In 
sovereign equality, that all States shall "see to it that 
information about relevant developments, progress and results are 
provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating on 
the CSCE... " can be read as a reference to the lack of represen­
tation of the NNA Interest at the MBFR talks in Vienna. The
directive "see to it that" is the loosest of requirements. This 
reflects the problems encountered in trying to establish a 
confidence building system which would embrace all areas of 
International activity, of how to balance ends and means given 
the immense diversity of political and social interests.
Basket II / Document II.
This, the first of two documents on cooperation, was of major 
Interest to the Eastern bloc. Whilst paying tribute to the 
"work already undertaken by relevant organizations... especially 
that of the U^Economic Commission for Europe," This section 
of the CSCE aimed at establishing a political framework for 
economic cooperation. The preamble records the participating 
States consciousness "of the growing role of international trade 
in economic growth and social progress." Under General provisi­
ons the question surrounding the Most Favoured Nation status was 
finalised, making it perfectly clear that this issue did not fall 
within the competences of multilateral fora (see pl20-l). Various 
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steady growth of trade, aimed at the avoidance of market disrup­
tion: vis the improvement of business contacts and facilities, 
economic and commercial information and marketing. All these 
measures involved the freeing of information, including legislat­
ive information essential for the establishment of permanent 
representation necessary for those wishing to expand commercial 
enterprises.
Section two resolutions distinguish between conventional trade 
agreements and industrial cooperation which sets out the need "to 
promote measures designed to create favorable conditions for 
industrial cooperation."
Projects of common interest: focuses on long term cooperation on 
"major projects of common interests... in the fields of energy, 
communication and exploitation of raw materials."
Provisions concerning trade and industrial cooperation:
This section addressed problems arising from the preceding 
sections namely, harmonization of standards, disputes arising 
from movement of goods and services, and permits in the event of 
dispute "arbitration in a third country" if necessary.
Science and . Technology is addressed in section four and ack­
nowledges the contribution of science and technology in the 
"solution of problems of common interest and the improvement of
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Environmental issues are covered in section f ive and involve a
comprehensive resolution for cooperation in the envirnnmettal
f ield .
Cooperation in other areas and promotion of tourism;
Section six deals with the development of transport, issues of 
border tntapnls, and the standardization of technical and 
administrative regulations. Interestingly the penultimate 
paragraph warns against the adverse effects of mass tourism,"... 
not to injure the environment and the artistic, historic and 
cultural heritage." The question of migrant labour, and that of 
the North/South problem of asymmetrical economic growth, dealt 
with in this section draws on existing International Labour 
Organization texts, at the same time safeguarding each State's 
ataepesa with a clause appertaining to its own "socan-etonomit 
situation" if and when problems arise from the migration of
workers.
Training of personnel: also in this section recognises the 
"importance of training and advanced training ... for economic 
development of every country.
Document III Relating to the Mediterranean
As the title indicates this deals with "Questions Relating to 
Security and Conperaaant in the Mediterranean," an issue that was 
contentious throughout the MPT and at Geneva. As about a third of 
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[Clonvinced that the Security in Europe is to be con­
sidered in the broader context of world security and 
is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean
area..., the process of improving security... should 
extend...to the Mediterranean area.
The participating States declared their intention to conduct 
relations with the six Levantine and Maghreb States In accordance 
with the spirit of the ten principles, and to develop cooperation 
in the fields of economic activity, on both, "a bilateral and 
multilateral basis cooperate towards the improvement of the 
environment of the Mediterranean." Last, but not least, they
recorded the commitment to "reducing armed forces in the region 
..., with the pururso of contributitg tt peace," which most 
probably wCII feature prominently on Malta’s agenda at the Follow 
Up Meeting in Belgrade.
Basket III / Document IV
This second of the two documents on cooperation deals with all
aspects outside solitucS" defence and economics, namely, the
human dimension. The preamble set out the actrcbCictr .thu,
Desiring to contribute to the saaee aad unneartenning 
among peoples and to the spubutual enrichment of the 
human personality without duttunniion as to rcce" sex 
language and religion, conscious that... contacts 
between people and the solution oo hhmoarCecbhn 
problems.. .determined therefore to ceotreate 3011^ 
themselves, irrespective of their political, economic 
and social systems... to work out new ways and
means...in full respect of the srincuslas guiding 
relations among partucipatung States....
Thus the sartceisatunt States pledged easier human contacts by
143
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the implementation of easier "contacts and regular meeting on the 
basis of family ties," on "reunification of families" and
"marriage between citizens of different states" and to allow 
renewal of family ties severed by the division of Europe. A 
caution is set out that such applications will not "modify the 
rights and obligation of the applicant or members of his family." 
and such applications are to be dealt with in an expedient, 
positive and humanitarian spirit. Facilitation of "wider travel 
for personal or professional reasons," including the improvement 
of conditions for tourism on an individual or collective basis" 
to encompass religious groups, "meetings among young people" and 
the "expansion of sport and contacts generally" are all deemed 
areas open to improvement.
Information: in this field consciousness of the need for an ever
wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life 
in other participating States focused on three important issues. 
"The improvement of working conditions of journalists": the 
"improvement in the dissemination of printed publications": and 
"expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by 
radio." The last provision was probably the most crucial of the
three issues.
Cooperation and exchanges in the field of culture;
The aim here: was to develop "mutual confidence and further the 
improvement of relations between States" by seeking "new fields 
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foreign languages and civilizations, and recognizing the value of
"national minorities or regional cultures."
This was by far the most difficult document to negotiate, but it 
also raised the highest expectations as the CSCE process enhanced 
and scrutinized the asymmetries between the two systems. By 
requiring that sovereign states be held accountable for the 
treatment of their own citizens to other sovereign states, this 
linked, for the first time, those aspects of security that prompt 
governments to repress their citizens to the international order. 
It turned out to be a revolutionary innovation in the conduct of
international affairs.
Basket IV / Document V Follow up to the Conference.
In the final text the participating States "declare their 
resolve, in the period following the Conference, to pay due 
regard and to implement the provisions of the Final Act...:
(a) unilaterally, in all cases which lend themselves to such 
action
(b) bilaterally, by negotiations with other 
participating States;
(c) mulilaterally, by meetings of experts of the 
participating States and also within the framework
of existing international organizations, such as the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and 
UNESCO, with regard to scientific and cultural 
cooperation.... to continue the multilateral process 
initiated by Conference.
The first meeting to pursue this end was scheduled for Belgrade






Stage III The Final Act 
organize the "date duration, agenda and other modalities of the 
meeting of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs." This provision proved to be ttie device that set the 
CSCE process in motion, setting it apart from simply an attempt 
to add another international organization to the plethora that 
already existed, because it provided the framework for the 
Conference to continue as an on going process. It is this 
section on the Follow Up Mechanism that has afforded to the CSCE 
its highly dynamic potential as a process. It states that there 
is merit in,
...proceeding to a thorough exchange of views both on 
the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act 
and of ttie tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, 
in the context olf the questions dealt with by tte 
latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, tte 
improvement of security and the development of coopera­
tion in Europe, and the development of the process of 
detente in the future.201
Each participating State was instructed to,
[Plublish and disseminate the Final Act, the original 
of which will be drawn up in the six official languages 
will be retained by the Government in its archives.
"Done at Helsinki, on 1st August 1975, in the name of" the High 
Representatives of the participating States. With Aldo Moro Prime 
Minister of the Italian Republic "double hatting" as President in 
office of the Council of the European Communities.^*^
3601 Cmnd 6198 The Helsinki Final Act as presented to . .Parliam­
ent August 1975 p51. '
=*=ibid PP225-282.
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Important Features of the Helsinki Final Act.
The CSCE and the signing of the Final Act provided hhe Vovists 
with a substitute World War II peace treaty, which had never been 
signed because of the division of Germany. It can be argued that 
although it follows closely the "treaty law model," it falls 
short as a treaty in international law, because of its non­
binding force. But, as indicated above it does carry the politi­
cal force of every Head of State or Government in Europe and 
North America. Bloed quotes van Dijk,
A commitment does not have to be legally binding in 
order to have binding force; the distinction between 
legal and non-legal binding force resides in the legal 
consequences attached to the binding force.sso:3
It is not the"binding force as such" but the legal consequences
that count. Bloed further points out that,
Violations of politically but not legally binding 
agreements is as inadmissible as violations of norms of 
international law. In this respect there is no dif­
ference between politically anti legally binding
rule^.^0*'1''
This is akin to "soft law", a non-conventional instrument 
increasingly used in the Community legal-order for resolutions 
that declare rules or codes of conddct .®°n N^^t^it^^t^an^^r^g
a°°quoted in Bloed op.cit.pll.
^’"’""idem
se^See "Soft Law in European Community Law" reprinted from 
European Law Review October 1989 Vol.14 No.5 pp274-7. Vaclav 
Havel in an address to Nato Council on 21 March, 1991 expressed 
the hope that the non-binding force of the CSCE accords will be 
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this, this mass of political force can be used as a tool of 
legitimization, or on the other hand the lack of legal commitment 
can be used to fend off criticism. As made clear made by 
Solzhenitsyn and The linkage of the progress bet­
ween baskets removed any tendency to forge ahead in the less 
contentious areas at the expense of progress in those more 
contentious areas. This system of progress has made negotiations
almost"condemned to succeed."®07
The CSCE, as it emerged from the Geneva talks, wos o weak 
institutional structure with no permanent political organ. The 
only semblance of continuity came from the provision of the 
Follow Up Mechanism, which was the nearest thing to an institu­
tionalized structure. It was, and still is, the only European 
forum where all European States (except Albania initially) meet 
with the United States and Canada and although this was an East- 
West alignment it is prudent to acknowledge the contribution of 
the NNA States, who from outside the two alliances served the 
process with a real contribution as "bridge builders" between the 
opposing ideologies.
Reaction to . the Helsinki Final Act.
As the title Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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suggests security and cooperation in Europe are inextricably 
bound. The mutual interdependence which ensues from cooperation 
opens up contact, which increases opportunities for both parties
to influence each other. This factor removed the Western
"bogeyman" as a tool of Soviet policy, both at home and abroad. 
The Soviet’s major gain was the acceptance, and what they per­
ceived as legitimization, by the international community, of the 
acquisition of territory taken by force in 1945. This in effect, 
was tacit recognition that the German question, which had 
dominated international relations of Europe for more than a 
century appeared to be solved by the formalization of two German 
States. However, one commentator saw the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act as an indication that,
[Ilf you are strong enough you are exempt from prin­
ciples smaller powers are asked to honour. It is what 
the Chinese call an unequal treaty, as it says everyth­
ing east of the Elbe is and is to stay communist.""*’’
As well as recognizing the post war boundaries and by implication 
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the Final Act epitomised the 
era of limited hostility, mirroring the growing confidence of the
ruling elites, that force would not be used by any party to 
impose a preferred solution.
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The web that was woven at CSCE encapsulated the common purpose of 
easing international tension. This was reflected in the opening 
paragraph of the document which reads that "to broaden and make 
continuing and lasting the process of detente" was the main 
objective. At the thirtieth United Nations General Assembly on 
30 September 1975, Foreign Minister Gromyko proclaimed the 
Helsinki Final Act to be,
[Qlne of the most outstanding documents of our time... 
the continent of Europe would at last break out of the 
vicious circle of its history when every post-war 
period turned into a pre war period followed by wars of 
aggression.
The multifaceted aspect of the Conference reflected the common 
interests of each party with each attaching varying weight to the 
aspects it liked or disliked.
After the Final Act was signed the Politburo of the Communist 
Party, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of 
Ministers of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
jointly expressed the leadership's positive evaluation of the 
Helsinki Final Act.. In February 1976, at the 225b CPSU
Congress, Brezhnev extolled the achievements of CSCE, commenting 
that "the results achieved..." by the "two years of work at 
Geneva and ten years of political preparation beforehand..., are
e Helsinki . to Belgrade The Soviet Union and the Implemen­
tation of the Final Act of the European Conference. Translated 
from the Russian: Moscow, Progress Publishers 1977 p73.
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worth the efforts expended." The results Brezhnev stressed were 
first and foremost "confirmation of the inviolability of bor­
ders," the "code of principles of interstate mutual relations" 
which, "in letter and spirit answered the requirements of 
peaceful coexistence." Brezhnev also r ecognised t ht p rovisions 
for "peaceful cooperation in the fields of economic affairs..." 
and finally confidence building measures. Warning that the
Helsinki Final Act would not be used as "a cover for interference
in the internal affairs of the countries of socialism, for anti­
communism and anti-Soviet democracy in the style of the Cold 
War." He nevertheless applauded the CSCE and the Helsinki Final
Act . 1 :1
In the United States when President Ford signed the Helsinki 
Final Act, the reaction was startlingly different from almost any 
other participating State. Until the President attended Helsinki 
the CSCE was virtually unknown to most Americans, subsequently it 
came under constant attack from the Republican Right. This 
alleged that the West had given a lot in return for "paper 
concessions," which the Soviets had no intention of implementing. 
Ronald Reagan, who at that time had not declared his challenge to 
Ford, announced "I think all Americans should be against it." = i = 
Some of Ford's own staff defended it as "another Kissinger deal
::K = i pravda 7 August 19 7 5.
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that was forced down the President's throat" in the pursuit of
zdetente . = :l- °
Based on an analogy with" Gulliver and the Lilliputians," 
Kissinger wanted to bind the Soviets by a "mesh of tiny threads" 
to the West, namely through agreements which may initially 
benefit the East in deference to the West. In this way he hoped 
the Soviets would come to realize that their relationship with 
the West was too valuable to break. A theory which presupposed 
that the Soviets were playing the diplomatic game by the same, 
rules as the West, desptee the experience during the Geneva 
stage, when it first became apparent that the Soviets had no 
understanding of what constituted a "gentleman's agreement." The 
danger lay in the possibility that, behind the facade of detente, 
the Soviet economic and military strength could surpass that of 
the West, causing a greater imbalance than hitherto. At a time 
when tth imperative wase te keep the competition between both 
camps awwy from war, which meant controlling the central balance, 
the essential components of which were arms control and crisis 
management.
Because of Kissinger's misperception of the potential political 
importance of human rights issues, the American press misIdterpr-
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etated the Helsinki Final Act exactly the way the Soviets inte­
nded. With headlines such as "Jerry don’t go" in the Wall St 
Journal, they judged the signing of the Helsinki Final Act to be 
nothing more that a confirmation of the status quo in Europe 
overlooking the potential significance of the two documents on 
cooperation.®1-* A clear indication that the American people, 
like the Soviet people had a limited grasp as to what the CSCE 
was all about, despite the freedom of information and of the 
freedom of the American press.
Instead of a "mesh of tiny threads" the two documents on coopera­
tion allowed a cluster of tiny colander like holes to open up in 
the "visible boundary between the two social worlds," which can 
be enlarged by patient prodding.®125
On the whole the superpower stance was adversarial, but the 
outcome of the Conference was considered by the members of the 
NATO Alliance, and their analysis reflected other views and con­
cerns. The following are extracts of views as presented in the
NATO Review of October 1975.®1&
Characteristically the French President dwelt on the absence of 
treaty force behind the documents "History has taught us that the
®1-*Maresca op.cit.pl59.
®lss”Every prospect pleases" Economist 2 August 1975. 
»*a.iCSCE Alliance Views" NATO Review 1975 No. 5 pp3-9.
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balance of power is a prerequisite on detente and peace... the I
essential climate of security...." However, in a more positive
vein, the German Chancellor reminded his audience that the
Federal Government had been working toward the process of wider
detente for some years, and that although, i1
This Conference has not created a new international law
for Europe. But we have created common rules to govern .J
the way we conduct our relations and live together in
Europe.
The Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindermans, J
... In future we must see to it that an idea of *1
cooperation based on frankness, open mindedness and 
that tolerance prevails in Europe and replaces the kind iof coexistence that is really nothing more than a form |
of mutual suspicion.
The Norwegian Prime Minister emphasized the importance of 
Alliances: they remain "essential elements in the present
security system in Europe"
The Turkish Prime Minister’s remarks reflected the North/South 
asymmetries, "Mankind aspires to peace justice and prosperity,"
aims that are linked and interdependent as there, "would be no 
peace without justice, equally there will be no prosperity 
without peace."
The excellence of the cohesion of the Nine was recorded by the 
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However, it was the Danish Prime Minister who put his finger on
the importance of new beginning, when, after he drew attention to
the omissions in the document of such measures as military
reductions and disarmament. He restated the concept of detente,
as a dynamic aimed at... cooperation between States as 
well as individuals.... Whether it will be a turning 
point in modern history remains to be seen.
So contrary to Albanian assertions that the superpowers were 
"trying to resolve major international problems among themselves" 
(see p36), what emerged was a framework that was truly Euroc­
entric. Whereas previously the superpower leaders had called the 
shots in their adversarial roles, in the CSCE they appeared as 
marginal and reluctant participants, albeit for different 
reasons, in the ongoing process. For years constant backup was 
required from the US, and it still is, but the achievement of the 
CSCE process was that it tied up the loose ends left, between 
East and West, by the treaties of the early seventies. Bowker 
and Williams suggest that, in the early seventies, "constraining 
both the power and the foreign policy ambitions of the Federal 
Republic of Germany" was a key element in Soviet foreign policy.- 
331-z Thus the CSCE allowed Germany to test its wings, by freeing 
its foreign policy, to the extent that the West German government 
did not have to be so absolutely beholden to the rest of Europe 
and the United States. As a result the European proteges had
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taken the lead, with the delegates of the thirty five States 
scheduled to meet in two years to debate whether promises have
been kept.
The next chapter will follow that lead through the Follow Up 
Mechanism provided for by Chapter V of the Helsinki Final Act 
beginning with the Belgrade Conference of 1977.
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The Final Act is no mutual declaration of love.
Vladimir Lomeiko.-
By the end of August 1975 the spirit of Helsinki was fast 
becoming the ghost of Helsinki when Czechoslovakian border guards 
shot down a helicopter containing East Germans trying to escape 
to the West. The Communist governments of the Eastern States 
remonstrated with the Austrian and West German governments for 
not policing their frontiers more thoroughly. That the Helsinki 
Final Act obliged all the signatories "gradually to simplify and 
to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry" was 
simply ignored,= heralding the Implementation problems to be 
faced at the first review meeting in Belgrade. Any notion that 
the Helsinki Final Act strengthened Moscow's hegemony in its East 
European Empire was negated by the dissent within the Eastern 
States, which followed the signing of the Act.
By 1976, as communication and trade links multiplied between East 
and West Europe and particularly between Eastern and Western 
Germany, violations of human rights perceived to be contravening 
the Helsinki Final Act were being monitored and made known to the 
governments and to the public of the other signatory States by 
various groups. The Poles resumed their historical role of
.'"Realities and Prospects of Detente as seen in Moscow 
after the Belgrade Experience" :The Belgrade Conference Progress 
or Regression. Eastern. Western and Nonaligned Appraisals of an
Unfinished Conferei^t^t;. Van Den Heuvel C.& Praaning R.(eds) Leiden 
New Rhine Publishers, 1978 p29. ‘
^"Blessed are the Meekers" Economist 23 August 1975 p37.
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defying their Soviet occupiers, leading to the inception of the 
"Committee for the Defence of the Workers." 1977 was declared
Human Rights Year and it began with the birth of Charter 77 in
Czechsolavakia. Discordant voices were raised on both sides of
the divide under the common objective of establishing that 
certain basic human rights are necessarily beyond arbitrary
decision.
In the United States what was perceived as the "government's 
mismanagement of the Vietnam war" caused increased Congressional 
interest in the conduct of foreign affairs transforming the 
United States into a "vigorous champion of Helsinki. ";3 The 
subsequent establishment of the Commission on CSCE, which was 
unique in that it reflected a bipartisan cross section of United 
States Administration drawing membership from the legislative and 
the executive, exemplified the argument implied in the Helsinki 
Final Act, that the multiple facets of security were the concern 
of governments and people.
Too preoccupied with gaining territorial safeguards vis-a-vis
the annexation of Finnish and Rumanian territories as well as the
acquisition of Czechoslovakia, German and Polish lands, Moscow 
had misjudged the real thrust of Helsinki. By missing the 
destabilizing potential of the Basket III issues for both their 
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missed the most Important factor, that essentially, a weak
domestic order invites external interference.^' This was the back 
drop to the first Follow Up Meeting of the CSCE, the creation of
which was, incidently, a Soviet proposal first mooted in Budapest
in 1970.
The abbreviation FUM may be interpretated as either follow up 
mechanism or follow up meetings and will be used interchangeably. 
Follow Up Meetings consisted of a series of meetings of experts 
and specialized conferences mandated and categorized as; Review 
meetings and Intersessional meetings.
Review Meetings





Review meetings are full scale meetings mandated with reviewing 
implementation of all baskets of CSCE and consideration of prop­
osals on any subject.
Intersessional Meetings
Intersessional meetings address a specific subject and have fixed 
dates to begin and end their work. There is no rule that limits 
the authority of the intercessional meetings simply because the
** Buzan B.People States and Fear:The National Security 
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consensus rule with its checks and balances ensures that no
delegation can be forced to accept any changes with which they do
not agreed
Hitherto all mandated meetings have been preceded by mandated 
preparatory meetings to set the agenda, procedure and modalities 
for the main meeting. This practice ended with the Vienna 
Concluding Document (VCD). when the agenda and modalities for all 
ten of the Intersessional Meetings and the Review Meetings 
scheduled to take place between 1989 and 1992 were preset.^ 
Mandates can require the adoption of a concluding document, 
however mandating a document may create pressure for delegates to 
produce something and with consensus this means agreement, but it 
cannot ensure that the necessary foundation for agreement will 
exist. No mandate can override the fundamental rule of consensus
even when the finite time has, or is, in danger of running out?’ 
There is also the danger that to produce a document according to 
a mandate becomes an imperative that overrides the discussion 
itself, as happened at Krakow in 1991 (see pl95).
The Belgrade Review Meeting
1977-8
In accordance with the provisions laid out in the Helsinki Final 
Act the preparatory meeting opened on June 15 1977. The remit of
"Schlager op.cit.p231.
^idem: Cm 649 Vienna Concluding Document 
‘See Schagler op.cit.p233.
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1977-78
this meeting was to prepare the agenda, modalities and procedure 
for the Review Meeting in Belgrade scheduled for October 4 1977. 
As happened at the MPT in 1972-73 the clash of objectives 
surfaced immediately. At Belgrade the West sought a full review 
of the implementation of the Final Act from Helsinki to Belgrade 
and a commitment to the continuation of the process. The East 
adhered to the stance that their political system need not change 
to conform with any domestic political feeling, despite the fact 
that the Helsinki Final Act does require implementations that are 
inimical to closed societies. This polarization of purpose was 
not helped by the fact that the interim period from Helsinki to 
Belgrade was full of unfinished business, for example, the
unfinished SALT and MBFR talks.
After eight weeks of bargaining, in which the United States took 
a leading negotiating role, the package which emerged favoured 
the United States position, although the NNA states would have 
happily settled for a simple guarantee of the continuation of the 
CSCE process. The CSCE symbolized for them the protection of the 
different values and interests bargained for and established at 
earlier stages in the negotiations.
The agreement of the preparatory meeting set out three phases 
in the first phase,
The main meeting would review the implementation of the 
Final Act in its zfirst phase, consider new proposals 
for developing detente in its second, and draft a 
concluding document in its third but there could well
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be overlap between the phases,with the record of'the past always 
subject to discussion:
In the second,
The main meeting would do most of its work in three 
committees - under the direction of a plenary body- 
divided according to the main baskets, with separate 
committees on Mediterranean issues and on the question 
of arranging further CSCE meetings (follow-up).
And in the final phase,
The main meeting would begin October 4, try to conclude 
by December 22, likely to run from mid-January till 
mid-February, but in no event adjourn until adopting 
(by consensus) a concluding document and setting the 
time and place for another similar meeting.'
The Belgrade Meeting ran for five months and five days, and took 
place in an atmosphere of confrontation and mutual accusations as 
principle VI on non-intervention in internal affairs, and 
principle VII on respect for human rights, came into such sharp 
conflict that useful dialogue was obstructed. Once again the 
differing concepts of detente caused problems. The Soviets 
believed that detente and the expansion of detente depended 
solely on the balance of forces between East and West and were 
convinced that the United States policy line on human rights was 
obstructive, rather than a necessary component in their foreign 
policy demanded by domestic political feeling. Given that the 
united States’ commitment on human rights issues (as discussed in 
the previous chapter) was compounded by President Carter’s 
election, the United States wanted to review, as a whole, the
'CSCE Commission ..Congress of the United States of America- 
The Belgrade Conference op.cit. pl2.
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improvements in Europe in the light of the Helsinki Final Act.
No conclusion about the future could be determined without an
analysis of the commitments and the record of their implementa­
tion. This led to serious differences of opinion on implementa­
tion, and full dialogue was never achieved because the Soviets 
fell back on the line that ’’any discussion of the implementation
deficiencies of another State was barred by the sixth prin­
ciple...” on non-intervention."'
In Soviet opinion, outlined by their Delegation Head lull 
Vorontsov at Belgrade, the West dodged any,
... serious discussion of the burning issues related to
European security and above all those of limiting the 
arms race and military detente in Europe, these 
delegations have sought to switch over to other 
subjects and to challenge the socialist countries on 
human rights and cooperation in humanitarian fields.* 10
Vorontsov further argued that Belgrade was simply being used as a 
smokescreen to obscure the evils inherent in capitalism, such as 
unemployment, racism and apartheid. It was spurious to talk of 
individual human rights, while ’’hawking the neutron bomb to 
Europe,” a bomb which was designed to kill human beings leaving 
private property intact. The inference that can be drawn from 
this viewpoint is that for the Soviets ideological feuding was 
still uppermost in their perceptions.11
•^President Carter’s Speech: Mastney op.cit ppl83-4.
loSpeech by Vorontsov Iulii, Soviet Delegation Head at
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The "burning issues" brought forward under new proposals by the 
Soviets focused on the military budget of NATO, and the 
economic provisions in Basket II which the Soviets claimed were 
discriminatory, Ideally the Soviets would have liked to separate 
security issues from CSCE to avoid the problem of linkage, a hard 
won condition at Geneva which was fought for so persistently by 
the Western caucus. The Soviets wished for a new treaty on the 
non-first-use of nuclear weapons among the participating States 
of the CSCE. A somewhat specious proposal as principle VI of the 
Helsinki Final Act prohibits the first-use of any weapons between 
participating States. The proposal for a freeze on membership of 
European military alliances, again reflected the Soviet fears 
vis-a-vis NATO, as there were no potential members clamouring to 
join the Warsaw Pact, but Spain's accession into NATO was 
pending. Proposals were proffered for pan-European conferences 
on Energy, Transport and the Environment, all of which focused on 
the future not the past. This was read in the West as a ploy to 
deflect scrutiny on implementation, which of course was the
raison d'etre for the West.
As a result of this huge divergence of opinions, the West German
wish for a specific statement averring that the individual "has a 
legitimate right to invoke the Final Act," along with all the
16 4
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aspirations contained in principle VII on human/rights, was not
realized at Belgrade. 1:2
The Belgrade Concluding Document (BCD) simply noted that new 
proposals were examined but not adopted, code words for no 
consensus. Three Intersessional Meetings of experts were man­
dated .
In conformity with the mandate contained in the Final 
Act... the meeting of experts will be convened at 
Montreau on 31 October..., on Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes...(PSD) .
Upon the invitation of the government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany the meeting of experts as envisaged 
in the Final Act to prepare a "Scientific Forum" will 
take place in Bonn on June 20 1978, with represent­
atives of UNESCO and UNECE invited along to state their 
views.
Upon the invitation of 




Mediterranean states will be 
the work of this meeting. 
security will be discussed at
the
the
government of Malta a 
Mediterranean will be 
on 13 February 1979 in Valletta. Its mandate 
within the framework of the Mediterranean 
of the Final Act..., the non-participating 
invited to contribute to 
Questions relating to 
the Madrid meeting.1::3
The next Review Meeting under the Follow Up Mechanism was set for 
Madrid on 11 November 1980, with the preparatory meeting beginn­
ing on September 9 1980, approximately eight weeks beforehand.
‘"From Speech by West German State Secretary, Mastney 
op.cit.pl81:see also Flanaghan in Leebaert op.cit pl95.
' Belgrade Concluding Document: Bloed op.cit pp57-8.
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The Mediterranean provision was the only achievement at Belgrade 
as the formrr c on^nm.t^n^e^r^i:E3 were mandated for in the Helsinki Final 
Act of 1775. hhe Medieerrrnnenn povvision wan ahhivvdd once gaain 
by the Maltese ee se o f r ht t hreat to wiLthhol d c .
On the one’ hand, viewed in the short term, the Belgrade meeting 
was a non-event. On the other-hand, the review eeLement, an 
important precedent, was preserved reiterating that detente could 
not be selective. Overall Belgrade held fast to the accomplish­
ment of the Geneva talks where heman rights issues were first 
anchored on the inte^nationaa agenda and there were to 
remain. In addetidCi sn the dong term ”the emblems of people as 
well as power remain firmly on the East/West r^gvn^.r.* AltCough 
nothing of substance was achieved there were no subtractions, 
therefore the validity of the Helsinki Final Act was in no way 
compromised. The Belgrade Concleding Document reads,
The representaaivee of the participatidn states 
stressed the political importance of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and reaffirmed the 
resolve of their governments, to implement fully, 
unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterall}, all the 
provisions of the Final Act.'-
Blaming the adversarial and confrontational relationship between 
the superpowers for the minimal outcome of Belgrade, Professor
1'trre^:i^ent Carter's speech to Fourth Semiannual Report by 
the President to the CSCE Commission 1 December 1178, Special 
Report No.45, Department of State, June 1178,pp3-7: Masioey 
op.cit.ppe83-184.
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Blndschedler, the Head of the Swiss delegation, described the 
outcome as "one per cent success and ninety nine per cent 
failure." The mandating of the Madrid Follow Up Meeting con­
stituted the "one per cent success."**’
It is prudent to remember, when considering the Belgrade Follow 
Up Meeting, that State systems do not provide freedom, Matthew 
Hoffman avers that,
It is an illusion that government, democratic or 
otherwise, can guarantee people freedom. It can only 
limit freedom in order to achieve other goals such as 
egalitarianism,.freedom is a separate value from 
democracy or socialism ... and one that is often in 
conflict with then.. 17
Professor J.E.S. Fawcett points out that,
(Tlhere are few rights, and no freedoms, that are 
fundamental in the sense that they are not subject to 
some limitations in the common interest... *<a
Two things were magnified at Belgrade, the first was the differ­
ing inherent values of the social systems. Secondly, in contrast 
to former negotiations the United States took the offensive. The 
United States emphasis on the Western perception of human rights 
freedoms directly challenged the essentials of security and 
stability as far as the soviets were concerned. It represented a 
subtle challenge to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and helped
*CiMacDonald I."The Weary Consensus," Mastney op.cit.pl80. 
'7"a Human Rights Lesson from East Europe" Independent
London, 13 January 1990.
*«Fawcett J."The Belgrade Conference: Recycled Paper?" 
Millennium: 1978 Vol.7 No.l pp52-59.
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to refute the argument that the Helsinki Final Act was simply a
recognition of the status quo. If the promotion of cooperation
in Europe was the objective of the Helsinki Final Act then as
Professor Fawcett points out, there are other ways to respond to
human rights violations,and that,
... [I]t is reasonable to conclude that the manner in 
which tht human rights issues were raised at the 
Belgrade Conference was a wrong tactic, that diplomatic 
action in various tactics is an alternative and more 
effective course for governments, and that it at least 
should be pursued in anticipation of the Madrid 
conference, if the Final Act is to make progress.-’*
A repetition of Belgrade could not be afforded if greater 
cooperation in Europe were to be achieved and the "process" 
element of the CSCE preserved.
Intersessional Meetings emanating from Belgrade Follow Up Meeting
of 1977-8
Montreaux Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
In line with the provisions made in the Helsinki Final Act, the 
first intersessional meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes, was hosted by the Swiss at Montreaux. This subject was 
of special interest to the Swiss, and was pushed for by the Swiss 
Exx^s.20 No agreement was reached, however, as both East and 
West felt the Swiss prrposal was too far rraching. TTe West 
favoured a more gradual appnacr whUot thr Eatt , despter havigg 
signed the Helsinki Final Act, was still using the principle VI
-'idem.
::so See Mastney op.cPO.p18.
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(non Interference in their internal affairs) argument to block
progress.
B&an - . fie t. in g.jan-S c lent! i i c.E o x.um,
Although agreement was reached at Bonn to hold the Scientific 
Forum "proper" in Hamburg in February 1980, the meeting was over­
shadowed by the trials of civil rights activists by the soviets. 
The British Foreign Secretary David Owen felt that blatant 
disregard of the Helsinki Final Act provisions in one sphere 
(human rights) made possible agreement in another sphere remote.
In the Helsinki Final Act the contribution of science and
technology to "the improvement of the condition of human life" 
was recognised (see ppl44). However, in the charged atmosphere
of the Bonn talks the reference to "human life" came too close to
"human rights" serving to raise the temperature even higher.®1
At all previous Intersessional Meetings the lead in negotiations 
was taken by state officials. Hamburg was the first interses­
sional Meeting consisting of private individuals, the leading 
scientists of the participating States. The science leaders of 
East and West met in an atmosphere of conflict over the treatment
of dissident scientists in the Soviet Union. However notwiths­
tanding this, the concluding report included a reference to the
®AWall M."Trials Cast Shadow over Bonn Meeting" Radio Free 
Europe.... .B&poyt: Mastney op.cit.pl91.
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Importance of human rights and freedoms as "one of the founda­
tions for a significant Improvement in their mutual rela­
tions . . .
Va1letta on Cooperat1on in the Mediterranean
Malta hosted this meeting from February 13 to March 26 1979.
The remit of this gathering was to promote mutual and beneficial
cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields. At
this meeting Malta's proposal for the institutionalization of the
CSCE process were rejected. This meeting simply referred all
problems to the UN institutions officially concluding that,
ECE, UNESCO and UNEP, in particular provided a satis­
factory framework for developing the pertinent coopera­




If the Helsinki Final Act was the zenith of East-West detente, 
the nadir was reached by the time of the Madrid talks. By Madrid 
the United States presence in Europe was accepted as a norm by 
the Soviets, and to all intents and purposes they accepted the 
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tion of intermediate range cruise and Pershing missiles in 
Europe. Howeve, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979, like the helicopter shoot-down in August 1975, showed the 
extent of the complete disregard for any international standards 
of behaviour the Helsinki Final Act was meant to engender.®” 
Madrid inherited little or nothing from the Belgrade Follow Up 
Mechanism. The Belgrade Concluding Document recorded only that 
the meeting had taken place and that the participants, despite 
their inability to reach consensus on any suubtantive issue, were 
in agreement to continue the process.
The preparatory talks for the Madrid Follow Up Mechanism took 
place from 9 September to 10 November 1980, immediately prior to 
the main meeting scheduled for 11 November 1980. In theory, as 
with other preparatory meetings, the remit was to fix the 
procedural framework for discussions at the main meeting. In 
practice however, what ensued during this nine week period was a 
procedural wrangle which constituted a battle for the continua­
tion of the FUM of the process, and the right to review the 
implementation of the HFA to date. At the outset the Soviets, 
perhaps still smarting from Belgrade, pushed for a change in the 
procedural rules, indeed they were "not prepared to operate" 
under the Yellow Book rules used at Belgrade, which they deemed
®”Although Afghanistan was a non-participating State in the 
CSCE, nevertheless it was deemed a violation because the decalo­
gue of principles were closely tied to the UN Charter.
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prejudicial to their interests, which lay in convening a European 
disarmament conference. In seeking to limit the attention paid to 
the implementation of the CSCE commitments so far, the Soviets 
argued foo the use of the gulllotine in debates to avoid protrac­
ted discussion. hhe Wtst, on the tthrr hand, dim not want limit­
ation in this respect since they were determined to retain the 
division between the review element and new proposals. They 
needed the review implementation measures in order to address the 
flagrant violations of human rights to date, and to resist East­
ern aspirations to decouple the issues in the hope of turning the 
CSCE into a military security conference. To achieve their ends 
the Soviets tried to link agreement to the continuation of the 
FUM, which they had long ago decided was not an unalloyed good, 
to agreement on the disarmament conference. This extended the 
discussion causing the mandated closing date to be missed.®®
The Madrid preparatory meeting was mandated to close on 10 
November,and failure to reach agreement before the scheduled 
main meeting next day, 11 November, resulted in the clock being 
stopped to gain time to complete the talks. So either goodwill 
was to some extent present, or both sides knew that another 
"Belgrade" would spell disaster for the process, and court the 
disapproval of world opinion. The Purple Book contains the 
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time was reduced from eleven weeks, as at Belgrade, to five 
weeks. The crucial distinction, for the Western caucus, between 
implementation and new proposals was preserved, reserving for 
them the prerogative to raise issues such as Afghanistan when 
they saw fit.®® Indeed the Madrid Concluding Document (MCD) 
makes specific reference to the Afghanistan issue where it 
stresses that "relations... with all other States should be
conducted in the spirit of these principles."®^
The Madrid meeting lasted three years compared with Belgrade's 
five months, and throughout had the added disadvantage of an 
environment shaped by the decline in detente, which followed the 
election of President Ronald Reagan in the United States. The 
subsequent boycott of the Moscow Olympics, by the United States
exacerbated the situation. In the first instance talks were
overshadowed by invasion of Afghanistan. Then, right in the 
middle of the talks, in December 1981, the implementation of 
martial law in Poland compounded the gloom. In September 1983
the Soviet shoot-down of the Korean Air Lines (KAL) civil
aircraft with the loss of 269 lives, overshadowed the Concluding 
Document, almost unhinging the whole process.
®eibid see also Bloed op.cit pl7.
There is a discrepancy of one week in these authors’ avowals, 
Freeman records the debate as limited to five weeks, whereas
Bloed records six weeks.
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The first attempt at drawing up an acceptable concluding document 
was undertaken by the Austrian delegation on behalf of the NNA 
States. Aimed at finding a balance between the contentious 
issues of security and human rights, this initiative lost any 
impetus it might have deserved as a result of the situation in 
Poland. In the charged atmosphere the subsequent wrangling 
precluded agreement for a further eighteen months. The West was 
disenchanted with the substance of the draft and proposed 
substantive amendments in the human rights sphere. A definitive 
agreement was reached only after the intervention of the Spanish 
Prime Minister. Although Maltese blocking tactics had been 
successfully used on previous occasions, it was made clear that 
in this instance, the concluding document was to be adopted with 
or without Malta. Eventually when Malta relented,®' the prolon­
ged talks produced,
A thorough and frank review of Implementation; a 
balanced and substantive concluding document containing 
new commitments in all three baskets; and provisions 
for new meetings to ensure continuity.®®
In other words the essential elements, without which the con­
tinuation of the Helsinki process would have been futile, and its 
success impossible, were achieved. Therefore, a compromise had 
to be reached between the Western commitment to the improvement
^-'AHhough agreement was reached in July, the Maltese 
"sideshow" delayed the conclusion of the Madrid Meeting until 
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in human rights and the Eastern commitment to a disarmament
conference,
It is ironic that the West "stole the Emperor’s clothing" with 
its proposal on military security. This happened when, out of 
the five draft proposals tabled, the French proposal was taken up 
and used as the basis for eventual agreement in the field of 
disarmament.00 This constituted a move to challenge the East on 
an issue where they wished to hold the prerogative. This French 
proposal pleased the NNA States as it was seen as a move away 
from the Alliance to Alliance concern of the MBFR talks on force 
reductions taking place in Vienna, which as discussed earlier 
(see pl39-40) excluded the NNA inttresest* At the Geneva talks 
of 1973-75, the East had underpinned the voluntary nature of the 
CBM, at Madrid, the United States aan the United Kingdom made 
much of the relatively poor record of the East on the discret­
ionary application of the CBM and ussd ttihs to "tighte n and 
improve the CBM regime inaugurated aa Helsinki." nn hhort the 
Alliance had predecided that voluntary measures did not advance 
or enhance confidence and security and agreed among themselves 
that any new measures should be "binding in character, militarily 
significant and verifiable."®® Because of the linkage of 
disarmament in Europe with Confidence Building Measures, the CBM
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of the Helsinki Final Act changed with the Madrid Concluding 
Document to become Confidence and Security Building Measures
making the acronym (CSBM).
A substantial part of the Madrid Concluding Document consisted of 
a reiteration of the Helsinki Final Act. In addition it provided 
for six meetings of experts.These meetings took place at:
Stockholm on . . CSBM
The Stockholm meeting on CSBM, including Disarmament in Europe, 
was mandated to begin on 17 January 1984, with a preparatory 
meeting mandated to run from 25 October and lasting until 11 
November 1983, at Helsinki.
Athens on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
In conformity with the recommendation from the Montreaux Meeting 
of Experts another meeting on PSD was mandated to commence on 
March 21 1984. At this point, Malta's neutral nonaligned policy
was acknowledged in the Madrid Concluding Document®'®
Venice on Mediterranean Cooperation
The Meeting of Experts was mandated to meet, within the framework
laid out at Valletta, at Venice from October 16-26,1984.
...to review the initiatives already taken.^and 
stimulate where necessary broader developments in these 
sectors. "®“
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Ottawa on Human Rights and.. Fundamental.Freedoms
Based on the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and on the 
invitation of the Government of Canada this meeting was mandated 
to begin on 7 May 1985 with a preparatory meeting beginning on 23
April 1985.
Budapest on Cultural Forum
A "Cultural Forum" was mandated to "discuss interrelated
problems concerning creation, dissemination and cooperation" to 
begin 15 October 1985.
Bern on Human Contacts
This meeting mandated to address the emotive issue of human 
contacts was so contentious that, in line with the requirements 
of consensus as practiced at the CSCE, it was agreed to omit it 
from the Concluding Document "proper" and include it as an adden­
dum. It reads as follows,
The Chairman notes the absence of objection...there is 
agreement to convene such a meeting to discuss the 
development of contact among persons... with due 
account to the inttoducttoy pprt off the Chhpter of the 
Final Act enmtled Cooperation in Humanitarian and 
other Fields...'-
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Finally the document mandated for the next Follow Up Meeting to 
be held in Vienna on 4 November 1986, mandated that the agenda, 
working programme and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting were 
to apply mutatis mutandis to the main Vienna Meeting. Subject to 
other decisions that might be taken at the preparatory meeting 
commencing on 23 September 1986 at Vienna.
Plans to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final 
Act in 1985 were set out in the Concluding Document o£ Madrid.
In.t.e.r.se.ss.ional  , .. Meetings emanating from Madrid
Stockholm January 1984
The aim at Stockholm was to promote discussion and negotiation of 
early warning measures designed to diminish the threat of 
surprise military attacks. They were to apply to all of Europe 
including the European part of Soviet territory up to the Urals, 
including sea and air space. This represented an extension of 
the zone of application into Soviet territory agreed at Geneva; 
therefore it constituted an amendment to the FA of 1975. The new 
CSBM that emanated from Stockholm were, like the CBM that 
preceded them, to be politically binding, however unlike the CBM 
they replaced, they were to carry adequate verification procedu­
res. The major provisions of the Stockholm Document were :-
1 Notification of certain military activities six weeks 
, or morein advance.
2 Observation of military exercises now an obligation 
rather than voluntary as laid down in the FA of 1975.
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3 calendar of major military exercises to be exchanged 
annually.
4 inspection rights on the territory of participating 
States.
At the behest of the Eastern bloc, the Stockholm Document also 
contained a reiteration of Principle II of the Helsinki Final Act 
namely, "Refraining from the threat or use of force..." (see 
pl33). These measures entered into force on 1 January 1987.
Athens March 1984
This was the second meeting of experts on PSD and a weaker 
version of proposals was presented by the Swiss. The Eastern 
States also submitted counter proposals but no agreement was 
reached. The adoption of a short report of little substance 
concluded the meeting with no proposal to meet again.
Venice October 1984
This was also a second meeting on Mediterranean Cooperation, of 
the non-participating invitees only Egypt and Israel accepted.
The main concentration was on Mediterranean environmental issues
which was reflected in the report adopted on 26 October 1984.
Ottawa,,..nay, 1.985
Difficulties reaching agreement in the preparatory talks caused 
another "stop the clock episode," the meeting "proper” being 
deferred from the mandated opening date by one day, from 7 May to
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8 May. According to the established pattern of negotiation on 
human rights issues the old polarization emerged with the East 
focusing on the problems of capitalism and the West on the abuse 
of human rights. The mandate for this meeting called for
recommendations to be submitted to all governments of all 
participating States, however no concluding document or official 
communique emerged.
Budapest October 1985
The participants of this "Scientific Forum" consisted of both 
officials and leading citizens of the participating States. The 
aim of this gathering was to foster intercourse and Interaction 
across the divide and in this respect it can be deemed a success 
as dialogue did take place. However no official communique 
emerged.
Bern April 1986
Although It could be argued that the exclusion of this meeting 
from the Vienna Concluding Document "proper" ranked it of lesser 
importance, this meeting followed the pattern of all other CSCE 
meetings. It returned to the Basket III issues of family ties 
and reunification of families. No concluding document was
adopted because of the United States’ refusal to agree thus 
undermining consensus. This action was defended by the United 
States delegation on the grounds that there were too many loop 
holes in the document, and not enough clear new commitment, which
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affected the credibility of the original Helsinki Final Act. 
This was the first time in all the negotiations of the CSCE that 
a draft concluding document on humanitarian issues was precluded 
by a single Western State. However, that the Soviets considered 
themselves bound by the "holey" draft Bern document, vindicates
to some extent the United States vet:o.®rz
The Vienna Review Meeting
1986-89
In contrast to the declining atmosphere at Madrid, by the opening 
of the Vienna meeting the "new thinking" caused by the accession 
of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in 1985, Mrs Thatcher had 
already decided that the new Secretary General of the CPSU was a
man she could do business with.
Although the "new thinking" did not permeate immediately at Vien­
na, by the close of the Vienna Conference Geoffrey Howe observed 
that.
Firm and clear sighted Western policies, combined with 
a new pragmatism in General Secretary Gorbachev’s 
Soviet Union, together have transformed the atmosphere 
in which East and West do busineso.
The stamp of Brezhnev, which had hitherto dominated the CSCE
process, was giving way to the stamp of Gorbachev. The new
policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, which opened up the Soviet
""'Bloed op.clt.p21.
3(’HH\we Sir G. London January 1989, cited in "CSCE The 
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Union, had a knock on effect in international relations.
As mandated by the Madrid Concluding Document the Vienna Follow 
Up Meeting was preceded by preparatory talks from 23 September 
until 6 October 1986. These preparatory talks finished well 
within the allotted time as major organizational issues that had 
caused problems at Belgrade and Madrid had been overcome by the 
fixing of the agenda at Madrid. This allowed for a more fixed 
structure for CSCE Follow Up Meetings J5*'55’
As at Belgrade and Madrid membership of the Vienna gathering did 
not change. All thirty five participating States attended. In 
accordance with the Follow Up provisions of the Helsinki Final 
Act and as mandated by the Madrid Concluding Document, the Vienna 
Meeting opened at ministerial level. It lasted for three years. 
After the opening welcome from the Austrian Federal Chancellor, 
opening statements were made by the Heads of Delegations, among 
them ministers and deputy ministers. Contributions were made by 
the non-participating States of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.In line with the procedure at 
Madrid the meeting consisted of three phases: the review of 
implementation phase, new proposals, and the final stage for 
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After noting the favourable developments since tire Madrid Follow 
up Meeting, most notably Stockholm, the Conference reaffirmed its 
resolve to implement fully all the provisions of the Helsinki 
Final Act and all succeeding CSCE documents. As usual frank and 
open discussion regarding the implementation of the Final Act 
provisions to date, resulted in intensive and controversial 
discussion. The Conference considered that although much had 
been achieved since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 
much of the potential of that Act and of the Madrid Concluding
Document remained unutilized.
The eventual compromise contained in the Vienna Concluding 
Document was the setting up of a separate sub-process, "specifi­
cally charged with reviewing and strengthening commitments in the 
human rights field."** This multilateral mechanism, ultimately 
known as the Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD or CDH as in
the French), laid down the four elements of procedure for 
monitoring the implementation of human rights. Firstly, par­
ticipating States are entitled to request information from other 
participating States on questions relating to the human dimension 
of CSCE, and they are entitled to an answer. Second, par­
ticipating States are empowered to hold bilateral meetings with 
other participating States to examine questions relating to the
•°Dodd T."The Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe: Past,Present and Future." Background Paper No 293
International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons 
Library July 1992 p7.
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human dimension. Third, when it is deemed necessary the
situation discussed at any bilateral meeting can be brought to 
the attention of the remaining participating States. Finally,
i£ all remains futile the concerned state can raise the issues at
the Conference on Human Dimension meetings mandated to meet 
annually as well as at the main Review Follow Up Meetings. The 
agenda and other modalities for these meetings were also set out 
in the Vienna Concluding Document in Annex X.1**1
Principle IX, as agreed at Geneva and laid out in the Helsinki
Final Act, on cooperation among states (see pl38) allowing for
the development of a positive role for persons to contribute, was
supplemented in the document of Vienna with a new provision, viz
To that end they will respect the right of persons to 
observe and promote the implication of CSCE provisions 
and to associate with others for this purpose... •*»
Hereafter, this enabled private citizens, to a greater or lesser 
degree, to monitor their government's progress vis-a-vis the 
fulfillment of CSCE human rights requirements. Human rights also 
received a place in Basket 11 (economic cooperation and environ­
ment) with recognition of the,
Importance of the contributions of persons and or­
ganizations dedicated to the protection and im- 
provementof the environment:, and will allow them to 
express their concerns.”'
1 Cm . ,649 . Vienna Concliillng...Document,,
”:idem
-”:iCm 649 Vienna Concluding . Document
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The other major achievement of the Vienna Conference was In the 
field of military security. The Vienna Concluding Document
mandated for two distinct security measures. The "Negotiations 
on Confidence and Security Building Measures" (CSBM) were
mandated to continue the work of the Stockholm Conference. In 
line with this development the term disarmament was dropped from 
the title. The "Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe" resulted in a separate conference on Conven­
tional Forces in Europe (CFE).■’**'*
T.hg,-Sgcuxi.ty..-Asp.Qgts of CSCE




















MBFR, CFE & CSBM incorporated into 
CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation.
•*-*idem Annex II & III.
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The Vienna security meetings must not be confused with Interses­
sional meetings. They were quite distinctive because although 
the CSBM and the CFE talks began simultaneously in Vienna they 
constituted a departure from the procedure as laid down in the
Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations(HR) of June 
1973. The first rule of procedure in the HR requires that all 
talks were to be held outside alliances (see pp39-40) For 
the first time at CSCE the mandate of the Vienna Concluding 
Document allowed for autonomous, bloc to bloc, negotiations 
within the CSCE framework for the CFE negotiations.
The ViennaiMeetings .on CSBM and CFE March 1989
CSBM Vienna 1989
Unlike the CFE. talks, discussed below, all thirty four CSCE 
participated in a three week seminar which ran ffom 16 January to 
5 February 1990, where, unofficially, NATO worked as a bloc. The 
remit of the CSBM meeting was to expand the Stockholm provisions 
in relation to,
[Mlilitary doctrine in relation to posture, structure 
and activities of conventional forces in the zone of 
application for confidence and security building 
measures.
Agreement was reached in five areas:
- (1) the annual exchange of information on military
manpower, equipment, deployment and budgets;
- (2) on the establishment of a communications network among the
participating states for CSBM and CFE purposes;
- (3) an annual meeting to review CSBM implementation;
- (4) improved inter-military contacts, including mandatory
visits to air bases;
"•Cmnd 69 3 2 Doc ume nt 52, p153 .
""Cm 1466 CSBM Document Vienna 199i p3.
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- (5) mechanisms giving states a right to an explanation of
unusual or hazardous military activities and, in the case 
of unusual activities, to call a bilateral or full CSCE if 
the explanation is not satisfactory.”-
The CSBM agreements are mandatory and reciprocal and applicable 
to all States from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU). They are 
politically, not legally binding, however, Group Captain Keith 
Chapman, a participant in the NATO negotiating team at CFE, avers 
that in practice there is very little difference.ce In the light 
of this progress a second seminar, on military doctrine, was 
scheduled for the spring of 1991 in Vienna. The CSBM seminars 
addressed military intentions, and can be regarded as the 
software of arms control, whereas the CFE addressed military 
potential and can be seen as the hardware of the arms control 
process."'®
CFE Vienna 1989
These discussions which began simultaneously in Vienna culminated
in Paris 1990. At United States insistence these were bloc to
bloc negotiations involving only the twenty three participating 
States of the CSCE which were memeere sf the WTO ann NATT, thus 
excluding the AAA interest. Howover, tht Vfeien aonnluding
”f"The CSCE: An Overview of the CSCE process: Recent 
Meetings and Institutional Development.CSCE Commission Congress 
of the United States of America Washington DC February 1992. pl5.
“*' Group Captain Keith Chohnpe Marar t 1992.(vfsfeing
speaker)
Borawski J. "The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures" RUSI Journal Autumn 1990 pp40-44.
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Document mandated for "Meetings in order to Exchange Views and 
Information concerning the course of the Negotiation on Conven­
tional Armed Forces in Europe.’’80 This provision allowed that 
at least twice during each session of the CFE negotiations 
meetings would be held with the NNA States to exchange opinions 
on, not evaluate, the progress of the CFE.
The aim of this conference was to eliminate the capacity for 
launching a surprise attack and large scale offensive action. 
Although the talks started with the member States of NATO and the 
WTO the latter by the end of the negotiations was moribund. By 
the time of the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris the eight 
successor States of the former Soviet Union participated in their 
own right, making twenty nine participating eStices.
The CFE Treaty was committed to tth objecctve of limiting the 
total number of conventional armaments over the whole ATTU area
to - 40,000 battle tanks: 60,000 armoured combat vehicles: 40,000 
pieces of artillery: 13,600 combat aircraft: aad 4,000 attack 
helicopters.
Although these talks were between bloos tt^e were structured in 
a manner to include twenty three individual Sttfces (twenty two
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after German unification). The aim was to limit the powerful and 
more dominant States within the Soviet alliance, despite this, 
during the talks the Soviets dominated all the WTO members to a
very high degree.
Article VI states that each State regardless of the group of 
"states parties" 5”:L to which it belongs is to hold a ceiling of,
- A.13,300 Battle Tanks:
- B.20,000 Armoured Combat Vehicles:
- C.13,700 Pieces of Artillery:
- D. 5,150 Combat Aircraft:
- E. 1,500 Attack Helicopters.
These agreements provided headroom in some quarters for Nato, but 
perhaps more importantly, these talks validated the extent of the 
threat the West faced as they demanded heavy reductions, on all 
items, for Warsaw Pact states.
The unprecedented collapse of the Warsaw Pact Treaty removed 
Soviet confidence in one fell swoop. It was one thing to
negotiate arms reductions over which they had full control, 
however, those agreed reductions could numerically disadvantage 
them when they fell under the control of successor States, 
especially when there is no love lost between them. This, 
coupled with a united Germany within NATO, was a discomforting 
prospect.5”® Consequently the Soviets embarked upon all sorts of 
ploys to evade the cuts. Three divisions were transferred to
^••'•"States parties" means the signatories to either BTO:~ &
Washington Treaty: or WTO. f
ssa Dean J. "The CFE negotiations present and future" d
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"coastal defence" force in an attempt to set them outside the 
Treaty. This was not only challenged by the West but also by the 
former Warsaw Pact States. Finally Gorbachev overruled the 
military generals and the Treaty moved towards ratification.
The Treaty proved very complicated for the newly democratizing 
States to handle consequently it took some time for all instru­
ments of ratification to be deposited with the Embassy of the 
Netherlands in Moscow. On 9 November 1992 the period of
provisional application ended and the CFE Treaty entered fully 
into force, almost two years after it was signed in Paris. At 
present there are thirty signatory States.
CFE-IA
The follow on from Vienna began in February 1991 addressing only
the manpower issue. The CFE-IA on personnel strength of conven­
tional armed forces in Europe. See Table I for troop limits and 
current holdings.
Although vast changes have occurred since the CFE treaty was
signed the importance of these Vienna meetings must not be under 
estimatad.e The CFE Treaty signed at the Paris Summit contains 
a declaration on the nonuse of force. It is legally binding in
® Keesinq's Record of World Evenis.MarcT 1989.p36 539.
For fuller analysis of these meetings see Vienna Document 1990
Cm 14 6 6 and 1992 Cm 1972: Confidence Building Measures in 
Europe,Larrabee and Stobbe(eds): Confidence Measures and U.S.- 
Soviet Relations, Larrabee and Lynch Institute for East West 




The CFE-1A Agreement on personnel strength of 
conventional armed forces in Europe
Country Troop Limits Current holdings 1992
Armenia na na
Azerbaijan na na
Belarus 100 000 125 000
Belgium 70 000 71 300
Bulgaria 104 000 97 000
Canada 10 660 ‘5 100
Czechoslovakia 140 000 145 000
Denmark 39 000 24 300
France 325 000 330 400
Georgia 40 000 na ■
Germany 345 000 411 800
Greece 158 621 139 800
Hungary 100 000 , 80 800
Iceland 0 0
Italy ' 315 000 306 000
Kazakhstan 0 0
Luxembourg 900 ■ 800
Moldova na na
Netherlands 80 000 z 76 000
Norway • 32 000 25 400
Poland 234 000 281 400
Portugal 75 000 45 500
Romania 230 248 187 000
Russia 1 450 000 1 536 000
Spain , 300 000 173 200
Turkey 530 000 512 000
Ukraine 450 000 230 000
UK 260 000 . 222 500
USA 250 000 182 100
'na': ‘not announced'. Country has yet to declare its personnel limit or it has not 
been deemed possible to assess its full-time manpower accurately.
Sources used by SIPRl for data in this table: lISS, Military Balance 1992-1993, 
pp. 51, 133, 244; Arms Control Today, July/Aug. 1992, p. 29; Focus on Vienna,, 
no. 28, Nov. 1992.
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international law, and can be seen as a "road that has completed 
its run" to a roundabout or junction on the journey to securing 
a safer Europe."5" The Vienna Concluding Document surpassed the 
Madrid Concluding Document as it mandated for a multiplicity of 
meetings of experts
- London _
The London Information Forum was mandated for 1989.
- Par is




Two Vienna meetings one on Conventional Armed Forces 
Europe (CFE), and one on Confidence and Security Building Measures 19i9
- Sof 9a
The Sofia meeting on the protection of the environment 1989.
- Bonn
Meeting on Economic Cooperation 1990.
- Plama de Mallorca
Meeting on the Mediterranean 1990.
- Valletta
Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 1991.
- Krakow
Symposium, on Cultural Heritage 1991.
As a result of these mandates the CFE, CHD and CDE more or less
acquired permanent status. Finally the Vienna Concluding
Document mandated that the next Follow Up Meeting of the Helsinki
process would take place in March 1992.
"""Hopkinson G."CFE:A Dead End?" RUSI Journal 1990 pp31-4.
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Considering how the mandating at Madrid streamlined the preparat­
ory meeting for this Vienna Conference, this was taken a step 
further and the agenda, timetable, and other organizational 
modalities were set out in advance for all meetings of experts 
mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document, thus negating the 
need for preparatory meetings. In addition similar conditions 
were mandated for the Helsinki Review Follow Up Meeting in 1992 
as applied to the Vienna preparatory meeting, and all were 
included as annexes in the Vienna Concluding Document.®'
Intersessional Meetings Emanating from Vienna
The London Forum on Information held from April 18-May 12 1989
This was the first of the non-military meetings of experts and 
its goals were as mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document to 
examine cooperation in the fields of information of all kinds. 
Although a large degree of openness was achieved no concluding 
document emerged due to a Romanian veto.®®
The . .Paris..MeetingL-.<op.. .t-he. . Human.D.imensio,n. held. from.. . May.30--.J.u.n.e.. 3
1989
Interestingly, this first meeting on the Human Dimension coin­
cided with the 200 anniversary celebrations of the French
" Vienna Concluding Document cited in Bloed op.cit. p215. 
.."From Vienna to Helsinki: Reports on the Intersessional
Meetings of the CSCE Process" CSCE Commission Congress of the 
United States of America Washington DC April 1992.
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Revolution in Paris in 1989. The next were held in Copenhagen in 
June 1990, and then Moscow in September/October 1991. These 
meetings were mandated to cover the whole range of human rights 
and humanitarian issues. No concluding document emerged from 
this meeting, the discussions and proposals were to be continued 
at Copenhagen (see next page).®"z
The Sofia._Me-e-t-l.njg_o..n_-th.e. ...protection. , of.,, the , Environment 1 ,,, October-
3 November 1989
The remit was to "elaborate recommendations and guidelines for 
further measures and cooperation in new and important areas of 
environmental protection." No concluding document emerged again 
due to a Rumanian veto, this time caused by disquiet over 
language in the report on the rights of environmentalists to 
freedom of expression.
The Bonn Meeting on Economic Cooperation in Europe held from
19 March-11 April 1990
Governmental officials were joined by representatives of the 
business communities of the participating States. The remit for 
the meeting was to create better working conditions for Western 
representatives. This conference was deemed a success. It 
produced the first non-military intersessional concluding 
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based economies as a starting point for economic relations in 
Europe this document signalled a separation between the economic 
sphere and the politico/military sphere, which had hitherto been 
inextricably bound because of their hitherto separate economic 
systems. In addition the concluding document contained a
reference to "private property rights."
The Palma Meeting on the Mediterranean- .. held , from 24 September-
19 October 1990
The remit of this third meeting on Mediterranean security was to 
further cooperation between the participating littoral States of 
the CSCE and the non-participating littoral States of the 
Mediterranean. Albania attended as an observer and membership 
dropped by one as the unification of Germany was acknowledged. 
This meeting brought into focus the dominant role of the EC at 
CSCE. It was an EC proposal which provided a basis for the
concluding document.®''-’
The Copenhagen Meeting on Conference on Human Dimension held from
V
5-29 June 1990.
This second meeting on the human dimension continued the momentum 
established by Bonn by providing new guidelines for the newly 
emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. It included Albania as
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States. Argumentation arose at this meeting between the advo­
cates of politically binding commitments and those in favour of 
treaty based commitments. The following quip summed up the 
situation neatly, "the fight used to be between East and West;now 
its between all of us [delegates] and all of our lawyers."®*
The concluding document embodies the key elements of how to run a
democratic State.
The Valletta Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
held from 15 January - 8 February 1991
This constituted the third meeting on PSD although the first post 
1989, and post Charter of Paris 1990. It was overshadowed by the 
situation in the Gulf and the killing of civilians in Lithuania. 
Contentious decisions in this field were deferred to the post 
Paris Charter’s new CSCE Council of Ministers' Meeting scheduled 
for Berlin 19-20 June 1991. A concluding document was drawn up.
Symposium on Cultural Heritage at Krakow held from 28 Mav - 7
June 1991
This meeting was a follow up from the Budapest meeting of 1985.
The remit set out at Vienna was "a dynamic exchange among experts 
in the field of cultural heritage. The Council of Europe and
UNESCO contributed to this meeting, and Albania obtained consen­
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consensus for any proposal for Baltic observer status. Dialogue 
was curtailed to facilitate the drawing up of a concluding 
document within the nine day time limit. There remained a 
feeling however that the structure mandated by the Vienna 
Concluding Document was inconducive to dynamic exchange; because 
the document had come to symbolize success, the need to produce 
it became the overriding concern.
Moscow__ Meeting.  the.,. .Conference on ...Human . .Dlmenalon . -X.Q ,, Septem­
ber^ October 1991
This meeting followed hard on the heels of the Moscow coup of 
August 1991. The Western reservations placed on the ethics of 
siteing this meeting in Moscow were formally removed. The United 
Kingdom, unlike the United States, deemed it necessary to justify 
this reversal by citing improvement in both the human rights and 
law of entry and exit areas.
This was the first Conference on Human Dimension meeting in 
which Albania was entitled to participate fully since membership 
was approved in June 1991. Immediately prior to the opening of 
this meeting an extraordinary meeting of the CSCE Council of
Ministers admitted the three Baltic States as full members of the
CSCE process. This decision ended the striving of these States 
for independence which had been consistently vetoed by the 
Soviets. The decision was taken under the Chairmanship of the 
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher with recourse to 
Helsinki Recommendation 54 on procedure. It allows for par-
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ticipation of all European States. Significantly, and in line 
with declared aspirations for greater openness at Paris in 1990, 
Soviet NGOs and private citizens were well represented.
The inability of the CSCE process to adequately address the 
Yugoslavia crisis was a concern at this meeting. The proposal to
convert the Warsaw Office for Free Elections into an Office for
Democratic Institutions was discussed but did not gain consensus. 
However, coming as it did just six months before the fourth 
review meeting at Helsinki, this meeting served as an early 
sounding board on the institutional changes that may be necessary 
to meet the changes and developments in the post-Cold War world.
The concluding document addresses the importance of both the rule 
of law, and adherence to democratic institutions and practices. 
Reiterating that human dimension issues were of international 
concern and not the sole prerogative of the State concerned, 
consequently any State, or third party states, can request a 
mission of experts to address human dimension issues that are 
perceived as destablizing. If a voluntary mission is refused or 
fails, further mandatory steps, (which are discussed more fully
later), may be taken.
The remainder of this work, starting with Chapter IV which deals
with The Charter of Paris of November 1990, considers the impact
of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe upon the CSCE.
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Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. 
The Courage of men and woman, the strength of the will 
of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the 
Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, 
peace and unity in Europe.1
From Process to Institutionalization
Just as the signing of the 1971 Treaties paved the way for the 
Multilateral Preparatory Talks in 1972, the 1990 signing of the 
"Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" paved 
the way for the Paris Summit in November 199 O.:S
The call for a CSCE Heads of Government Summit to address the
changes in Europe and how the CSCE role might be expanded, was 
first mooted by Mr Gorbachev, whilst on a visit to Italy.®
The Paris summit followed months of upheaval in Central and 
Eastern Europe in an accelerating historical process. The Berlin 
Wall was breached in November 1989, ending Soviet domination of
the Eastern Bloc States. Germany was unified with the East 
acceding to membership of NATO in 1990, and the Warsaw Pact 
rendered moribund. The decision to institutionalize and strengt­
hen the CSCE was taken at the second Conference on Human Dimen­
sion at■ Copenhagen 1990, and was then reiterated at the NATO 
London Summit of July 5-6 1990." It is important to note that
1 Preamble to the Charter of Paris November 1990 Cm 14 6 O. 
March 1991.
Facts on File September 1990 p77O.
® Perhaps, with his eye on the CFE progress, Mir Gorbachev
wished to conclude the CFE treaty at summit level, see Bloed 
op.cit.p25.
•'’London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic
Alliance July 1990 NATO REVIEW 1990:4:32-3.
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the Paris summit was not a Review meeting under the Follow Up 
Mechanism of the CSCE process. It was the first CSCE summit 
since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. From 19-21 
November 1990 the Heads of State and Government of the thirty- 
four {1 Germany) participating States met in Paris to formally 
end the forty years of the Cold War.
The Secretary Generals of the United Nations and of the Council
of Europe addressed the Summit. Albania was granted observer 
status while, due to a Soviet veto, requests for observer status 
from the Baltic States were not acted upon.®
In his opening address the host. President Mitterrand ack­
nowledged the significant changes in Europe. "It was, he said,
the first time in history that we witness a change in 
the depth of the European laansccpe that is not the 
outcome of war or a bloody revolution.®
In his view, the Paris Summit was to be or to act as an nnti 
Congress of Vienna of 1815, "when tth victorious powers drew the 
map of Europe without any concern for peoples or their aspira­
tions ..
®In 1990 the Baltic repubaics,waich were three separate 
states when annexed by the USSR in 1940, were striving to regain 
independence lost as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 
August 1939 between Germany and the USSR. Times Guide to Eastern 
Europe London 1990 ppl94-213.





The Charter of Paris 1990
Eur .ocean.., .Sec urity a t. . . the.P,a.r.,l s.Summi t
The first day saw the signing of the Conventional Forces Europe 
(CFE) Treaty, which was a culmination of the Vienna negotiations 
mandated by Vienna Concluding Document of the Review Follow up
Mechanism of the CSCE of 1986-9. This historic agreement between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact constituted the first multilateral 
agreement on conventional weapons in Europe. It was signed by 
the twenty two participating States comprising of the NATO and 
Warsaw Treaty Organization, two days before the Charter, as
outlined earlier.
This Treaty, did not address troop levels(see pl90), but not­
withstanding the lack of a formal commitment on troop numbers, it
represents a significant advance in European security as it
establishes technical parity between the two alliances. (NB in
the East the idea of an alliance is devoid of any political
content, it Is merely a practical device for weapons accounting
purposes).
The Charter of Paris for a New Europe
The twenty page Charter was divided into three sections
- A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity
- Guidelines for the Future
- New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process and the
Supplementary Document
The first two Chapters of the Charter reaffirm commitments that
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have previously been undertaken by the CSCE process. The third 
section and the Supplementary Document cover the new ground.
S^ct±on_L
A. . New , Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity
This section addressed principles first addressed by the Bonn 
Concluding Document on Economic Cooperation in Europe (see pl93- 
4),governing cooperation between the different CSCE member 
States, based and building on those of the HFA of 1975, namely:­
- l.to build and strengthen democracy as the only form of
government.
- 2 to recognize human rights Easl the birthright of all human
beings.
- 3 to uphold free and fair elections.
- 4 to affirm the right of all individuals to freedom of
thought.
- 5 ownership of property
- 6 to protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious
identity of national minorities" and to develop "market 
economies.
By adopting these principles the European leaders, Eastern and 
Western alike, for the first time in history agreed to a common
set of values and objectives. The Paris Summit addressed in
President Mitterrand's words "economy, environment, standard of 
living, "or "the things that people expect them to address."* 
Thus freedom, democracy, human rights and security are to be the 
cornerstones of the new European architecture. As the era of
'International Herald Tribune. 22 November 1990 p2.
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confrontation and division in Europe ended, relations to be based
on "respect and cooperation."^
Section II
Guidelines for the Future
Section II consisted of declaratory reaffirmations in the sphere
of the human dimension, security, economic cooperation, the
environment, culture, migrant workers and the Mediterranean.
The salient issues were the mandating a Meeting of Experts on
National Minorities. This meeting was to be held from 1-19 July
1991 in Geneva, with a remit to conduct a,
[Tlhorough discussion on the issue o f national m inono — 
ities, and the rights of persono belenging to ohtm, with due attention to the diversity of situations and 
to the legal, historical., political a nd ecc^r^c^ioj^c back­
grounds ....
With the aim of considering new measures that might improve the 
implementation of commitments in this area. A commitment to
strengthen democratic institutions and further application of the 
rule of law was initiated with the convening of a seminar in Oslo
from 4-15 November 1991. . •
Secur ity
On the question of security the participating States pledged 
themselves to build on the important achievements attained in the
'“ibid pi.
i°Cm 1464 Charter of Paris Annex III p24.
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Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe through CFEl, and 
in the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures. 
It was noted that, all talks would be concluded, if possible, by 
the Follow Up Meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki 1992 in preparation 
for, "a more structured cooperation among the thirty-four 
participating States" on disarmament and security building. 
This aspiration became an instruction with effect from the second 
Council meeting in Prague in January 1990.*0 This paved the way 
for the new European Security Forum established in the Helsinki 
Concluding Document of 1992.
Hope was expressed that a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons 
would emerge from the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 
under way in Geneva, and of the earliest possible conclusion of 
the Open Skies initiative. The basic elements of the Open Skies 
initiative were agreed in Ottawa in February 1990, namely that 
unarmed military or civilian aircraft, including aircraft of NNA 
States, be permitted, as a confidence building measure, to fly 
equitable reconnaissance missions over each other's territory.XSB
In this section the contribution of non-governmental organiza­
tions in the achievements of the CSCE objectives to date were
•" "-Section VII Draft Summary of Prague Council Meeting Prague 
1992 p6 .
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recorded with a promise to involve such groups in the new
structures of the CSCE.
Section.in
New Structures and Institutions for CSCE
Starting with the forthcoming Follow Up Review Meeting mandated 
by the Vienna Concluding Document of 1989, for Helsinki 1992, the 
Charter of Paris provides that all future review follow up 
meetings of the CSCE process will be held at Head of state or 
Government level. In future Follow Up Meetings are to be held 
every two years and limited to three months unless otherwise 
agreed. The peripatetic nature of the conferences remains un­
changed .
Council of- . Ministers of CSCE
The most salient feature of the new CSCE structure was the
creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers aimed at providing a 
central forum for political consultations.
The initial meeting of the Council was mandated to be held on 
19-20 June 1991, in Berlin, and thereafter at least once per 
annum in rotating locations. The remit of the Council is to
oversee the CSCE process, and to prepare for and set the agenda 
for the Heads of State or Government meetings.
204
Chapter IV
The Charter of Paris 1990
The need for an emergency mechanism to deal with crisis situat-
ions was recognized and the Council was charged to,
...discuss the possibility of establishing a mechanism 
for convening meetings of the Committee of Senior Offi­
cials in emergency situations."®
Committee of Senior Officials
A Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) was established by the 
Paris meeting to service the Council. As well as preparing the 
agenda for Council meetings the CSO is charged with identifying 
issues for discussion from those suggestions submitted by the 
participating States. In addition it must implement subsequent 
decisions that emanate from Council. The representative of the 
State whose Foreign Minister chaired the preceding Council 
meeting will chair the CSO meetings. The Chairman of the CSO 
will convene meetings after consultation with the participating
States.
The CSO will meet at the site of the new secretariat in Prague 
unless timed immediately before a CSCE Council Meeting in which 
case they meet on the same site. The CSO mandate allows for two 
day sessional meetings as often as necessary, and given this 
broad remit this group could well become the most important 
working group of the new CSCE provisions implemented at Paris.
"■Charter of Paris Supplementary Document Paris 19 9 0,pi5.
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CSCE Secretariat
Based in Prague the secretariat is designated to provide
administrative support to the Council and the CSO. The secretar­
iat of the host State for the Follow Up Meeting of the CSCE proc­
ess will also be afforded the support of the Prague Secretariat. 
Included in its remit is the general provision of information on 
CSCE to - interested parties, including Non-Governmental Organiza­
tions (NGOs) and International Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs), as well non-participating States.
The Secretariat consists of a
- Director
- three officers
- administrative and technical personnel as recruited by the 
Director
Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)
Based in Vienna, The Conflict Prevention Centre's main function 
is to "assist the Council of CSCE in reducing the risk of 




The Heads of Delegation to the CSBM negotiations were mandated to 
form the Consultative Committee until the Helsinki Follow Up 
Meeting of 1992. This Consultative Committee will be required t-o 
work within the established framework of CSCE procedures, 
determine.its own work programme and is ultimately responsible to 
the Council of Ministers. The Secretariat will service the
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Consultative Committee of the CPC. It will consist of the
following staff:­
- a Director
- two officers in charge of organization of meetings(including 
protocol and security), communication, documentation and 
information, financial and administrative matters.
- administrative and technical personnel as recruited by the
- Director
Initially the centre will hold and exchange information and 
assist as a support mechanism with implementation as required
under the CSBM Vienna Document of 1990 viz
- consult and co-operate as regards unusual military activities;
- annual exchange of military information
- communications network
- annual implementation assessment meetings
- cooperation as regards hazardous incidents of a military 
nature
Provision was made in section F3 of the Charter for the potential 
expansion the CPC’s mandate. At the discretion of the Council, 
this may include a procedure for "conciliation of disputes as 
well as broader tasks relating to dispute settlement."1® The 
seminal meeting, scheduled for 3 December 1990 was mandated to be 
chaired by Yugoslavia!ln December 1990 enough of the former 
Yugoslavia was intact for this task to be performed. However at 
the 13th CSO meeting Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was 
suspended from all CSCE meetings by virtue of the Consensus Minus
1 ■' Cm 1466 CSBM Vienna Document 19 9 0 
"-Cm 1464 Charter of Paris pl6.
2 0 7
Chapter IV
The Charter of Paris 1990
One rule established by the Prague Document of the CSCE Council
of January 1992.X e>
The centre opened on 25 February 1991. The Danish Director is 
Mr.Bent Rosenthal. To date the Consultative Committee have had
thirty meetings, addressing missions to Yugoslavia, Kosova, the 
Georgian-Ossetian conflict, and Skopje. Missions of long duration 
are planned for Kosova, Sandjak, Vojvodina, and Skopje.
Office for Free Elections
In line with the provisions laid out in the Copenhagen Concluding 
Document of the Conference on the Human Dimension (see annex I
attached), the remit of this office is to "facilitate contacts 
and the exchange of information on elections within the par­
ticipating States," The office personnel to consist of:-
~ a Director responsible to the Council through the CSO
- one Officer in charge of organizational procedures
- administrative and technical personnel recruited by the 
Director of the Office
Like the CPC the Office of Free Elections is required to carry 
out such tasks as may be assigned to it by the Council of Foreign
Ministers. This office began operations on 8 July 1991. The
Director Luchino Cortese is an Italian.
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The Director of each of the Institutions discussed above is 
appointed by the Council, from the senior personnel of the parti­
cipating States, on rotation, for a three year non-renewable 
term. The long established rules of procedure of the CSCE apply 
mutatis mutandis to all the newly created institutions.
A Seminar on Democratic Institutions was mandated to meet in Oslo
from November 4 to November 15 1991, with a remit to,
...hold discussions of ways and means of consolidating 
and strengthening viable democratic institutions in 
participating States...'^
As has become procedure since first set out at the Vienna Review 
Meeting of 1989, the Charter of Paris set the agenda, timetable, 
and other organizational modalities for the mandated meetings in
Annexes II and III of the Charter."®
This effort at institutionalizing the CSCE represents an attempt 
to establish a future framework for North Atlantic European 
relations stretching from Vladivistock to Vancouver, and as such 
carries the greatest implications for the future of the Helsinki 
process. Though the Charter of Paris defined how the "New 
Europe" should look, it did not define how it should be built. 
This task was left to the new CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers.
"•'ibid pl9.
"®Cml4 64 Charter of Paris p 19 .
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Two meetings of The CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers have been 
held to date at Berlin in June 1991 and Prague in January 1992.
CSCE Council Meetings emanating from the Charter of Paris
Berlin_1991
Prague 1992
At the First meeting of the CSCE Council mandated by the Charter 
of Paris and held in Berlin in June 1991, Albania was formally 
accepted as a participating State by the Council, remaking the 
total of thirty five (the number had dropped by one owing to the
unification of Germany).
The combination of events in the Baltic States of Lithuania and
Latvia, and the escalation of the Yugoslavian conflict brought 
home the realization that the existing operational structures 
available to the embryo institutions of the CSCE were inadequate 
in dealing with outbreaks of nationalism unleashed by the ending 
of the Cold War. In the face of the re-emergence of interethnic 
conflict, the Foreign Ministers of the participating States 
resolved to redress the imbalance in the operational structures 
by the Creation of an Emergency Mechanism similar to measures 
laid out in the Vienna Concluding Document in the sphere of Human 
Dimension (see above), whereby if major disruption that might 
endanger security occurs in any one State, other participating 
States are entitled to request information, with a right to a 
reply, from that State within forty-eight hours. In the event of 
an unsatisfactory reply to a request, and providing twelve other
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States support it, an emergency meeting of the CSO can be
instigated .
Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (PSD) issue has been under 
consideration since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 
1975. Originally an initiative of the Swiss, (see above) and 
now known as the Valletta Mechanism (1991). This was endorsed
by the Council as the way forward.
The CPC in Vienna, with its new Communication Network set up to 
facilitate procedure in emergency situations, was designated as 
the centre for Peaceful Settlement Document. Undrr the auspices 
of the director of the CPC each participating State was invited 
to submit the names of four qualified candidates for inclusion in 
a register of experts to act as "third party" arbiters for 
resolving disputes within the PSD mechanism.
Committee of Senior Officials
Powers of Crisis Management
Under the mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard
to emergency situations, the CSO powers with regard to emergency
situations extend to
“ sending of fact finding missions to area of conflict
- acting as mediators
- calling of meetings for further discussions
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These provisions constituted an extension or amendment of the 
Helsinki Final Act, disallowing or negating principle VI viz on
interference in internal affairs.
A Statement on the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia was 
issued by the Council from this meeting.1'*
CSCE Council Meeting Prague 30-31 January 1992
Following the receipt of letters accepting the commitments and 
responsibilities of the CSCE six of the successor States of the 
former Soviet Union namely: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan were formally accepted as 
participating States. Permanent observer status was granted to
Croatia and Slovinia.
Henceforth, the Committee of Senior officials(CSO) will assume 
responsibility for all CSCE functions acting as the Council's 
agent in between meetings of the Council.
The "Prague Document on Further Developments of CSCE Institu­
tions and structures" was adopted. This document in part set out 
the issues to be addressed and consolidated by the Helsinki 
review follow up meeting mandated to begin in March 1992. Among 
the developments in this document the Warsaw Office for Free 
Elections metamorphoses to become The Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).
"Summary of Conclusions Berlin CSCE Council of Ministers' 
Meeting. 1991 CSCE Secretariat Prague.
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Measures to enhance the role of the Conflict Prevention Centre
(CPC) by providing Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention
Instruments (discussed below) were addressed.
The Principle of Consensus Minus One rule was adopted to allow 
action in the absence of consent of the offending State in cases 
of clear infringements of CSCE principles.
The adopted text on the Declaration of the CSCE Council on the 
"Non Proliferation and Arms Transfers" set out the participating 
member States governments’ commitment to cooperate in gaining 
universal adherence to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
Intersessional Meeting emanating from the Charter of Paris
Oslo Seminar Democratic Institutions
The agreement reached at Paris to hold this extra intersessional 
meeting reflected the common view that Eurasia, Europe, the
Soviet Union and the Baltic States were at an historic
crossroads. From 4-15 November 1991 according to the mandate
contained in the Charter of Paris this meeting addressed the ways
and means of "consolidating and strengthening viable democratic
institutions."
° Prague Document on Further beyelopment of the CSCg 
Institutions and Structure 1992 CSCE Secretariat Prague.
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The first two discussions were plenary sessions open to the 
public, followed by seven days of closed sessions by three 
working groups. Of the issues considered most relevant to the 
newly democratizing States, constitutional reforms, the rule of 
law, independent courts and the separation of powers were 
addressed by one group. The organization of elections, 
political parties and NGOs by the second group, while the third 
group addressed comparative aspects of legislation in the area of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
There was a degree of overlap here with the issues addressed at 
the Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension mandated by the 
Vienna Concluding Document and held from 10 September until 4 
October 1991. However, it was from this seminar that the idea
was first mooted for the transformation of the Office of Free
Elections at Warsaw into the Office of Democratic Institutions.
The Charter of Paris was a bringing together of various points of 
view on the authority and future responsibilities of the CSCE. 
Although, as observed above, the Charter of Paris did not define 
how the "New Europe" should be built, however once the provisions 
therein were implemented the way forward was clearer for the
further decisions that were to be taken at the Helsinki Review
Meeting in July 1992.
The following chapter will review the document which emanated 
from the Fourth Review Follow Up Meeting of the CSCE process
214
Chapter IV
The Charter of Par^# 1990
mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document, entitled
The Challenges of Change. This lays out the way forward for an
institutionalized CSCE to make an effective contribution to the
interlocking jigsaw of organizations in the "New Europe."
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By this stage In the post Paris climate, as the single Soviet 
security "threat" in Europe transcended into a multiplicity of 
security "risks," it became clear the CSCE did not have the
operational resources necessary to address the multitude of 
potential inter and intra state problems inherent in the "new" 
Europe. This problem was addressed by the Helsinki Follow Up 
Meeting mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document of 1986-89.
In January 1992, the CSCE Council of Ministers’ Meeting at Prague
decided that,
[Tlhe Helsinki Follow Up Meeting should be an important 
milestone in the development of the CSCE process and 
should provide a clear vision for its future course.1
This fourth Follow Up Meeting of the CSCE process ran from 24 
March to 8 July 1992, followed by the Third Summit of the Heads 
of State and Government on 10 July 1992 at Helsinki. The 
concluding document that emerged from the Helsinki negotiations 
is entitled "The Challenges of Change." It divides into two sec­
tions, Section I addresses the problems of change, and Section 
II sets the out requirements deemed necessary to ensure the 
political management of crises, conflict prevention, and crisis 
management arising from such change. To this end the Helsinki 
Document reinforced the provisions made by The Paris Charter for
an institutionalized CSCE.
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Ss.-tlan ...I
Promises and . Problems of Change
At the outset this document acknowledges that the ending of the
Cold War demands,
[A] comprehensive programme of co-ordinated action- 
which will provide additional tools for the- CSCE to 
address tensions before violence erupts and to manage 
crises which may regrettably develop.2
It also acknowledges the crucial role of the CSCE in efforts to
.... forestall aggression and violence by addressing
the root causes of problems and to prevent, manage and
settle conflicts peacefully by appropriate means.3
The document states that despite the changes in Europe, the CSCE 
concept of security adheres to the broad based concept as 
contained in the Helsinki Final Act.. This concept links human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and economic and . environmental 
"solidarity and cooperation" to the maintenance of peace at both 
interstate and intrastate levels. These issues were equally valid 
in the" management of change as they were necessary in the 
mitigation of confrontation.
By formally acknowledging that a lasting peaceful order depends 
on "mutually reinforcing institutions, each with its own area of 
action and responsibility," and by declaring the CSCE "a
regional arrangement" in line with Article 52 of the Charter of




The CSCE Follow up Mecfianism
The Helsinki Review Meeting 1992
United Nations, the Helsinki Document provides the important link
between European and global security.,,;|-
it was formally recorded that the first meeting establishing the
CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, had taken place in Budapest on 3 
July 1992, (disccssed below). The Helsinki Document also
provides for a programme of coordinated support for the recently 
admitted participating States, and to the "active participation 
of our publics in CSCE," thus allowing for open sessions 
hitherto barred at CSCE meetings.
Finally, this section set the next Review Follow up Meeting for 
Budapest in 1994 with, as now has become the custom, the Helsinki
Follow Up Meeting modalities applying mutatis mutandis unless the




Since Prague in 1992, the Committee of Senior Officials has been 
the eyes and ears of the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers and 
although the CSCE Council still remain the "philosopher kings" of 
the CSCE, the Helsinni Documenn tgre^atlv enhances the profile of
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of CSCE. Post Helsinki II all CSCE mechanisms and instruments
come under the authority of the Committee of Senior Officials. 
The only restraint on this carte blanche approach appears to be
the Consensus rule. The Committee of Senior Officials set the
agenda for the review cenferences, which in future will adopt a 
decision rvieneed cocumen t, and lee concluded with a Heads of 
State or Government Summit, tasks which hitherto fell within the 
remit of the Follow Up Meeting.
In carrying out; h ii id^ie ihe Cha irman in Oi fCce ees re courur ee 
three aids. TTh i^rt ie hee Trnike system ueei by tee EPC
system within the EC Twelve, that is, the preceding and succeed­
ing Chairmen can ©perere in unuson whwn deemed nenecsary. 
Secondly, on exercising the crhknmaa’s prerogative the Council or 
the Committee of Senior 0£fCnnols may found a<d hoc steering 
groups, where necesstkn, wherrrki eE<nviousiy e he worr e f e he esCE 
was conducted by plenary working groupp esually state efff.cials 
of varying degrees of capability. Assuming that potential
members of such groups will nst cony ee strrWolsnts buu a3.so haw 
an interest in the iooue involved, it will, hopefully, lead to a 
higher and speedier success rate.
The remit of such ad hoc groups will be mandated specifically 
as te tasks and objectives and duration by whichever body 
establishes it, e tth Council or the Commintte of e enSne
Officials. The e i^os aad sine ii to be determined by the
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question to be addressed, but all groups must include the Troika.
When expedient action is necessary the Chairman may establish an
ad hoc group by using the "silence procedure" - that is, par­
ticipating States are allowed five days to consider, if no 
objection is registered, then consensus is assumed. If consensus
cannot be reached the Committee of Senior Officials must address
the question. Thirdly, in a crisis or conflictual situation it 
is the Chairman’s prerogative to designate a personal representa­
tive or trouble shooter, with a clear and precise mandate, and 
for whose action the Chairman is responsible to the Council or
the Committee of Senior Officials.
Economic Forum
In line with the agreement at the Prague Council meeting (30 
January 1992), the Committee of Senior Officials is also mandated 
to form a specialized Economic Forum to meet annually on Basket 
II issues. The Forum would not duplicate the work of other 
International organizations. It was envisaged as a "flexible 
frame work for discussion, not the establishment of a new 
institution..."®, its goal to encourage, by means of specialized 
seminars, the existing international institutions working on the 
transition toward democracy and market economies of the recently
acceded States.
“'Baker James U.S. Secretary of State.International Herald 
Tribune 31 January 1992.
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Such institutions are exemplified by the Centre for Cooperation
with European Cconomies in Trnnsition (CEETT) operating under the |
aegis oo the EECD, and the United Nat ions Economic Commies ion
for Europe (UNECE)."z The first meeting of the Economic Forum was
mandated to be held on 16-18 March 1993, in Prague.
In addition to this consolidation of the Council and the Commit­
tee of Senior Officials powers, the Helsinki Document set up j 
three main additional functions or innovations: - i
- 1 High Commissioner for National Minorities J
- 2 Peace Keeping Operations S
- 3 Forum for Security Cooperation
High Commissioner for Minorities 4
The High CnmmissinnlT is to be an eminent international per- , 
son^^y whose Impartiality must be beyond question by any 
participating state. Appointed initially for a three year term, 4
with an optional second term, the High Commissioner is designated J
to operate under the aegis of the Committee of Senior Officials, 
working closely with the Committee of Senior Officials chair and 4 
the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
(discussed below). '•
The remit of the High Commissioner for National Minorities is an 
"early warning" or "early action" role using where appropriate 
the "Emergency Mechanism" with regard to,
[^lensinns involving national minority issues that have i
'z Cm 2092 Challenges of Change. Chapter VII p57.
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the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE
area.
The most significant change here is the acceptance that National 
Minorities raise not only human rights issues, but also security 
issues, allowing for a pre-emptive approach to potential causes
of conflict rather than a retroactive one.
The_Qff ice -Q-f -D-emocrat-ic   s^rt-(d_.,.H-Ujaian Rlghta.
This was the sometime Office of Free Elections enacted by the 
Paris Charter, and renamed by the Prague Council Meeting in 
January 1992.
The expansion of the ODIHR’s remit involves:­
- the policing of commitments in the Human Dimension
- information bureau, and organizer of seminars for the recently 
admitted participating States
- assistance of whatever nature needed by the newly appointed 
High Commissioner on National Minorities
Clearly, enhancing the ODIHR’s remit to this extent makes it the 
CSCE’s secretariat for the Human Dimension, as it provides the 
operational base for the High Commissioner for National Minoriti­
es. Paragraph 6 links the Human Dimension to early warning in 
the prevention of conflicts. Equally clearly it signifies that 
the Council of Europe cannot assume the monopoly over the Human 
Dimension in the "new" Europe, as paragraph 14 recommends 
that"other relevant international organizations and institutions 
be encouraged... to make contributions.”'^
“Emergency Mechanism Annex II of the Berlin Meeting of 
the CSCE Council. CSCE Secretariat Prague
■Ghebali Victor-Yves "The July CSCE Helsinki Decisions - a 
step in the right direction." Nato Review 1992 No.4 pp3-19.
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Future seminars were mandated to be held on
- a CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Tolerance to be held in the 
Autumn of 1992
- a CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Case Studies on Naiiona1 
Minorities IssuesyPositive Results Spring 1993 "
- a CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Migration, including Refggees 
and Displaced persons early in 1993
CSCE Peace Keeping Operations
This innovation gives the CSCE prrcces an 3rn1^ operational 
function in conformity with Chapter VIII of United Nations 
practice of, no use of force, impartiality, and the consent of 
the parties involved. (NB prior participation in the peace 
process i.e. ongoing attempts at peaceful settlement is n 
prerequisite before nny attempt at oo^e^^i^n;ton is embarked! 
upon.)
The Committee of Sgoncl OfficiaIs operates overall control and 
ultimate Rsrconnininaty oi3 the gnageRernOng operation: with a 
consultation facility with the Consultative Committee of the 
Conflict Prevention Centre. The acknowledgement, in section one 
of the document, of the CSCE peiception of itself as a "regional 
arrangement" allows that potential CSCE Peace Keeping Operations 
can seek lecourse under the UN Security Council's umbrella, if 
and when necessary, as : outlined above.
Recourse can also be made, on a cnsr by case basis, to Nato, the 
EC, the WEU and the CIS for expertise and / oi iRsculCRi; as was 
the case, when the CSCE asked the EC to handle the Yugoslav 
conflict. In the case of the NATO Alliance the emphasis
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is placed on consultation with individual member States of the 
Alliance not the organization itself. CSCE retains direction of 
operations and any member State of CSCE can participate, not just 
NATO member States.1'"’ This decision represented a compromise, in 
the face of French antipathy toward the United States wish that 
NATO should become the main military arm of the CSCE. It also 
reflects the acceptance of NATO's credo that the problems of 
post-communist Europe requires an interlocking set of European
institutions, as well as transatlantic institutions.11
The Consultative Committee of the CPC can dispatch "fact finding 
and rapporteur missions" to assist the Committee of Senior 
Officials in peace keeping functions. The CPC has no remit in 
disarmament negotiations. That has been placed in the New Forum 
for Security Cooperation. However, the Consultative Committee 
will assist the latter in reflection on conflict prevention.
CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation
In essence this forum, which came into being on September 22 
1992, is an evolution of the adoption of:­
- The Vienna 1992 Document on CSBM
- The conclusion and the adoption of the CSCE Declaration of the 
Treaty of Open Skies
- The Concluding Act of the negotiation on Personnel Strength of 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
- the CFE Treaty signed but still in the process of 
ratification
" '::>Cm 2092 Challenges of Change, para. 52 p24. 
:tlGhebali op.cit.p6.
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The forum incorporates both the MBFR and CFE processes as well as 
reviewing the implementation of the provisions in the Vienna 
Document on CSBM mentioned above. It has a duality of purpose as 
it may meet as a special committee or as a consultative commit­
tee. It is, therefore, to serve as a permanent framework for 
consultation, and negotiation. Open-ended subsidiary working 
groups are to assist the Forum, unlike previous mechanisms which 
have had carefully set out mandates.However any participat­
ing member State may sit on the Forum unlike the CFE talks which 
involved only NATO and the moribund WTO.
Included in its remit is the aim for "greater transparency in the 
military field" through support of "regimes on non-prolifera­
tion and arms transfers, and enhance "contacts, liaison, exchan­
ges and cooperation between their armed forces," including 
threats to security outside their territories.1^ The findings
or deliberations of the Forum will be reviewed at the next
mandated follow up meeting of the CSCE process in 1994.
A Programme for Immediate Action, which is subject to amendment 
only by consensus, is set out in the Annexe of the Helsinki 
Document. "All measures negotiated in the Forum will be develo­
ped in a way which precludes circumvention," in other words they
iaCm 2Q92 Challenges. q£ Change.;. chapter v The csce Forum 
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will be binding.This document finally interred the ongoing 
argument regarding the right to review of implementation of CSCE
commitments.
All three mechanisms, the Committee of Senior officials and CPC 
and ODIHR have now,, post Helsinki, a specialized evaluation
mechanism. The ODIHR and the Committee of Senior Officials were
strengthened to a greater extent than the CPC which indicates 
that the way forward for the CPC is still controversial.
EryXoamsjxt
In an attempt to "Intensify the existing and growing cooperation" 
on environmental issues the participating States"recognize their 
individual and common commitment towards achieving these goals"
To this aim a meeting of CSCE Experts was mandated to address
SustaInab.Ie.. De.v.e.l.Q..gmen.t..q£ Boreal___and__ loaberaifi__ EfiXfiAte to be
held in Montreal from September 27 to October 6 1993.
Finally, in accord with the United States initiative for greater 
openness in the CSCE, Japan is to be afforded the opportunity to
attend and contribute to all CSCE consultation and meetings in 
which Japan has a direct interest.
The CSCE secretariat and the ODHIR have separate budgets and any 
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umbrella of these budgets is to be held responsible for "the
cost effectivness and financial discipline" o£ such meetings.'®
ODHIR Human Dimension Seminar . .on Tolerance
This seminar mandated by the Helsinki Concluding Document was
held on 16-20 November 1992 in Warsaw. It was the first of its
kind organized by the CSCE. It was decided by the Helsinki 
Follow Up Meeting that seminars would not produce a concluding 
document, therefore no documentation is available.
The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Early in April 1991 representatives of the participating States 
convened in Madrid to establish a 245 seat assembly of the CSCE. 
This assembly will convene annually in July at the site of the 
annual rotating meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers. 
Although there was no conscious decision to base the CSCE 
Assembly on any existing assembly the format comes closest to the 
North Atlantic Assembly, however, there is no formal linkage. 
Representation is by the determined in proportion to population 
of the individual State, and delegates are appointed by the 
governments of participating ^:^:as.ls It is essentially a 
debating chamber, sitting for one week, which can issue non­
binding declarations and recommendations. The State acting as
>®ibid p76.
'*In UK, after close cross party consultation, thirteen 
Parliamentarians were appointed. House of Commons Official Report 
15 June 1992. Hansard Vol.209 Col.356-7.
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host tt the annual sesembly will ssrvice it with a secretariat. 
The heads oO the atii-onal delegatio ns to CS CE wi 11 constitute a 
standing committee to manage the sessions. They will operate in 
accord with the CSCE principle of consensus. At the plenary 
sessions though, the principle of majority voting was adopted, 
thus removing the recourse to the veto by the participating
States prone to its use.-7
The Helsinki Review Follow Up Meeting confirmed the CSCE, as one 
pillar of the new European security architecture. The tass new,
which falls to the Committee of Senior Officials, is pursue tt
strengthen those procedures.
Table II outlines the new structure of the CSEE."("
"’"The Washington Post 4 April 1991:see also Estrella R. "The 
CSCE and the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly" NATO REVIEW 
1991 No.5 pp23-26. ;




CHAPTER SIX : THE CSCE STOCKHOLM 1992
Beyond Institutionalization
Stockholm December 1992
As pointed out in the preceding chapter The Concluding Document
The Challenges of Change which emanated from the Helsinki Review 
Meeting set the policy for the new era. It conferred upon the 
CSCE a "variety of tools...., to make it more operationally 
effective and solution oriented in the face of mounting in­
stabilities . ”The Third Meeting of the Council of Ministers
held at Stockholm in December 1992 set the new institutional
provisions in operation.
The Stockholm Meeting was Chaired by the Swedish Foreign Minister 
who holds the position of Chairman in Office until the Rome 
Meeting of CSCE Ministers in November 1993. Agreement was 
reached to welcome the Republics of Czech and Slovak as par­
ticipating States. They were to become individual members from 
1 January 1993 when they formaILly separattd. A 1 etter 9 f 9 ommit- 
ment to CSCE principles fifom each government was 9 irculated 9 o 
all participating States at Stockholm. Membership of the CSCE 
now stands at fifty three. The formal title of the document 
which was released after the Stockholm Meeting is; Summary of 
Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting : Shaping a New
Europe - The Role of the CSCE" ::;s
■Inttevention by U.S. Secretary of State,Eagleburger L. 
to the CSCE Council of Ministers, Stockholm, 14 December 1992.





Only the issues appertaining to the future structure of the CSCE 
will be discussed below, Although Annexe I outlines all topics 
covered in the document.
High Commissioner National Minorities (HCNM)
The appointment of the HCNM Mr Max van der Stoel was confirmed. 
His remit is to "analyze carefully potential areas of ten- 
sion...to enhance political solutions in line with the CSCE 
principles and commitments.”-’ The HCNM is responsible for 
selecting his own tasks, his priority task is to address the 
problem of Russian minorities in the Baltics.
Evolution of the CSCE Structures and Institutions
Since its instigation by the Paris Charter the Committee of 
Senior Officials has developed into the central decision and 
administrative making body of the CSCE. Various factors have
culminated, however, to make it a rather unwieldy body. Every
few weeks the Committee of Senior Officials face an immense
agenda; there is no permanent representation; and the institu­
tions are sited in three capitals, resulting in the lack of a 
central core of responsibility. The Stockholm meeting addressed
these issues.
The first step in strengthening the operational capabilities of 
the CSCE was the decision to appoint a Secretary General. Based
-Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting





on a UK initiative the Secretary General will derive "his/her 
authority from the collective decisions of the participating 
States acting under the guidance of the Chairman in Office."
As the CSCE Chief Administration Officer the Secretary General 
will act as the representative of the Chairman in Office and 
support all activities aimed at fulfilling the goals of the CSCE. 
S/he will assume overall responsibility for the management of all 
CSCE structures and operations including the CSCE, the CPC 
Secretariats and the ODIHR. The preparation of meetings and the 
implementation of the decisions of those meetings also fall 
within the Secretary General's remit, in addition to any extra 
functions entrusted to her/him by the Council or the Committee of 
Senior Officials. The appointment is to be made by the Council., 
subject to agreement by consensus, for a period of three years 
with a possible extension of a further two years, allowing for a 
maximum of five years in office. Under the auspices of the 
Secretary General both the CSCE Secretariat and the CPC Secretar­
iat in Vienna are to come under a single organizational struc­
ture ,
The Committee of Senior Officials weer chhrged by the Council 
with the task of reviewing the structures and operational 
practices of CSCE with a view to improving its operational 
capacity to meet new challenges. To increase the ability of the 
Committee of Senior Officials to act as agents of the Council 





instructed to meet weekly between sessions of the Committee of 
Senior Officials. Dubbed the "Vienna group" and drawn from 
ambassadorial level, they will organize the agendas for the 
Committee of Senior Officials meetings thus providing a measure 
of permanent representation.
A group of legal and other experts have been commissioned to 
report to the Committee of Senior Officials to enable them,the 
CSO, to "consider the relevance of an agreement granting an 
internationally recognized status to the CSCE Secretariat, the 
CPC and ODHIR," before the Rome meeting at the end of this year.-* 
Coupled with this, paragraph eight clearly sets out the intention 
to strengthen further contact with other relevant
international organizations, especially the United Nations.
To this end the Committee of Senior Officials are instructed to
explore further the,
[Plractical implications of the understanding, ex­
pressed in the Helsinki Document 1992, that the CSCE is 
regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of 
the Charter of the United Nations.*
The Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr Boutros Boutros
Ghali, has already called for a stronger role for regional
'"There is no general agreement on international immunities 
which grants immunity to inntitutions. So this is taken to mean 
internationally recognized s^atu ounce Article 105 of the UN 
Charter adopted by the General Assembly in February 1946, which 
provided for "diplomatic immunity for persons and property. Me 
Clgnahatan G.V. Diplomatic Immunity Hurst & Co London 1989 pp76- 
83 .
'"Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting :





associations in support of international peace and security. In 
addition he suggested that the CSCE should seek observer status
at the United Nations. It has been agreed that the United 
Nations representative of the participating State holding Council
Office shall attend to the interests of CSCE at the United
Nations.e'
These two directives, along with the appointment of the Secretary 
General, and the setting up of the "Vienna group," may be the 
precursor to the CSCE becoming a treaty based organization, by, 
for example, registering the Helsinki Final Act and all subse­
quent documentation with the United Nations. These documents set 
out the CSCE view of how States ought to behave, rather than how 
they are conttacted to behave. Tt^zi^ was one of the strengths of 
CSCE dnrinn the EEst--Wess division of Europe. In terms of the 
future of CSCE it It worth noting the view that,
The instiLtut ional izat ion of the CSCE can hardly succeed 
if the CSCE Charter remains c legally non binding 
political agreement.7
This returns to the argument tet out by Bloed (see ppl47w8),whIce 
deemt that a commitment does not have to be legally binding, 
rather the binding force resides in the legal consequences 
attached to the legally binding force. Two things follow from 
this in the new security tihuatnon in Europe. The 1992 Helsinki
^United Nations Document NS/31/92 September 1992.
'zBeauh H "From Collective Self Defence to a Collective





Document expressly states that there are matters that are of,
(Dlirect and legitimate concern to all participating 
States and do not belong exclusively to the internal 
affairs of the State concerned.*3
This is perhaps an indication that movement is taking place 
toward a consensus on what constitutes illegitimate behaviour in 
international relations. Secondly, all treaties signed have, 
either overtly or covertly, an optout clause. When n State oo a
State ' s actors wish to renege on
States will purely in their own
f a c t o r compounds the need to
international law of mandatory
what is deemed to be illegitimate
treaty commitments they act as 
Interest. Perhaps this latter
move toward the inclusion in
sanctions, set in statute, for
behaviour.
The CSCE Forum for Security and Non-Proliferation
The.. Council Ministers welcomed the constructive work begun by the 
Forum for Security and Non-Proliferation. They urged that the 
CSCE contribute to the concept of non-proliferation by all 
participating States becoming original signatories to hhe 
"Convention on the prohibition of the development. Production, 
Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruc­
tion" when it opens for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993.' 
Ministers of participating States not yet parties to the "Conven­
tion on Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons or the Geneva Conven * 4
‘"Cm 2092 Challenges of Change p5
'Signed to date by 143 States:International Herald Tribune





tlon of 1925 on prohibition of chemical and Biological Weapons in
War" recorded their willingness to do so. in addition Ministers 
of non-nuclear weapon States not yet parties to the Treaty on the 
"Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" pledged to become parties
to that treaty without delay.
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
The work of Hans Correl, Ambassador of Sweden, came to fruition 
with the presentation for signature of the Convention on Con­
ciliation and Arbitration, within the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes Mechanism (see Annexe ii). This document both follows 
up and extends the participating States commitment under the 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (PSD) principle of the Helsinki 
Final Act of 1975, Principle V. it builds on previous work of 
the CSCE, in particular the Vienna Concluding Document, the 
Charter of Paris, the 1991 Valletta report on Peaceful Settlement 
of Disputes, and the Helsinki Document 1992.'*
Because of widely differing views, two previous attempts to draft 
the convention had failed. The first break-through came with 
Valletta 1991 (which was subsequently endorsed by the first 
Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Berlin in June 1991). 
The main factor accommodating this break-through was a change in 
political will caused by the two contributory factors of the





crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the Gulf ear. Consequently for 
the first time in the history of the CSCE, at Stockholm, a 
legally binding document subject to ratification was presented 
for signature. Twenty nine participating states signed and the 
document is open to signatories until the end of March 1993.
The new body to be known as "the Court" will meet in Geneva.
Articles 3 and 4, respectively, set out the procedure for
appointing conc iliators and arbitrators. Each participating
State, within two months following the entry into force of the
Convention, is required to appoint two conciliators , only one of
whom need be a national of the particular State. One arbitrator 
and one alternative are required to be appointed, and they can be
either nationals or non-nationals.11 The tribunals will be set
up on a case by case basis, therefore they will be ad hoc rather 
than permanent.
There are four annexes to the document:-
1 Modification to Section V of the Valletta Provisions for a
CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
2 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE
3 Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission
4 Provisions for Directed Conciliation
1 - Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, Stockholm 






The modification to Valletta Is In essence a speeding up of that 
mechanism, by reducing, from three months to two, the time allo­
cated to allow parties to a dispute to either agree or establish 
a Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
ConcIliatIon
In the event of a dispute a participating State which ns a 
signatory to thnt document, must enter Into conciliation, if 
conciliation Is deemed necessary by a third party. The hened 
party can be one of the parties to the dispute or several. 
parties acting jointly. The offending party does not have to 
accept the findings of the Court, unless prior commitment Is made 
to do so, however, If they do not accept the findings of the 
Court then the matter goes for further deliberations to the
Committee of Senior Officials.
Arbitration
The Arbitration procedure can only be acdvated with the consent 
of the parties to the dispute. The parties are bound by any 
ruling heah follows. The .Impoehast factor In the new mechanism, 
which existing mechanisms, for example the International Court of 
Justice, do not have, is the Involvement of a third party, which
under certain conditions the Valletta Mechanism makes man­
datory.
'"‘The Concluding Document of the Valletta Meeting of 
January-February 1991 outlines the "CSCE Dispute Mechanism "
This Mechanism is designed to be used for interstate disputes. 





The ooiginal pi^pse. of hhi 1975 Helsinki Conference was to prov­
ide a substittte £oo a WW 11 pecce ttraty which was nnvee ssennd 
because of the division of Germany. The Soviets settled for a 
document guaranteeing the post war borders which in effect
recognized two German States. The US was not; ppetieclaery iineer 
ested at that time, the CSCE agreements were seen by some as a 
sellout. It was considered that the pledges did not even pay lip 
service to the principles of democracy. However, the emphasis on 
human rights by CSCE has helped toward tht ssllodeeSeuuCeen ef 
communism, leaving the way open to address the collective. In 
the opinion of Hans Correl, one of the architects of the Con­
ciliation . .. and . . Arbitration . Convention, a State cca aadrees ecolee- 
tive security only after it can guarantee tht ienreierul sseuriiy 
through human rights.
These are the tools that will enable the CSCE to take the lead in
Europe as a regional collective security system. Table III maps 
out the organizational structure of the new institution. The 
task now is for the participating States to focus on the things 
the CSCE can do most c00ectivcey, to make use of and thereby 
strengthen those procedures.
resolve peaceably a dispute between them, to enlist the assis­
tance of a third party or parties, from a register of mechanism 
candidates to be set up, to enable them to do so.
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The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the 5’S:Soviet Empire marked a sea change in the conduct of international 
affairs. The reverberations shook the very foundations of the 
set order in Europe, plunging Europe and the world into an





initial euphoria gave rise to visionary speeches outlining a 
world order. Concurrently with preparations for an overseas
war in the Gulf, President George Bush said,
tWle stand today 
ment... out of 
order can emerge:
at a unique and extraordinary mo- 
these troubled times,... a new world 
a new era in which the nations of the 
world, east and west, north and south can prosper and 
live in harmony... a world where nations recognize the 
shared responsibility for freedom and justice... where 
the strong respect the rights of the weak.®
However, as the Warsaw Pact splintered removing the old order of 
division into blocs, the newly democratizing states of Central/ 






nonplussed and confounded by the scale and implications of the
1
x"Thoughts on Perpetual Peace" cited in Hinsley F.H.
Power and the Pursuit of Peace .Ca mbridge,CUP 19 88.p62.
“President George Bush, from text of address given to joint 
Session of Congress 11 September 1990."The New World Order:an 
analysis and document collection" United States Informatlon 





change. Amid the euphoria, the newly democratizing states 
acclaimed the CSCE as the ideal support structure and umbrella 
framework under which to build a new European security order.
The Warsaw Treaty members formalized their views in the Moscow 
Declaration of 7 June 1990 by calling for the overcoming of the 
division of Europe and the institutionalization of the CSCE 
process.0 Since the CSCE had from its inception been regarded as 
a propaganda tool of the soviet Union the response of the West to 
this suggestion initially was guarded.
As chaos reigned in the Soviet Union interest waxed and waned to 
such an extent that the newly democratizing States, alarmed at 
the prospect of being caught in a growing security vacuum, turned 
to NATO which they perceived as the Alliance with a proven track 
record. Whatever the cause: be it inertia, institutional self­
preservation, the powerful military industrial lobby,or simply 
natural caution, NATO dallied when faced with the removal of its 
raison d'etre. Apparently intent on maintaining the role it had 
played prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall NATO seemed to be 
caught in a state of paralysis seeking nothing but adherence to 
the status quo."
'Disarmament Vol. XIII No.4 of the United Nations,
"Carpenter T.G. A, Search for Enemies Americas Alliances 





At the CSCE Paris Summit in Nevembe r 1 9,0, ehe Airerican s were 
wary of attempts to turn the CSCE conference process inCo ac 
organization that would provide security guarantees for its
members and eclipse NATO. Tyee frarnt atet toho wod0d gin0n to 
assume a predominantly or even a solely European identity if 
former communist States were admitted to membership. A leaked 
Pentagon Document outlining the United States strategic goals for 
the post Cold War eea put it momo sucuinctly. ”we must seek to 
prevent the emergence of European on]^^ security arrangements
which would undermine NATO.-"’
By the Rome NATO Summit of November 1111, which finalized the New 
Strategic Concept it was recognised that "the security of every 
state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours."^' 
However, President Bush revealed Amennen hesfhaOce n ever ehe 
idea of a new world order when he iniicated, hhat the old NATO
Alliance must remain the key to the security interest of the 
UcnhTd Stahec and Europe.
[Slecurity interests of the UcihTd States and Europe 
were indivisible and therefore the Atlantic Alliance 
could not be replaced "even in the long run"^
•’’The Ray of Hope the US Tried to Kill" European 26 March
1112 .
"The Alliances's ShvahTgio Concept. November 1111.
NATO Icfarvahiac Service Brussels.






Yet to envisage a new world order, the foundation of which was 
not laid anew in Europe, would be futile leading to nothing but
dison^t^i:.
As the situation developed, the expansion of the CSCE process, 
"to provide a strong pan-European forum, including security 
matters, that would accommodate Soviet interests," as well as the 
radical rethink of NATO doctrine, and early p rogress in thie CFE 
negotiations at Vienna, were a 11 pairt o f t he d eel atmuR, ( ii the 
margins of the First CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting at Berlin
in June 1991) between the Soviets and tte Wee^ to enable a
unified Germany to have full membership of NATO.- Despite the 
expectation that a truly transformed NATO with pan European 
security aspirations would reach out to "the countries of the 
East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to 
them the hand of frinseetie^,r, hliere was no radical rethink of 
NATO's position in the Europe's security architecture at this 
stage. The implicit message was that there would be no new NATO 
membrss.'-"’ In the meantime the rapid rate of change in the
Ciedepsedsnr 5 June 199 0.
"The London ,, Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic
Alliance 5-6 July 1990; NATO REVIEW 1990 No.4pp32-3.
:LO Despite Article 10 of the NATO Treaty which expressly 
permits this.
See also: Croft S. "Nato and Nuclear Strategy" Security and 
Strategy in the New Europe Ed. Colin McIeees.Rourledge London 
1992 ppll2-125.
Roth Senator William, Challenged,^ Sse.Res.90 
NATO's changes as "just cosmetic" due to a "general desire at 





political environment, which was accelerated by the post coup
implosion of the Soviet Union, caused the security anxieties
of the newly democratizing States of Central/Eastern Europe to
become acute. It became clear that these anxieties had to be
addressed in some way. The next step toward meeting the desires 
of the States caught in the developing security vacuum was
outlined in November 1991 in the NATO Rome Declaration on Peace
and Cooperation. * x =•
This document applauded the commitment of the Soviet Union and 
the other States of Central and Eastern Europe to political and 
economic reform and, based on the "conviction that our own 
security Is inseparably linked to that of all other States in 
Europe" proffered all practical assistance with the transition 
involved in these reforms. The "practical assistance" constituted 
the development of a new institution to further this new era of 
partnership. As a consequence The North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) x::s was spawned, adding to the gamut of existing 
institutions, vying to manage the "new" security architecture of 
Europe (TaiblelV) . This development seemed to challenge the
increasingly unable to address the challenges posed by a radical­
ly new global security system.Thus Nato is increasingly marginal­
ized in situations that should lie well within its competence..."
x x NATO Information Service.
’•“j-ronour^ced nack-see to avoid confusion with the North 
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widespread view that the new structure outlined for CSCE in the 
Charter of Paris would allow the CSCE to crystalize, and become 
an effective pan-European body able to act to cement together the 
former enemies of forty years of ideological conflict. It 
appeared as though, despite the bargain struck at Berlin,the 
CSCE’s moment had come and gone (see p242).
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was proposed by The North 
Atlantic Assembly in November 1990 and this proposal was sup­
ported by US Secretary of State Baker and Herr Genscher, then 
Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was 
decided that interaction in this new forum should take place 
annually at ministerial ’ level with the North Atlantic Council, 
and bimonthly at ambassadorial level. NACC ministerial meetings
or those at ambassadorial level were to be to convened as often
"as circumstances warrantThe goal was to promote "a Europe 
whole and free" by embracing a broader aspect of security that 
encompasses the" political, economic, social and environmental 
aspects as well as defence, "through interlocking institutions 
such as the"CSCE, the At1antic Alliance, the EC, the WEU and the 
Council of E uropeMembership cat the inaugural meeting in
December 1991 included the NATO members en bloc as well as the
^From text of the statement delivered at the inaugural 
meeting of NACC,by the Secretary Manfred worner North Atlantic 
__ gau.hg.ll__ Statement__ on___ Dialogue,..gto.tofeosTlr... and







Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania and the 
Representative of the Soviet Union. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kyrgyz^^, Moldova, Tajikistan.'1'"' Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Ubeknstae all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) enrolled at an Extraordinary Meeting of NACC held reoee 
months later at the NATO Headquarters on 10 March 1992. The 
accession of Albania and Georgia gave' a membership of thirty 
seven. Kazakhstan, although not rerreseeree at this meeting, 
indicated its intention to participate in future meetings.*"
At first sight it is difficult to understand why NACC was born. 
From the begining NATO's position had been that the West should 
hold on to, and make use of existing institutions rather than 
"invent airy fairy new ones which would only spawn new bureauc­
racies (":lz Yet two years after ' "the Wall" crumbled, and one 
year after the signing of the Charter of Paris, and just six 
months before the Helsinki Review FUM, NATO members themselves 
created, seemingly gratuitously, a new institution the membership 
of which almost completely overlapped with membership of the
CSCE .
'va represented by the Russian Delegate.
"'Pitots Communique from Statement issued at the Extraordi­
nary Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperarion Council 10 Mioch 
1992.





On the one hand, however, NACC has served as a useful vehicle to 
push through the ratification process, without renegotiation, of 
the CFE Treaty signed at Paris in 1990(see p200). Following the
implosion of the Soviet Union the ratification of the CFE treaty 
was caught in limbo, because understanding the Treaty, and 
grappling with the reapportioning of equipment were, for the 
successor States, mammoth tasks. In the nuclear field NACC 
handled the redeployment of former Soviet nuclear weapons; 
attempting to ensure the implementation of agreements vis-a-vis 
the transfer and destruction of weapons on the territory of the 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In addition, discussions aimed 
at preserving the integrity on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) have 
taken place. Seminars held within the NACC forum offer NATO 
expertise in defence/military related matters to NATO's former 
opponents
On the other hand, the creation of NACC did not remove the 
aspirations of some States to join NATO for two reasons. First 
because although NACC was designed to provide some sense of 
collective security it did not concede the specific commitment of 
military support against aggression which members of NATO enjoy. 
Secondly, membership does not include the NNA States.
NACC is not generally regarded as having a glowing future.
Overtime it will either be absorbed into the CSCE’s European





Security Forum, or the States that accede to ohh EC will accede 
to membership of the WEU. Others will rely, with Western help on 
expertise, on unilateral trraogemeohs as Switzerland and Finland 
have done over the yer^.3--5’ Heweve r, En Ostwh 19 E3 ^anand 
requested observer statut at NACC meeeings - an indication 
perhaps that the perception of the security climate Tas changed 
so dramatically that independent self-defence security arrange­
ments no longer suffice. What the creahino of NACC Tas done is 
retain the sTort-term European security debate securely within
the ambit of the EC States and WEU and NATO.
The Current Debate
The current debate, cectnes on which inn111tition can best meet 
the requirements of the new European security order. The key 
players the EC, the WEU, NATO and the CSCE in Europe, and in the 
wider context the United Nations, all appear as part of the old 
order vying to manage the "new" security architecture of Europe.
A key feature of the current debate is the Atlanticist versus 
Europeanist argument which continues on botlr sides of the
Atlantic. It reflects the bemusement surrounding the question of 
the extent of United States participation in the new European 
security architecture, among those who on the one hand deem the 
United States presence within NATO as vital to the maintenance of 
European security and those, on the other hand, who see the 
future security of Europe as a wholly European responsibility





vested within the WEU, and under the umbrella of the new European 
Union as prescribed the Treaty on European Union of February 
1992. After the CSCE Paris Summit in November 1990, Gianni De 
Michelis, the Italian Foreign Minister, warned that in respect of 
the reorganization of European security "there is bound to be 
overlapping and confusion" and that "we'll be in a transitional 
stage for at least three or four more years." Nearly four
years into the post wall era the search for a new security system 
is still dogged by overlap and confusion.
The European Community
By 1949 Europe was divided into specific economic systems. As
1993 begins the political earthquake that erupted in 1989 is
still volcanic, and this in turn has been one factor challenging
the Twelve's aspirations to closer integration. The end of the
Cold War has generated a number of questions about the United
States' position in Europe, as well as questions about the future
role and policy of Russia, resulting in the relative weakening of
both States influence in Europe. The converse of this decline has
given rise to questions as to whether the Twelve can increase
their relative power. Given the new developments some have argued
It is ludicrous to suggest that a cora^unU^^... with a 
GDP of nearly $6 trillion... cannot manage problems 
that arise from disorder in Eastern Europe or defend 
itself from threats that might emanate from sources 
outside the European region.5®






The Treaty on European Union is intended to take further the in­
tegrative process of the EC, and when ratification is complete,
amends the Treaty of Rome, adding a security component to the
European Union. Instead, to paraphrase Gaddis, the forces of 
integration have caused a measure of disintegegtion,22 It would 
appear that the EU is facing problems with cohesion. New members 
or potential new members of the European Union are to be afforded 
membership of, or association with the WEU. Ireland, currently 
not a member of any military alliance hhs already ratified the 
Treaty on European Union and has taken on observer status in the 
WEU. The Danes successfully negotiated, at the December 1992 
Edinburgh European Council Meeting, an opt-out from the develop­
ments in the defence field contained in the Treaty. If some 
States remain outside the European Union's security dimension, it 
is likely to reduce the European Union's cohesion, which in turn 
will Impair its ability to deal effectively with salient issues 
involving European security. The handling of the situation in 
the former Yugoslavia can be cited as evidence of this assertion. 
In the meantime it would appear that the EU, whatever the nature 
of its security dimension, will lack the cohesion, will and 
instruments to provide stability in Europe. This is so, not 
simply because of the many internal and external cross pressures 
facing it, but also because of the complexities of the issues
involved.







The WEU is a wholly European grouping and for this reason it is 
favoured by the French who have long harboured antipathy toward 
the Atlantic influence of the Alliance (see pp21-2).
The UK accepts that the WEU has a role as a useful bridge between 
NATO and the EC, because it includes France, which still remains 
outside the NATO integrated command structure. The Treaty on 
European Union highlights the Alanticist v Europeanist debate 
because it includes a substantive commitment to strengthen the 
WEU the implication being that a more powerful WEU can be 
consistent with NATO. The Treaty on European Union, however, also 
left unresolved, pending a further review of the issue in 1996­
1998, the substantive question of the Atlanticist versus Europ­
eanist debate, and the longer term relationship between WEU and 
NATO. Currently there are substantial rivalries between the WEU 
and NATO, and in practice the WEU defers to Nato’s procedures, 
infrastructures and command systems to carry out any operation,as 
a consequence the WEU is impotent without NATO's good offices. 
The real question is - can WEU be separate from Nato? It is also 
a moot point if, in the long-term, the WEU would suffice as a 
security/defence structure acceptable to Eastern States because 
of its pro-German stance, and lack of US input.
Perhaps most importantly the continual existence of both NATO and 
the WEU causes overlap in membership and competences, and such





effective defence. TTe current Secretary General of WEU, Willem 
Van Eekelen, himself is under no illusion that the WEU is on 
short tenure, and th.at the recent transfer of WEU1 s headquarters 
from London to Brussels will speed up its demise.-0
NATO
NATO's raison d’etre since 1949, Tas been to use Lord Ismay's 
aphorism, "To keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the 
Russians out." Forty three years later work is underway within 
NATO to reorient the alliance to enable it to meet the challenges 
and needs of the new security situation.
Nato is not an international actor in its own right, therefore, 
this restructuring is taking place because NATO's member States 
themselves see the need for change. Manfred W’oner has recently 
argued that,
[0]f all existing loherottlootl organizations NATO 
remains the only one which can guarantee the security 
of its member countoies(sic) against all military 
threats to their secoi tty.:"*
This is a truism only if one accepts that principally NATO is a 
military alliance and that military threats are the central 
deshabllzlog factor in today's world. But there maybe little 
point in securing sixteen member states within a narrow geograph­
ical area if forces of instability which affect their security
"^^ConveHeatioo with Malcolm Mackintosh sometime adviser on 
Soviet affairs to Prime Minister Thatcher,





rage on their periphery. If NATO wishes to be more than a 
military alliance, it will require to re-examine many features of 
its functions, and its membership.
On NATO's own admission its security guarantees could not be 
given without the good offices of the United States. However, the 
one certainty which must be faced is that there is no surety 
that, in the longer term, the United States will continue its 
current commitment to European security or be willing to involve 
itself in disputes which are perceived to have lietle relevance 
to vital United States' security innteests.ts io would seem 
prudent therefore to build up collective security processes 
within a European framework.
The NATO Foreign Ministers, took a step forward in this direc­
tion, when at their NAC meeting in Oslo in June 1992, they 
adopted a resolution making troops available to CSCE for future 
peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. A press release
stated,





to support,^! a case by case basis in 
our own procedures^eacekeepingthe responsibility of the CSCE, 
available alliance resources and
-"5Gaddis J. argues that the juxtaposition of economic and 
political forces that are shaping the. modern world suggest the 
need for more serious thinking about where US security interests 
lie. op.cit.p212.
Times London 5 June 1992.pl.
See also Statement issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic 





This resolution was adopted in the light of the decision taken at 
the Prague Council Meeting of 1992 that the CSCE should not be 
burdened with raising,training and equippigg forces for peaceke­
eping operations. The Oslo decision marks a move away from 
"the out of area" problem that has dogged NATO since its incep­
tion but which is, as one eminent writer avers, simply super­
structure.®^ United States Secretary of State, Eagleburger 
evinced the extent of the change in the following statement,which 
has strong overtones of Senator Roth's proposals (see f/nlO).
Nato must now become effective in helping to resolve 
peaceably the different but multiple conflicts which 
threaten European stability in the post cold war 
era... Let me make it clear in this respect that the 
United States is prepared to make essential con­
tributions ,such as lift and logistics,to peace keeping 
operations
NATO's readiness and willingness to re-examine its role and 
function, even under the auspices of the CSCE, marks its metamor­
phosis from a military alliance devoted to the collective defence 
of its members to an international regional security organization 
concerned with the wider issues of security in Europe and beyond. 
Its raison d'etre has already changed in all but name.
As the circle has turned the CSCE, which was considered from the 
outset to be a Soviet propaganda tool to undermine NATO now
•'zHowaad M.avers that the only obligations of the North 
Atlantic Treaty are contained in Article 3,4,5, everything else 
was negotiated separately."The remaking of Europe" Survival 1990 
Vol.XXXII No2 pl04.





becomes a key player in Nato's raison d'etre. Without NATO there 
would not have been a CSCE process. However, within that process, 
because negotiations were to be conducted "outside the military = 
alliances"(see p40), NATO had to step aside from its pre-process 
role. Twenty years later it has re-entered the arena with a 
complete change in role, a role inextricably bound to the CSCE.
Looking to the Future 3
The political, social and economic changes which ended the Cold 
War, and redrew the political map in Europe, have, largely 
inadvertently, thrown up security risks from a multiplicity of
' -7
different sources. Given the potential consequences of these
risks don~tnvpivemedt in the maintenance of international and
European peace and security is not an option for Europeans.
The United Nations, although no longer immobilised by the East- 2 
West confrontation, is pe^ccived by "Wesesinrde to fail more .z
often than it succeeds in the resolution of conflicts."'* In
some quarters the UN Secretary General Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali 
is perceived to be primarily concerned with championing 3rd World 
issues. His recent attempt to have CSCE monitor heavy weaponry
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of his keenness to divest the .
UN of responsibility. Dr Boutros Ghali's recent calls for 
regional associations to adopt a sStopnee rdl in support of 
international peace and security (sse ppp22--3) have been added to





by the new United States' administration. The United States 
being no longer willing to foot the bill, or play the unilateral 
role of world policemanPrraaps these developments herald the 
reapportioning of eompetenees among the international organiza­
tions. Although the UN is overstretched and grossly under­
funded, it also operates through a series of weak mandates, and 
is deemed to be "too slow and unreliable for Europe" 2932
What becomes clear is the need for a regional security organiza­
tion in Europe now. The necessity for the American decision to 
back the Owen/Vance peace plan for the former Yugoslavia confirms 
the view, that in the short term, no single European institution 
can hold the line in security matters in the current climate. The 
problem no longer is to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, 
and the Russians out. Lord Ismay's aphorism is now an anachronism 
The problem is identifying a credible overarching framework 
capable of keeping the Americans and the Russians in, accommodat­
ing the NNA States, and the emerging fragile democracies of the
former WTO.
Given this wider context, there is a need for a framework 
equipped to deal with the multiplicity of risks emanating from 
underdevelopment, population growth resource conflicts, religious
''President Clinton op.cit.p2.
Times London 5 August 1992 p9 8 August 1992.pl






fundamentalism from within and outwith Europe. In the short term 
the struggle is to maintain the ethos of the collective security 
approach. The newly democratizing States, in the short and 
perhaps even the medium term, will be content to follow Western 
Europe's lead in providing security while they build up their 
political and economic structures. In the longer term the rising 
power and status of Germany, both on the world scene and in 
Europe, will tilt the balance toward the continentalization of 
Europe.
In the longer term
Perusal o f the preceding chapters would indicate that the
progress o f t h e CSCE was directly related to the amount of
interest vested in by the participating States. In effect the
progress o f the CSCE varied according to the climate in the
international arena.
In times of confidence, such as the period of detente in the 
1970s, the greatest advances were achieved. Likewise, in times of 
disillusionment and uncertainty progress ground almost to a halt, 
as happened in the late 1970s when the superpowers returned to 
the policy of confrontation. During this period, although western 
Europe was not the focal point in the "new cold war," progress in 
the CSCE was affected nonetheless, only to be revived when the 





This reflects that the relationships existing between the major 
powers affect the international strategic environment, which in
turn determines how events evolve. In other words it must be
recognized that the future role of the CSCE depends entirely on 
how relations between states develop and where power is centered.
Implicitly, the Treaty on European Union undermines the concept 
of the territorial state as the base political unit in Western 
Europe,(wherein the concept of State first evolved). The Treaty 
constitutes a move away from the strict system of sovereign 
states to a European Union based on federative power. The 
European Union, by underpinning the latent federative power of 
Western Europe, could ensure that the new European security 
architecture will be stable, and thus restore the political 
stability which disappeared with the ending of the Cold War.
Despite the existing tensions within NATO it will form another 
pillar of the new edifice, supplying the expertise accumulated 
through joint exercises, and operating through the WEU and NACC 
(while they last), whilst making full use of the CSCE mechanisms 
which may avoid the necessity of deploying forces. Eventually 
NATO will find it necessary to extend its membership to comple­
ment its extended mission of building up collective security 
processes within a European framework. Furthermore,in the longer
term when the unifying process in Germany is completed, and if,as r






sional army comes to fruition/, Grrmany could provide the "lift 
and logistics" that the United States currently provides for 
NATO; thereby, allowing the real fusion of NATO and WEU. This 
could well be the logical outcome to Germany being required to 
play a greater role commensurate with its economic might, thus 
taking up the Bush administrations’s Invitation to Germany to 
become a "partner in leadership."'*
The region to the East of the unified Germany is for Western 
Europe a security nightmare, but the Eastern States involved in 
that nightmare are looking for a dream. As their efforts to 
establish liberal democracies come to fruition, there is a real 
danger that, if only the States that are deemed clubbable, namely 
those States most likely to fulfil the market requirements, are 
catered for, a psychological "wall" will replace the Berlin Wall 
thus continuing the division of Europe.
Since the ending of the Cold war military threats are no longer 
the central desOabltzing factor for most of Europe. Likewise the 
criteria for determining great powers has changed, relying more 
on economic rather than on military capability, removing military 
preparedness as the single most important power faator.'. The war 
in the former Yugoslavia, whether categorised as civil or tnOer-
"""International Herald Tribune 8 February 1*93 pi.
'* Muller S.& Schweigler G.From Occupation to Cooperation:
The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order.






state, is the precursor of many bitter ethnic conflicts in 
Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. It also indicates 
that in the final analysis there is no substitute for hard 
military power. However, no single dominant power will foster or 
be able to foster future security, thus enhancing the need to 
develop criteria and mechanisms for dealing with such situations.
The post-wall perception of security set out in paragraph 33 of
the Helsinki Document of 1992, has made clear that in the new
security situation in Europe,
Security is indivisible. No State in our CSCE com­
munity will strengthen its security at the expense of 
the security of other states.
Consequently,
[Blehaviour rather than architecture will be crucial, 
the architecture of the house is not so important, 
rather its the behaviour inside.®*5
This is where the CSCE can take the lead in Europe as a collec­
tive security structure because it can generate consensus. It 
involves five major entities that are sovereign rather than 
hegemonic entities viz the EC Twelve, the United States, Russia, 
the NNA States and the CIS, and it offers observer status to non­
participating interested parties. It is the most inclusive of 
all European institutions. It has been the instigator of security 
advances such as arms control and CSBM which will be continued in 
the European Security Forum. Institutionalization has equippedrI





it with powers of evaluation, an important tool with which to 
attain compliance. It transcends the Cold War and was an 
instrument in bringing about its demise. It has in the past been 
a forum for cooperation and dialogue in which "hangups about 
giving and hearing criticism about each other's behaviour have
been overcome."^ Since Stockholm the PSD mechanism has added 
powers of Arbitration and Conciliation to preventative diplomacy 
and political consultation through rapporteur missions, coupled 
with the containment of crisis if conflict were to breakout.
Through ODHIR the CSCE has powers to address wider issues such as 
minorities, drugs, and migration. Perhaps its crowning asset is 
that it maintains the confidence of the newly democratizing 
States, and Russia.
Joffe argues that in the last analysis institutions do not matter
in the absence of an "existential threat" or "existential foe."
He argues against the notion of collective security, averring 
that "nations in a collective security setting will not neces­
sarily band together against an aggreseor.”r f^ate^r they will 
follow national interest, and in his view struggle with this even 
when locked into an alliance. When a threat or foe does manifest 
itself States will behave as States will, they will act, and do 
act according to contra-causal laws. In others words, their
"^Ir^t^ctevenltion by UK Secretary of State Hogg at 3rd Council 
of Ministers Meeting Stockholm December 1992. /
3(>jof^e J."Collective Security and the Future of Europe" 





international behaviour is not determined, each State will decide 
autonomously to what extent they are obliged. The Gulf war is a 
good example of this. Despite intense and extensive persuasive 
diplomacy by the United States, of European States the UK was 
willing, France less so and the remainder lukewarm.
The central problem that the UN faces, namely the reaching of a 
wider consensus on what constitutes legitimate/illegitimate 
behaviour in the international arena, the grounds for outside 
intervention, and the setting in statute of penalties for such 
behaviour,(Prtnciple VI:see pl35-6), will also be a central 
problem for the CSCE, as it will for any regional organization.
The CSCE has proven both that States can be nurtured, and that in 
Churchill's words "to jaw jaw is better than to war war.""% The 
alternative to this is at best reversion to national defence, 
mutual suspicion, and the arms races of recent history, and at 
worst, for the weaker States, vulnerability to internal reaction­
ary forces. However, in the absence of a panacea for peace it 
can be argued that while there is no "existential threat" or 
"existential foe," securing an overarching pan-European security 
community through the CSCE would contribute significantly to
defuse the factors that cause "threats" and "foes" to manifest
themselves.
In the newly institutionalized CSCE the emphasis/is placed on the 
rejection of the zero sum game of exploitation and on respect for 
the vulnerabilities of participating States through preventive 
diplomacy. This makes the CSCE the only truly all European and





transatlantic forum with the potential to address and handle the 
broad security issues thrown up by the instability and uncertain­
ty in Europe, because the emphasis is placed on maintaining the 
collective approach while trying to widen the consensus as to 
what constitutes illegitimate behaviour in the international 
arena, aiming at a "Code of Conduct governing relations between 
states in the security field.".'" "The moral was to invest more 
ingenuity and will" into prevevUve diplomacy before states reach 
the stage where external inerffrrenc e become s ieevitbUe. •1 Per­
petual peace is, by the very nature of the international system,
an illusion. The demise of the Cold War has enabled the tool of
diplomacy to come centre stage only because its demise has legit­
imized the diplomatic system. The rational calculation and 
expectation of mutual benefit may dictate cooperation. Every­
thing hinges on the central question, "under what conditions will 
cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authori­
ty?" Axelrod comes to the conclusion that,
[Mlutual cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists 
without central control by starting with a cluster of 
individuals who rely on reciprocity ..::R
The role of the CSCE in the "new Europe" is to manage the challe­
nge of change which persists in no uncertain terms.
i
."’Hurd Rt Hon D. ’ 'Foreign Policy and International Security 
Rus i Journal December 1992 p2
.’"R.Hon Douglas Hurd. UN _ Document NS/33/92. September 1992. 
.."xelerd R."The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists."







and 8 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of 
on the Human Dimension of the CSCE July 1990.%-
■ 7
The participating States declare that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through 
periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government. 
The participating States will accordingly respect the right of their citizens to take part in the 
governing of their country, cither directly or through representatives freely chosen by them 
through fair electoral proct^sses. They recognize their responsibility to defend and protect, in 
accordance with their laws, their international human rights obligations and their international 
commitments, the democratic order freely established through the will of the people against the 
activities of persons, groups or organizations that engage in or refuse to renounce terrorism or 
violence aimed at the overthrow of that order or of that of another participating State.
To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the 
participating States will
7.1 hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law;
7.2 - permit all scats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested
in a popular vote;
7.3 guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens;
7.4 ensure that voees are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures and 
that they arc counted and reported honestly with the official results made public;
7.5 respect the right of citizens to seek political or pubic officei ir^dbik^t^alb.| or as
representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination:
7.6 respect the right ofindividuass and groups to establish, in full freedoms their own political 
parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and 
organizations with the necessary legal guar-arnees to enable them to compete with each 
other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities:
7.7 ensure that law and pubic pohcy vyprk to permit political campaigning to be condueeed 
in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor 
intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views and 
qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting 
their vote free of tear of retribution:
,7.8 provid^c thiat no ^^g^a.1 or ;^dnihis^i^^^he:i obostacle stands in the way of unimpeded access 
to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and indiv iduals 
wishing to participate in the electoral process:
7.9 ensure that candidaees who obtain the necessary number of voecs requrred bv law are 
duly installed in office and arc permitted to remain in office until their term expires or 
is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformitv with 
democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures.
The paftieipating Stiaees consider hat t the pieeenee ofobservers. both foreign anddomeshc, can 
enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. Thev therefore 
invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private 
inniuitions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national 
election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will afso endeavour to facilitatc 
simlar access for election proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will 
undertake not to interfere in the electoral prochedingr.”
=-Cm. 1464 Charter of Paris: Supplementary Document p21.
Annexe II
14-15 December Stockholm: 3rd COUNCIL OF 
FOREIGN MINISTERS
* Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm 
Council Meeting., Shaping a New Europe - Tine 
Role of the CSCE (T)
- Regional Issues
. Former Yugoslavia 
. The Baltic States 
. Moldova 
. Georgia
. Conflict dealt with by the Conference on 
Nagorno-Karabakh
. The Republic of Tajikistan
- The CSCE as a Community of Values
- High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(The Council appoints Mr. Max van der Stoel)
- Peaceful Settlement of Dssputes
. Adopts measures to enhance the procedure 
for selecting Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
. Adopts the text of a Convention on 
Conciliation and Arbitration, and declares it 
open for signatures by interested
participating states (29 participating states 
sign during the Stockholm meeting)
. Adopts conciliation procedure as an option 
available to participating on the basis of 
agreements ad hoc, or, in advance, on the 
basis of reciprocal declarations
. Decides that the Council or CSO may direct 
any two participating states to seek 
conciliation to assist them in resolving a 
dispute
- The CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation 
and Non-Proliferation
- Preventative diplomacy and peacekeeping
- Evolution of CSCE structures and institutions
- Improved co-operation and contacts with 
international organizations in particular the 
United Nations
- Integration of new participating States
- Admission of new participating States 
. The Czech Republic
- The Slovak Republic
- Date and venue of the next Council Mieeting: 
November/December 1993, Rome
* The Secretary General of the CSCE {Council 
establishes the post, mandates duties (annex)}
* Management of Resources (annex)
* Letter of accession of new participating states
(annex)
o All approved texts arc available in the six working languages 
of the CSCE (English, French, Gcrman, Italian, Russian, 
Spanish), with the exception of mission reports which arc 




THE EEACEFOIL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WHTEtlN THE CSCE 
A BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE STUGKSKUiM CONVENTION
At ■the meeting ot the CSCE Council of Ministers in Stockholm on 
14—15 December 1992, the Council is expected to adopt a 
Convention which will be open for signature in Stockholm. The 
Convention is ' based, on what was orvginaeey a French -German 
proposal, but it will be called the "Stockholm Convention" since 
it Is to be signed here- The Convlnnvon has been prepared at a 
meeting of a group of experts in Geneva in October 1992, and 
me^otiations were conducted in a working party under Swedish 
chairmanship (Kr Hans Corell, the Under—Secretary for Legal and 
Consular Affairs) - .
The proposed Coneennion constitutes one aspect of an extensive 
programme drawn up within the CSCE for the peaceful settlemppt of 
disputes. In principle, it contains two sections covering 
conciliation and arbitration. The new body will be called "the 
Court", although it will not be a permanent court but rather a 
system with conciliators and arbitrators appointed in advance, 
who can then be called in to perform their duties. Hence, 
conciliation commissions and arbitration tribunals will be. set up 
for individual cases on an "ad hoc" basis.
A dispute between two or more states may always be subject to a 
conciliation procedure under the Convention on the application of 
one of the parties or as a result of joint action on the part of 
several parties. However, a eoneveianion proposal will not be 
binding on the parties, unless they have made a specific 
commit^ent to be bound by the proposal. If a party does not 
loyally participate in the procedure, the matter will be reported 
to the CSCE.
The arbitration tribunal can only commence its work if the ’ 
parties have agreed to this — either generally or in the specific 
case. A ruling pronounced fy an - arbitration nvVbunae is always 
binding on the parties.
An important issue is how the costs of the Court are to met. This 
question will be regulated in a "finance protocol" which is 
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